Developing Smart Experiences

Studies have drawn on single theoretical perspectives to examine smart experiences; however, this chapter proposes a multi-theoretical perspective for understanding the development of smart experiences. This is an alternate perspective to exploring the planning and management processes that precede the formation of smart initiatives. Different theoretical perspectives, focused on stakeholder involvement, are drawn upon to understand the engagement in developing smart experiences. This development has created various smart experiences, which was possible due to core collaboration components and varying factors. The chapter calls for empirical investigations into smart tourism through the lens of tourism collaboration to deepen understanding of this development. Practitioners can also benefit from using this perspective, as it provides insights useful for developing smart experiences at the destination level, which is currently lacking in public discourse.

Inflection Points, Kinks, and Jumps: A Statistical Approach to Detecting Nonlinearities

Inflection points, kinks, and jumps identify places where the relationship between dependent and independent variables switches in some important way. Although these switch points are often mentioned in management research, their presence in the data is either ignored, or postulated ad hoc by testing arbitrarily specified functional forms (e.g., U or inverted U-shaped relationships). This is problematic if we want accurate tests for our theories. To address this issue, we provide an integrative framework for the identification of nonlinearities. Our approach constitutes a precursor step that researchers will want to conduct before deciding which estimation model may be most appropriate. We also provide instructions on how our approach can be implemented, and a replicable illustration of the procedure. Our illustrative example shows how the identification of endogenous switch points may lead to significantly different conclusions compared to those obtained when switch points are ignored or their existence is conjectured arbitrarily. This supports our claim that capturing empirically the presence of nonlinearity is important and should be included in our empirical investigations.

Can art promote understanding? A review of the psychology and neuroscience of aesthetic cogntivism

Art promotes knowledge and understanding. Philosophers have debated this proposition, which is referred to as aesthetic cognitivism. Despite its intuitive appeal, few empirical investigations have tested the validity of this claim. In our review, we outline philosophical arguments for and against aesthetic cognitivism. Then, we discuss how empirical aesthetics and neuroscience can contribute to conversations about aesthetic cognitivism, with a focus on visual art. We propose that engagement is necessary to acquire new knowledge and understanding, describe motivational states associated with engagement, and posit who is most likely to experience these states and engage with art. We conclude with a discussion on how aesthetic cognitivism might be measured and modeled. By grounding aesthetic cognitivism in empirical aesthetics, researchers can construct testable hypotheses about art’s role in promoting knowledge and understanding.

Can art promote understanding? A review of the psychology and neuroscience of aesthetic cognitivism

Art promotes knowledge and understanding. Philosophers have debated this proposition, which is referred to as aesthetic cognitivism. Despite its intuitive appeal, few empirical investigations have tested the validity of this claim. In our review, we outline philosophical arguments for and against aesthetic cognitivism. Then, we discuss how empirical aesthetics and neuroscience can contribute to conversations about aesthetic cognitivism, with a focus on visual art. We propose that engagement is necessary to acquire new knowledge and understanding, describe motivational states associated with engagement, and posit who is most likely to experience these states and engage with art. We conclude with a discussion on how aesthetic cognitivism might be measured and modeled. By grounding aesthetic cognitivism in empirical aesthetics, researchers can construct testable hypotheses about art’s role in promoting knowledge and understanding.

Resentment and Coping With the Democratic Dilemma

Resentment is a complex, multi-layered emotion, within which perceptions of unfairness and feelings of anger are central. When linked to politics, it has predominantly been associated with the alleged “crisis of representative democracy” and populism. However, recent studies have shown that resentment can intervene positively in people’s relations to politics and political institutions by facilitating certain types of political participation (Capelos & Demertzis, 2018). Despite this, the concept of resentment, and hence its role in contemporary representative democracy, is often poorly defined, with empirical investigations of its manifestation(s) remaining scarce. Borrowing a conceptualization of resentment as “resentful affectivity,” our article draws on the analysis of focus groups carried out in Belgium (2019–2020) with individuals where resentful affectivity is likely to be observed (i.e., contemporary movements of contestation such as the Yellow Vests, Youth for Climate, and individuals who occupy a socially disadvantaged position). We find that experiences of intense anger, fear, disappointment, and the unfairness of representative democracy, i.e., of how representative democracy works on the ground, coexist simultaneously with remaining hopes in the democratic system. We show how this complex blend of emotions confronts citizens with what we call a “democratic dilemma.” We document the different ways in which citizens cope with this dilemma and conclude by highlighting both the positive and negative ways in which resentment intervenes in the contemporary “crisis of representative democracy.”

Implicit Attitudes Are (Probably) Beliefs

Most psychologists and philosophers maintain that implicit attitudes are not beliefs. This chapter argues that they are by presenting a dilemma for criteria of belief that are supposed to distinguish implicit attitudes from beliefs. It then argues that if we adopt an independently motivated, fragmented model of the human mind, we can explain frequently cited and prima facie puzzling empirical data that can appear to distinguish implicit attitudes from beliefs. Finally, the chapter sketches some simple predictions that fall out of the combination of a fragmented model of the mind and the view that implicit attitudes are beliefs, hopefully opening the door for empirical investigations into novel strategies for altering implicit attitudes.