Rethinking Integration of Epistemic Strategies in Social Understanding: Examining the Central Role of Mindreading in Pluralist Accounts

In recent years, theories of social understanding have moved away from arguing that just one epistemic strategy, such as theory-based inference or simulation constitutes our ability of social understanding. Empirical observations speak against any monistic view and have given rise to pluralistic accounts arguing that humans rely on a large variety of epistemic strategies in social understanding. We agree with this promising pluralist approach, but highlight two open questions: what is the residual role of mindreading, i.e. the indirect attribution of mental states to others within this framework, and how do different strategies of social understanding relate to each other? In a first step, we aim to clarify the arguments that might be considered in evaluating the role that epistemic strategies play in a pluralistic framework. On this basis, we argue that mindreading constitutes a core epiststrategy in human social life that opens new central spheres of social understanding. In a second step, we provide an account of the relation between different epistemic strategies which integrates and demarks the important role of mindreading for social understanding.

Concepts Creep to the Left and the Right

In a target article in 2017, social psychologist Nick Haslam proposed that concept creep explains how established social concepts expand to incorporate new phenomena, with such expansions fundamentally changing conceptual definitions and contributing to a loss of a shared social understanding. However, Haslam’s piece (along with several commentaries) focused on concept creep in relation to a small number of categories (e.g., prejudice, bullying, trauma) that are typically more salient for those on the political left. In this work, we examined whether concept creep is a uniquely leftist phenomenon, or whether we can observe the same conceptual expansion for categories typically salient for conservatives. We found evidence for such symmetry when considering categories such as sexual deviance, terrorism, and personal responsibility – with some nuanced exceptions. We discuss our findings in relation to growing political polarization, intergroup relations, and the study of partisan differences using a variety of politically salient stimuli.

Re-approaching Celts: Origins, Society, and Social Change

This work re-approaches the origins of “the Celts” by detailing the character of their society and the nature of social change in Europe across 700–300 BC. A new approach integrates regional burial archaeology with contemporary classical texts to further refine our social understanding of the European Iron Age. Those known to us as “Celts” were matrifocal Early Iron Age groups in central Gaul who engaged in social traditions out of the central European salt trade and became heavily involved in Mediterranean politics. The paper focuses on evidence from the Hallstatt–La Tène transition to solve a 150-year-old problem: how the Early Iron Age “Celts” became the early La Tène “Galatai,” who engaged in the Celtic migrations and the sacking of Rome at 387 BC.

Conceptualization of the Social in historical and economic interpretations

The aim of the article is to conceptualize the Social in topological and temporal structures. In "Les nouvelles sociologies" Ph. Corcuff sets the theory of society as socio-economic and historical constructs of a sociologist. The authors claim that the social understanding of society present the Social in variable and invariant aspects. This disclose the lack of theoretical tools of comprehension. Only in the space of a philosophical view, the thinking subject considers the plurality as a unity. Various social theories intersect in philosopher's position. Unraveling different "points of view" on society in the process of interpretation creates new meanings. The philosophical concept expresses the identity of the subject and the object. Therefore, the "vision" of a philosopher can be defined as determining (subjective) and as definable (objective). The objectified meaning of the Social written out by economics, as it were, constantly needs subjective justification and historical legitimation.

Imagining Music Education in the “We-Mode”

In this article, I explore the “we-mode,” a concept under investigation by social cognition researchers that emerged from John Searle’s concept of collective Intentionality. Wemode thinking captures the viewpoints of individuals engaged in social interactions and expands each individual’s potential for social understanding and action. This access to the knowledge and understandings of those with whom they collaborate creates shared knowledge and understandings that may lead to collective Intentionality or we-mode. The discussion begins with a look at how living and working in groups affects identity formation, using Paul Gilroy’s notion of planetary humanity as an example of we-mode thinking. As Searle explains, collective Intentionality emanates from the Background (similar to Bourdieu’s habitus), which thus allows for the possibility of collective Intentionality or we-mode thinking and action. The article concludes by querying the potential for developing we-mode thinking in music education within an anti-racism framework, followed by an introduction to the four articles published in this issue.

Into Your (S)Kin: Toward a Comprehensive Conception of Empathy

This paper argues for a comprehensive conception of empathy as comprising epistemic, affective, and motivational elements and introduces the ancient Stoic theory of attachment (Greek, oikeiōsis) as a model for describing the embodied, emotional response to others that we take to be distinctive of empathy. Our argument entails that in order to provide a suitable conceptual framework for the interdisciplinary study of empathy one must extend the scope of recent “simulationalist” and “enactivist” accounts of empathy in two important respects. First, against the enactivist assumption that human mindreading capacities primarily rely on an immediate, quasi-perceptual understanding of other’s intentional states, we draw on Alfred Schutz’ analysis of social understanding to argue that reflective types of understanding play a distinct, but equally fundamental role in empathic engagements. Second, we insist that empathy also involves an affective response toward the other and their situation (as the empathizer perceives this). We suggest analyzing this response in terms of the Stoic concepts of attachment, concern, and a fundamental type of prosocial motivation, that can best be described as an “extended partiality.” By way of conclusion, we integrate the above concepts into a comprehensive conceptual framework for the study of empathy and briefly relate them to current debates about empathic perception and prosocial motivation. The result, we argue, is an account that stays neutral with regard to the exact nature of the processes involved in producing empathy and can therefore accommodate discussion across theoretical divides—e.g., those between enactivist, simulationalist, and so-called theory-theorist approaches.