An initial ‘snapshot’ of sensory information biases the likelihood and speed of subsequent changes of mind

We often need to rapidly change our mind about perceptual decisions in order to account for new information and correct mistakes. One fundamental, unresolved question is whether information processed prior to a decision being made (‘pre-decisional information’) has any influence on the likelihood and speed with which that decision is reversed. We investigated this using a luminance discrimination task in which participants indicated which of two flickering greyscale squares was brightest. Following an initial decision, the stimuli briefly remained on screen, and participants could change their response. Using psychophysical reverse correlation, we examined how moment-to-moment fluctuations in stimulus luminance affected participants’ decisions. This revealed that the strength of even the very earliest (pre-decisional) evidence was associated with the likelihood and speed of later changes of mind. To account for this effect, we propose an extended diffusion model in which an initial ‘snapshot’ of sensory information biases ongoing evidence accumulation.

Dissociable influences of reward and punishment on adaptive cognitive control

To invest effort into any cognitive task, people must be sufficiently motivated. Whereas prior research has focused primarily on how the cognitive control required to complete these tasks is motivated by the potential rewards for success, it is also known that control investment can be equally motivated by the potential negative consequence for failure. Previous theoretical and experimental work has yet to examine how positive and negative incentives differentially influence the manner and intensity with which people allocate control. Here, we develop and test a normative model of control allocation under conditions of varying positive and negative performance incentives. Our model predicts, and our empirical findings confirm, that rewards for success and punishment for failure should differentially influence adjustments to the evidence accumulation rate versus response threshold, respectively. This dissociation further enabled us to infer how motivated a given person was by the consequences of success versus failure.

Dynamic decision policy reconfiguration under outcome uncertainty

In uncertain or unstable environments, sometimes the best decision is to change your mind. To shed light on this flexibility, we evaluated how the underlying decision policy adapts when the most rewarding action changes. Human participants performed a dynamic two-armed bandit task that manipulated the certainty in relative reward (conflict) and the reliability of action-outcomes (volatility). Continuous estimates of conflict and volatility contributed to shifts in exploratory states by changing both the rate of evidence accumulation (drift rate) and the amount of evidence needed to make a decision (boundary height), respectively. At the trialwise level, following a switch in the optimal choice, the drift rate plummets and the boundary height weakly spikes, leading to a slow exploratory state. We find that the drift rate drives most of this response, with an unreliable contribution of boundary height across experiments. Surprisingly, we find no evidence that pupillary responses associated with decision policy changes. We conclude that humans show a stereotypical shift in their decision policies in response to environmental changes.

Gustatory cortex is involved in evidence accumulation during food choice

Food choice is one of the most fundamental and most frequent value-based decisions for all animals including humans. However, the neural circuitry involved in food-based decisions is only recently being addressed. Given the relatively fast dynamics of decision formation, EEG-informed fMRI analysis is highly beneficial for localizing this circuitry in humans. Here by using the EEG correlates of evidence accumulation in a simultaneously recorded EEG-fMRI dataset, we found a significant role for the right temporal-parietal operculum (PO) and medial insula including gustatory cortex (GC) in binary choice between food items. These activations were uncovered by using the EEG energy (power 2) as the BOLD regressor and were missed if conventional analysis with the EEG signal itself were to be used, in agreement with theoretical predictions for EEG and BOLD relations. No significant positive correlations were found with higher powers of EEG (powers 3 or 4) pointing to specificity and sufficiency of EEG energy as the main correlate of the BOLD response. This finding extends the role of cortical areas traditionally involved in palatability processing to value-based decision making and offers the EEG energy as a key regressor of BOLD response in simultaneous EEG-fMRI designs.

The time-course of distractor-based activation modulates effects of speed-accuracy tradeoffs in conflict tasks

The cognitive processes underlying the ability of human performers to trade speed for accuracy is often conceptualized within evidence accumulation models, but it is not yet clear whether and how these models can account for decision-making in the presence of various sources of conflicting information. In the present study, we provide evidence that speed-accuracy tradeoffs (SATs) can have opposing effects on performance across two different conflict tasks. Specifically, in a single preregistered experiment, the mean reaction time (RT) congruency effect in the Simon task increased, whereas the mean RT congruency effect in the Eriksen task decreased, when the focus was put on response speed versus accuracy. Critically, distributional RT analyses revealed distinct delta plot patterns across tasks, thus indicating that the unfolding of distractor-based response activation in time is sufficient to explain the opposing pattern of congruency effects. In addition, a recent evidence accumulation model with the notion of time-varying conflicting information was successfully fitted to the experimental data. These fits revealed task-specific time-courses of distractor-based activation and suggested that time pressure substantially decreases decision boundaries in addition to reducing the duration of non-decision processes and the rate of evidence accumulation. Overall, the present results suggest that time pressure can have multiple effects in decision-making under conflict, but that strategic adjustments of decision boundaries in conjunction with different time-courses of distractor-based activation can produce counteracting effects on task performance with different types of distracting sources of information.

Proactive and reactive accumulation-to-bound processes compete during perceptual decisions

Standard models of perceptual decision-making postulate that a response is triggered in reaction to stimulus presentation when the accumulated stimulus evidence reaches a decision threshold. This framework excludes however the possibility that informed responses are generated proactively at a time independent of stimulus. Here, we find that, in a free reaction time auditory task in rats, reactive and proactive responses coexist, suggesting that choice selection and motor initiation, commonly viewed as serial processes, are decoupled in general. We capture this behavior by a novel model in which proactive and reactive responses are triggered whenever either of two competing processes, respectively Action Initiation or Evidence Accumulation, reaches a bound. In both types of response, the choice is ultimately informed by the Evidence Accumulation process. The Action Initiation process readily explains premature responses, contributes to urgency effects at long reaction times and mediates the slowing of the responses as animals get satiated and tired during sessions. Moreover, it successfully predicts reaction time distributions when the stimulus was either delayed, advanced or omitted. Overall, these results fundamentally extend standard models of evidence accumulation in decision making by showing that proactive and reactive processes compete for the generation of responses.

A spurious correlation between difference scores in evidence accumulation model parameters

Evidence-accumulation models are a useful tool for investigating the cognitive processes that give rise to behavioural data patterns in reaction times (RTs) and error rates. In their simplest form, evidence-accumulation models include three parameters: The average rate of evidence accumulation over time (drift rate) and the amount of evidence that needs to be accumulated before a response becomes selected (boundary) both characterise the response-selection process; a third parameter summarises all processes before and after the response-selection process (non-decision time). Researchers often compute experimental effects as simple difference scores between two within-subject conditions and such difference scores can also be computed on model parameters. In the present paper, we report spurious correlations between such model parameter difference scores, both in empirical data and in computer simulations. The most pronounced spurious effect is a negative correlation between boundary difference and non-decision difference, which amounts to r = –.70 or larger. In the simulations, we only observed this spurious negative correlation when either (a) there was no true difference in model parameters between simulated experimental conditions, or (b) only drift rate was manipulated between simulated experimental conditions; when a true difference existed in boundary separation, non-decision time, or all three main parameters, the correlation disappeared. We suggest that care should be taken when using evidence-accumulation model difference scores for correlational approaches, because the parameter difference scores can correlate in the absence of any true inter-individual differences at the population level.

Age-related response speed deficits arise from specific impairments in sensory evidence accumulation rate

Older adults exposed to enriched environments (EE) maintain relatively higher levels of cognitive function, even in the face of compromised markers of brain health. Response speed (RS) is often used as a simple proxy to measure the preservation of global cognitive function in older adults. However, it is unknown which specific sensory, decision, and/or motor processes provide the most specific indices of neurocognitive health. Here, using a simple decision task with electroencephalography (EEG), we found that the efficiency with which an individual accumulates sensory evidence was a critical determinant of the extent to which RS was preserved in older adults. Moreover, the mitigating influence of EE on age-related RS declines was most pronounced when evidence accumulation rates were shallowest. Our results suggest that EEG metrics of evidence accumulation may index neurocognitive vulnerability of the ageing brain.