The Federalist Papers

The Federalist is widely considered to be one of the most influential political writings in the early United States. Consisting of eighty-five essays in total, the first seventy-seven essays were originally published in New York newspapers between October 1787 and April 1788, and the final eight appeared in the first collected edition of The Federalist in 1788, although they were later republished in New York newspapers as well. The Federalist was written collectively by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay to promote the ratification of the newly drafted Constitution. In keeping with the conventions of 18th-century public political debate, The Federalist was published under the pseudonym “Publius” to present its arguments to the public in anonymous terms, focusing attention on the content of the essays rather than the personal views or personalities of the authors. Although Hamilton, Madison, and Jay would not be formally identified as the authors of The Federalist until the publication of a notice in The Port-Folio on 14 November 1807, their collective authorship was widely known by the 1790s, and their reputations as respected statesmen and innovative political thinkers brought considerable attention and credibility to their arguments. Through the voice of Publius, The Federalist explains and defends the core principles and structure of the new government outlined within the Constitution, while also identifying the flaws and weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation. In doing so, The Federalist provides substantive critical and philosophical discussions of federal governance and its relationship to the principles of plural sovereignty, national unity, republican representation, citizenship, national security, commercial interests, and the separation of powers, all of which had a profound influence, not just on the ratification debates, but also on subsequent interpretations of constitutional language and authority, from the founding period to the present. While scholars have endlessly debated the political, historical, philosophical, literary, and cultural impact of The Federalist, these essays continue to serve as foundational texts for studying the politics and culture of the early United States, as well as contemporary interpretations and revisions of constitutional principles in legal, legislative, and cultural spheres.

Federalists and the Beginnings of the Council of Europe: Converting Institutions and Opinion to Supranationality (1949–1951)

In 1949, it seemed that Western governments were ready to accept some delegation of sovereignty, which met the ambitions of increasingly well-organised Europeanists. One of the most ambitious advances was the proposal for a European Assembly, which could have heralded the beginning of an integration process. However, on this point, as on many others, there was not total agreement between the unionists and the federalists: for some, the Assembly was simply a co-operation structure, while others thought it should be a constituent body. The federalists—who had been united since December 1946 within the European Union of Federalists (EUF), which claimed to have no fewer than 150,000 members—were very demanding. After the adoption of the Statute of the Council of Europe on 5 May 1949, the EUF Central Committee approved a “motion on the Consultative Assembly” in which it openly demanded the drafting of a federal pact that would lead to real European power. Faced with the modest intergovernmental status of the Council of Europe, the EUF proposed that the Assembly of this Council should be transformed from a “consultative” to a “constituent” assembly, which amounted to condemning any kind of conciliatory attitude. Therefore, the constituent path was becoming more and more important within the federalist organisation: it was now a matter of pressing, without restraint, for the triumph of ideals freed from initial reluctance, in the most diverse forums. The most important of these remained the Council of Europe, which was, in the eyes of the federalists, an institution that could be improved. Defending an integrated Europe, the federalists called for the creation of a democratic power on the scale of the challenges of the time, which seemed to them to exceed that of the nation states. To achieve this, they defended a “political” vision of integration, of which the Council of Europe could be the spearhead. It is this struggle, which took place at a time when the construction of Europe seems to be based on a simple but firm act of will, that this article will examine.

Leon Wasilewski at the Treaty of Riga Negotiations: to the Centenary of the Peace of Riga (1921)

The article is dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Riga (1921), discussions about the significance of which do not stop today. What significance did this treaty have for the history of Europe, and especially for its political architecture of the interwar period? What were the consequences of this agreement for Poles, Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians? Estimated of the agreement signed a hundred years ago still differ – some believe that the document then established the borders of Poland almost within the Second Partition of Poland (1793) was the defeat of the then Polish elite, others – that it was an expression of the real state of affairs. This article focuses on the course of Polish-Soviet negotiations during the signing of the treaty, the struggle within the Polish delegation between supports of two state geopolitical concepts (National Democracy “incorporative” and “federal” J. Pilsudski) and establishment of the Eastern border of the Polish state. The well-known Polish diplomat and politician Leon Wasilewski played one of the key roles during these negotiations, and the study of his activities will help to clarify several controversial points during the negotiations. The Treaty of Riga (1921) put an end to the Polish-Bolshevik war, defined the Polish border in the East and the same time cancelled the Petliura-Pilsudski Agreement, which testified to the defeat of the federalist program of J. Pilsudski. Further, the Polish government’s policy towards national minorities later proved to be almost discriminatory, weakening the Polish state from within. For Ukraine and Belarus, this agreement proved to be a national catastrophe, depriving them of the prospects of statehood. This peace can be called a “situational compromise”, which in the short term solved the problem of ending the war, but did not solve any of the geopolitical problems of Poland: neither guaranteed security nor guaranteed the stability of Poland’s Eastern border. The violation of this peace by Soviet Russia was a matter of time, as it happened in 1939

Accountability, polarization, and federalism: Oversight during and after the COVID-19 pandemic*

The decision by the Trump administration to leave many of the policy decisions regarding COVID-19 to United States governors has had significant consequences for the management of the pandemic. During the COVID-19 response, the federalist approach has created complications in areas including resource acquisition, crisis communication, testing, and social distancing. Such issues have been magnified the differences between centralized and decentralized state public health systems. Governors have found themselves at odds with the Trump administration in regard to competing for vital equipment, signaling to the public the severity of the virus, and defining an adequate testing system. Many governors took bold action and acted in bipartisan cooperation with the governors of other states, often in the face of strong criticism and protests. The lessons learned from COVID-19 regarding the need for coordination at the national level must be documented for history. Rather than relying on state-by-state after-action reports, which separately could be become fodder for ideological debate, this commentary recommends a bipartisan, joint after-action report signed by state governors as a mechanism to preserve state experiences.

Constitutional Majoritarianism against Popular “Regulation” in the Federalist

In this essay, I make the interpretive claim that we cannot properly understand the Federalist without appreciating the extent to which the papers mount a sustained rejection of extra-constitutional democracy—practices in which people aim to assert authority over the terms of common life in ways that are not sanctioned by existing laws. I survey such practices, which were common in America before and after the Revolution. I argue that there is continuity between Publius’s justification for rejecting extra-constitutional democracy and his justification for his preferred system against constitutional alternatives. Adequate analysis and evaluation of the Federalist’s arguments about faction, representation, and institutional design require attention to the double duty the arguments play against constitutional and extra-constitutional opposition. This interpretive argument supports several analytic and evaluative conclusions. First, we must distinguish a new form of “non-hierarchical dualist” constitutionalism, according to which irregular democratic activity need not be limited to extraordinary “constitutional moments” or revolutions. Second, the politically egalitarian character of procedures depends not on the procedures alone, but how the maintenance of such procedures limits other forms of democratic practice. Third, the argument suggests a novel defense of “uncivil” disobedient politics: one grounded not in contributions to democratic deliberation, but in the entitlements of citizens to direct assertions of authority over common life.

“In the Mold of Justice Scalia”: The Contours & Consequences of the Trump Judiciary

This article reviews the causes, contours and potential consequences of President Donald J. Trump’s 234 appointments to the federal judiciary. The causes will be familiar to political scientists who are fond of reminding people that “elections have consequences” and that the “Supreme Court [and by extension entire federal judiciary] follows the election returns.” The contours of the Trump Judiciary are congruent with Trump’s campaign promise to appoint judges “in the mold of Justice Scalia,” the conservative legal icon who died suddenly in February 2016. We show how Trump and Senate majority leader Mitch McConnell made good on this promise with the help of the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, appointing ideologically conservative, young, and mostly male and white judges to lifetime appointments on the federal bench. In laying out the potential consequences of Trump’s remaking of the federal judiciary, we outline three areas where these judges are likely to make an impact on law and politics in the coming decades: rolling back liberal and progressive victories in the culture wars, likely in more subtle ways that align with Alison Gash’s concept of “below-the-radar” legal change; extending the federal deregulation campaign that began in earnest with the Reagan Administration; and issuing rulings in the areas of voting rights, campaign finance, and redistricting that tip the scales of democracy in favor of Republican electoral outcomes.

Between the Many and the One: Anticolonial Federalism and Popular Sovereignty

Recovering a marginal body of pluralist political thought from early twentieth-century India, this article explores how the question of popular sovereignty shaped the federalist reconfiguration of the anticolonial democratic project. The turn to federalism was facilitated by the Indian reckoning with Hegel in the late nineteenth century, which led to the diagnosis that the universality ascribed to monist sovereignty relies on a “unilinear” theory of development. Through a sustained engagement with British pluralist and American progressive thought, Indian federalist thinkers eventually developed a many-willed conception of the people. In so doing, they hoped to overcome the denial of Indian peoplehood on the ground of its lack of national unity and historical backwardness. However, the alternative source of sovereignty the federalists pointed to—plural and many-willed—stood in tension with their simultaneous pursuit of a people speaking in one voice. In this way, the constitutive tension of the pluralist conception of sovereignty came strikingly alive in the colonial world.

Decentralized Economic Complexity in Switzerland and Its Contribution to Inclusive and Sustainable Change

The UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) aim at harnessing economic complexity for sustainable and inclusive economic growth by calling for a decade of joint action. In this paper, we show how the action-oriented collaborative culture of complex and competitive economic ecosystems in places outside the major population centers may generate significant positive external effects for society and the environment at large. We illustrate this by means of two small case studies in Switzerland, a country with a federal system that enables decentralized economic development. The first case study investigates the economic ecosystem of the small town Monthey to show how productive migrants and embedded multinational companies increase the knowledge and know-how of local small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The successful collaboration of insiders and outsiders accounts for the internal economic complexity that makes the region innovative and competitive. The second case study highlights the importance of the federalist system by showing how the canton of Solothurn succeeded in nurturing globally competitive export-oriented SMEs. We conclude that the success of these inclusive economic ecosystems in unexpected places may only be understood in the specific geographical, historical and political context, as well as the general openness of these regions toward entrepreneurial migrants and global business. The importance of local social capital makes it hard to replicate such success stories. Nevertheless, they indicate that the global knowledge economy may not just pose a threat, but also offer great opportunities for productive regions beyond the major global high-tech clusters of economic complexity.