A Commentary on Ambedkar's Posthumously Published "Philosophy of Hinduism"- Part III

This article forms part III of a running commentary on Ambedkar’s posthumously published “Philosophy of History” (Ambedkar, 2014a). We attempt to follow Ambedkar’s reflections on the early origins of religion and his initial distinctions of the religions of “savage society” and “civilized society” (Ambedkar, 2014a, p. 9). Using the tools of philosophical critique, we see his attempt to dissect the real “principal” (Ambedkar, 2014a, p. 10) of religion beyond the apparitional nature of rites, rituals, and taboos. This leads to a series of deductions of what constitutes the very “core,” “source,” and “substance” of religion rooted in the “preservation of life” (Ambedkar, 2014a, p. 10). However, this is also a moment that will foreshadow Ambedkar’s ultimate judgement of Hinduism’s status as a religion when founded on the unequal social structure of caste. We argue the following in this article: what Ambedkar says about the architectonic of “savage society” and the failure to undergo a profound revolution in the nature and concept of religion bears an eerie resemblance to what ultimately takes the place of “savage society” (Ambedkar, 2014a, p. 9) over time, namely the Hindu caste system. This makes modern Hinduism a strange hybrid of pre-history and a future history whose conclusion is uncertain. Whether caste can disappear from society is the burning question. And this is intertwined with profound metaphysical questions of time, life, birth, and death, which only philosophy can deconstruct if a religion, like Hinduism, were submitted for critical judgement. The article concludes with an attempt to set the stage for the next phase of the commentary: there Ambedkar will transition from a general discussion about the philosophy and history of religion as a concept to an actual engagement with the philosophical contents of the religion known and practiced by hundreds of millions of adherents as Hinduism. As we already know, his conclusion is dire: a religion can only be true if it is rooted in ‘justice’ and serves the ‘utility’ of individual freedom (Ambedkar, 2014a, p. 22).

Cutting the Knot of the World Problem: Sri Aurobindo’s Experiential and Philosophical Critique of Advaita Vedānta

This article proposes to examine in detail Aurobindo’s searching—and often quite original—criticisms of Advaita Vedānta, which have not yet received the sustained scholarly attention they deserve. After discussing his early spiritual experiences and the formative influence of Sri Ramakrishna and Swami Vivekananda on his thought, I outline Aurobindo’s philosophy of “realistic Adwaita”. According to Aurobindo, the sole reality is the Divine Saccidānanda, which is not only the static impersonal Brahman but also the personal, dynamic Cit-Śakti (Consciousness-Force), which manifests as everything in this universe. At various points in his corpus, Aurobindo criticizes Advaita Vedānta on three fronts. From the standpoint of spiritual experience, Aurobindo argues that Śaṅkara’s philosophy is based on a genuine, but partial, experience of the Infinite Divine Reality: namely, the experience of the impersonal nondual Absolute and the corresponding conviction of the unreality of everything else. Aurobindo claims, on the basis of his own spiritual experiences, that there is a further stage of spiritual experience, when one realizes that the impersonal-personal Divine Reality manifests as everything in the universe. From a philosophical standpoint, Aurobindo questions the logical tenability of key Advaitic doctrines, including māyā, the exclusively impersonal nature of Brahman, and the metaphysics of an illusory bondage and liberation. Finally, from a scriptural standpoint, Aurobindo argues that the ancient Vedic hymns, the Upaniṣads, and the Bhagavad-Gītā, propound an all-encompassing Advaita philosophy rather than the world-denying Advaita philosophy Śaṅkara claims to find in them. This article focuses on Aurobindo’s experiential and philosophical critiques of Advaita Vedānta, as I have already discussed his new interpretations of the Vedāntic scriptures in detail elsewhere. The article’s final section explores the implications of Aurobindo’s life-affirming Advaitic philosophy for our current ecological crisis.

FROM BEST INTERESTS TO BETTER INTERESTS? VALUES, UNWISDOM AND OBJECTIVITY IN MENTAL CAPACITY LAW

The Mental Capacity Act 2005 governs personal decision-making for adults. It incorporates five overarching principles, including that incapacity may not be inferred merely from a person's unwise decisions and that where a person lacks capacity decisions must be made in her best interests. Through analysis of judicial treatment of unwisdom, best interests, subjectivity and objectivity, considered against parliamentary debates on the Mental Capacity Bill and philosophical critique of ideas of (un)wisdom, we argue that these principles are problematically irreconcilable. The Act's radical under-specificity means, paradoxically, that this comes to be resolved through abstracted values, rather than the centricity of the person herself.

In the Name of God? Religion, Silence and Extortion

This article critically analyses the role religion (I refer here to Islam and Christianity) has played in promoting silence and extortion in Africa with particular reference to Nigeria. In my philosophical analysis, African and Western literatures will guide my reflection on religion, the role it played in advancing the colonial agenda and its use in today’s African societies. This analysis seeks to present a case for the position that the colonial debris of disempowerment, injustices, manipulation, and extortion are still very much part of African society. They have only assumed new outlooks and language, thus plunging many Africans into silence in the face of what is often presented as sacred and unknown. The desired aim of this article is to present a philosophical critique of religion by comparing it with existing use of religion in Africa, especially Nigeria. Keywords: Religion, Christianity, Extortion, Silence, Nigeria, Injustice

“The old burden” of subjectivity in criticism of L. Feuerbach and Junghegelianer

The article is devoted to the consideration of key aspects of the socio-political meaning and direction of the philosophical and theological doctrine of the Junghegelianer. The nomination of philosophy as the “mother of sciences”, combining the old metaphysics and new dialectic, to the center of the social “agenda” is explained both by internal reasons (split in the Hegel “school”, competition from positivism, renaissance of theological thought), and the impact of external factors. The problem of understanding “subjectivity” in the philosophical critique of the 1840s, which turned out to be a stumbling block for many panellists, is explored; the categorical content of the concept has not been clarified. The task is to identify the basic characteristics of such widely interpreted “subjectivity” and clarify the positions of the parties. Replacing the speculative practices of the “old” Kantian school with intellectual (going from Schelling) “procedures” of philosophizing formed a completely new philosophical paradigm of a different era. The revolution of 1848 updated many philosophical ideas, filling them with social content. The conclusions state the contradiction and a certain eclecticism of the philosophical designs of the Junghegelianer.

The Replication Crisis in Psychology: An Overview for Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology

Psychology is in a replication crisis that has brought about a period of self-reflection and reform. Yet this reform appears in many ways to focus primarily on methodological and statistical practices, with little consideration for the foundational issues that concern many theoretical and philosophical psychologists and that may provide a richer account of the crisis. In this paper we offer an overview of the history of the replication crisis, the critiques and reforms at the heart of the crisis, and several points of intersection between the reform movement and broader theoretical and philosophical issues. We argue that the problems of the replication crisis and the concerns of the reform movement in fact provide various points of entry for theoretical and philosophical psychologists to collaborate with reformers in providing a more deeply philosophical critique and reform.