Social Service Contracting: International Experience and China Practice

In China, social service contracting is a new phenomenon even in the most developed cities and areas. The action that the government contracts with non-government organizations in delivering community service is merely a local initiative under the context of social administration reform. There are scarce theoretical and empirical discussions relevant to social service contracting in Chinese academic community. In the light of this gap, this article draws on literature of social service contracting in developed countries or cities to understand key elements ensuring an effective contracting and impacts of contracting. Available literature on social service contracting in China is used for discussion to understand the development of social service contracting in China. Public and social services contracting in China can be briefly divided into three models: non-competitive contracting model, competitive contracting model and informal contracting model. Factors influencing the implementation of contracting programs in China are concerned with the participation of sufficient NGOs, the roles and attitudes of government agencies and the relationship and the interaction between stakeholders. The contracting programs both have positive and negative impacts on service provision.

The Impact of Different Public Contracting Management Models on the Inputs and Outcomes of Local Public Services

Many empirical studies have found that local public contracting reduces the inputs and outcomes of public services. However, few studies have examined what factors are associated with such inputs and outcomes. To address the limitation, this study conceptualizes two competing contracting management models (competitive and cooperative) and empirically tests the associations between these contracting approaches and service inputs and outcomes. The findings report that while local governments using competitive contracting elements have lower service inputs through reduced local operating expenditures and part-time employment; cooperative contracting elements do not necessarily produce enhanced service outcomes.

The coercive laws of competition in a neoliberal era: the case of forestry in Costa Rica

Market-oriented forms of conservation are believed to deliver enhanced efficiency in ecosystem management. This greater efficiency is derived from the introduction of competitive mechanisms in resource governance. Market competition, however, produces new social relations that can alter the division of benefits between various actors within the economy and present opportunities for accumulation. The consequent gains in efficiency are not necessarily equitably distributed. Furthermore, the introduction of competition can erode cooperative arrangements designed to assist the poor and politically marginal. Drawing on theories of the 'coercive laws of competition', I seek in this article to understand how competitive structures compel actors to behave in ways that put profit before social or environmental responsibility and encourage self-interested behavior. I explore these ideas in the context of Costa Rican forest conservation, showing that competitive contracting in private forest management has resulted in an uneven distribution of benefits and a comparative advantage for larger landowners. In addition, I also re-think the 'coercive laws' for a neoliberal era.Keywords: competition, neoliberalism, conservation, markets, efficiency, PES

Involving the third sector in local service delivery in Bangladesh: Why and how?

The rise of involuntary and non-government efforts to deliver services in Bangladesh has opened the way for local government units to involve many community and voluntary organisations (CVOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs)– collectively described as the ‘third sector’ – in delivering local services. This article attempts to set out how the third sector can be incorporated into the stream of local service delivery. It analyses the rationale behind the engagement of the third sector in this area. It also looks at suitable mechanisms to enable local government institutions (LGIs) and third sector organisations to meet community objectives seamlessly, transparently and fairly. During the last two decades or so, many third sector organisations have collaborated with public sector organisations including LGIs regardless of any specific long term strategies. To involve the third sector in local service delivery there should be some clear cut standard procedures, strategies including commissioning, partnership, competitive contracting and co-production. The article concludes that, given the current situation of LGIs in Bangladesh, only co-production is a suitable mechanism for incorporating the third sector into local service delivery.

Multi-agent Contracting and Reconfiguration in Competitive Environments using Acquaintance Models

Cooperation of agents in competitive environments is more complicated than in collaborative environments. Both replanning and reconfiguration play a crucial role in cooperation, and introduce a means for implementating a system flexibility. The concepts of commitments, decommitments with penalties and subcontracting may facilitate effective reconfiguration and replanning. Agents in competitive environments are fully autonomous and selfinterested. Therefore the setting of penalties and profit computation cannot be provided centrally. Both the costs and the gain differ from agent to agent with respect to contracts already agreed and resources load. This paper proposes an acquaintance model for contracting in competitive environments and introduces possibilities of reconfigurating in competitive environments as a means of decommitment optimization with respect to resources load and profit maximization. The presented algorithm for contract price setting does not use any centralized knowledge and provides results corresponding to a realistic environment. A simple customerprovider scenario proves this algorithm in competitive contracting.