The Effects of Monetary Policy Announcements

The effects of news (i.e., information innovations) are studied in dynamic general equilibrium models where liquidity matters. As a leading example, news can be announcements about monetary policy directions. In three standard theoretical environments—an overlapping generations model of fiat currency, a new monetarist model accommodating multiple payment methods, and a model of unsecured credit—transition paths are constructed between an announcement and the date at which events are realized. Although the economics is different, in each case, news about monetary policy can induce volatility in financial and other markets, with transitions displaying booms, crashes, and cycles in prices, quantities, and welfare. This is not the same as volatility based on self-fulfilling prophecies (e.g., cyclic or sunspot equilibria) studied elsewhere. Instead, the focus is on the unique equilibrium that is stationary when parameters are constant but still delivers complicated dynamics in simple environments due to information and liquidity effects. This is true even for classically-neutral policy changes. The induced volatility can be bad or good for welfare, but using policy to exploit this in practice seems difficult because outcomes are very sensitive to timing and parameters. The approach can be extended to include news of real factors, as seen in examples.

INSTABILITY OF SUNSPOT EQUILIBRIA IN REAL BUSINESS CYCLE MODELS UNDER INFINITE HORIZON LEARNING

This paper examines the stability of sunspot equilibria in one-sector RBC models under infinite horizon learning. We present general conditions under which the reduced-form model can possess E-stable sunspot equilibria and apply these conditions to three prominent one-sector RBC models. We find that the rational expectations sunspot equilibria are generally unstable under learning.

THE WELFARE COST OF EXCESS VOLATILITY IN INCOMPLETE MARKETS WITH SUNSPOTS

In an incomplete markets economy with sunspots, the Pareto-criterion cannot rank sunspot equilibria of different levels of excess price-level volatility. Therefore, I propose a measure of excess volatility cost in terms of a period-0 endowment good. Ex-ante endowment subsidies are provided, in theory, to each consumer, so that the resulting equilibrium allocation of the higher volatility is Pareto-equivalent to the original benchmark equilibrium with a lower volatility level. The aggregate volatility cost is computed as the sum of all consumers' subsidies. Focusing on local analysis that considers small variations around a given volatility level, I show that the aggregate cost strictly increases in volatility even though each individual cost does not necessarily have this property.