contingent fact
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Author(s):  
LOUISE RICHARDSON

Abstract It is generally accepted that sight—the capacity to see or to have visual experiences—has the power to give us knowledge about things in the environment and some of their properties in a distinctive way. Seeing the goose on the lake puts me in a position to know that it is there and that it has certain properties. And it does this by, when all goes well, presenting us with these features of the goose. One might even think that it is part of what it is to be a perceptual capacity that it has this kind of epistemological power, such that a capacity that lacked this power could not be perceptual. My focus in this essay is the sense of taste—the capacity to taste things or to have taste experiences. It has sometimes been suggested that taste lacks sight-like epistemological power. I argue that taste has epistemological power of the same kind as does sight, but that as a matter of contingent fact, that power often goes unexercised in our contemporary environment. We can know about things by tasting them in the same kind of way as we can know about things by seeing them, but we often do not. I then consider the significance of this conclusion. I suggest that in one way, it matters little, because our primary interest in taste (in marked contrast to our other senses) is not epistemic but aesthetic. But, I end by suggesting, it can matter ethically.


Author(s):  
Pedro Enrique García Ruiz

Uno de los aspectos dominantes en los desarrollos de las ciencias sociales y las humanidades en la actualidad es la adaptación de enfoques naturalistas. Los programas naturalistas rechazan el estatuto de lo humano que había defendido tradicionalmente la filosofía al sostener que la conciencia es reducible a un hecho contingente y, por lo tanto, puede comprenderse desde un criterio meramente objetivista. El filósofo francés Jean-Marie Schaeffer llama a esta postura la “tesis de la excepción humana” y sostiene que la fenomenología de Edmund Husserl es el último ejemplo de esta postura. Trataremos de mostrar que el antinaturalismo tan característico de la fenomenología husserliana es sostenible pese a la crítica de Schaeffer. En este sentido, buscamos explorar brevemente la posibilidad y sentido de una fenomenología naturalizada.One of the key aspects in the development of the social sciences and humanities today is the adaptation of naturalistic approaches. Naturalists programs reject the status of the human that had traditionally defended philosophy holding that consciousness is reducible to a contingent fact and, therefore, can be understood from a purely objectivist approach. The French philosopher Jean-Marie Schaeffer calls this approach the “thesis of human exception” and argues that the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl is the latest example of this approach. Try to show that the anti-naturalism so characteristic of Husserlian phenomenology is sustainable despite criticism of Schaeffer. Here, looking briefly to explore the possibility and way of a naturalized phenomenology.


Author(s):  
Mark Balaguer

Chapter 4 provides an argument for a non-factualist view of the composite-object question; i.e., it argues that there’s no fact of the matter whether there are any such things as composite objects like tables and rocks and cats (where a composite object is an object that has proper parts). In addition, this chapter explains how the argument can be extended to establish the much more general (and much more radical) conclusion that there’s no fact of the matter whether there are any material objects at all—including mereological simples (i.e., objects that don’t have any proper parts). The argument proceeds by undermining the necessitarian and contingentist views of the composite-object question; so, roughly speaking, the idea is that there isn’t a fact of the matter about the existence of composite objects like tables because there isn’t a necessary fact about this and there also isn’t a contingent fact about it.


Author(s):  
Kenneth Einar Himma

Chapter 10 rejects the society-of-angels argument against the Coercion Thesis on the ground that the psychological features of the “angels” are too far removed from what is remotely probable for rationally competent self-interested subjects like us who live in worlds of acute material scarcity like ours to tell us anything of theoretical significance about the content of our concept of law. There is nothing that counts as a legal system in the society of angels because our conceptual practices presuppose that the practices constituting something as a system of law are intended and reasonably contrived to regulate the behavior of rationally competent self-interested subjects like us who would never, as a descriptive matter of contingent fact, conclusively defer to the dictates of a purely institutional authority the way the angels do because we should not do so, as an objective matter of normative practical rationality.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-3
Author(s):  
Keith DeRose

The Appearance of Ignorance develops and champions contextualist solutions to the puzzles of skeptical hypotheses and of lotteries. It is argued that, at least by ordinary standards for knowledge, we do know that skeptical hypotheses are false, and that we’ve lost the lottery. Accounting for how it is that we know that skeptical hypotheses are false and why it seems that we don’t know that they’re false tells us a lot, both about what knowledge is and how knowledge attributions work. Along the way, the following are all explained and defended: Moorean methodological approaches to skepticism, on which one seeks to defeat, rather than refute, the skeptic; contextualist responses to skepticism; contextualist substantive Mooreanism; the basic safety approach to knowledge and the double-safety picture of what knowledge is; insensitivity accounts of various appearances of ignorance; the closure principle for knowledge; and the claim that our knowledge that we are not brains in vats is a priori, despite its being knowledge of a deeply contingent fact.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 285-313
Author(s):  
Kirk Lougheed

The epistemology of disagreement examines the question of how an agent ought to respond to awareness of epistemic peer disagreement about one of her beliefs. The literature on this topic, ironically enough, represents widespread disagreement about how we should respond to disagreement. I argue for the sceptical conclusion that the existence of widespread disagreement throughout the history of philosophy, and right up until the present day indicates that philosophers are highly unreliable at arriving at the truth. If truth convergence indicates progress in a field, then there is little progress in philosophy. This sceptical conclusion, however, need not make us give up philosophizing: That we should currently be sceptical of our philosophical beliefs is a contingent fact. We are an intellectually immature species and given the existence of the deep future we have some reason to think that there will be truth-convergence in philosophy in the future.


2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-136
Author(s):  
Howard Sankey

It is argued that to believe is to believe true. That is, when one believes a proposition  one thereby believes the proposition to be true. This is a point about what it is to believe  rather than about the aim of belief or the standard of correctness for belief. The point that  to believe is to believe true appears to be an analytic truth about the concept of belief. It  also appears to be essential to the state of belief that to believe is to believe true. This is  not just a contingent fact about our ordinary psychology, since even a non-ordinary believer  must believe a proposition that they believe to be true. Nor is the idea that one may accept a  theory as empirically adequate rather than as true a counter-example, since such acceptance  combines belief in the truth of the observational claims of a theory with suspension of belief  with respect to the non-observational claims of a theory. Nor is the fact that to believe is to  believe true to be explained in terms of an inference governed by the T-scheme from the belief  that P to the belief that P is true, since there is no inference from the former to the latter. To believe that P just is to believe that P is true.


2019 ◽  
pp. 107-111
Author(s):  
A.W. Moore

An interpretation of Kant’s first antinomy is defended whereby both its thesis and its antithesis depend on a common basic principle that Kant endorses, namely that there cannot be an ‘infinite contingency’, by which is meant a contingent fact about how an infinite region of space or time is occupied. The greatest problem with this interpretation is that Kant explicitly declines to apply counterparts of the temporal arguments in the antinomy to the world’s future, even though, if the interpretation is correct, such arguments are clearly there to be applied. This problem, it is argued, is surmountable.


Author(s):  
Tyler Tritten
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  

The Afterword offers a defence of thought as free speculation in which no possibilities can ever be excluded a priori. It also argues that although ontological speculation is required to ground other sciences, their findings never necessitate which ontology must accompany them. Facts can always be interpreted in multiple ways; meaning is never fixed. That there is meaning, however, rather than non-sense is a contingent fact and not a necessity.


Philosophy ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 93 (3) ◽  
pp. 395-410 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emiliano Boccardi

AbstractAccording to A-theories of time, the metaphysical ground of change and dynamicity is provided by a continuous shifting in which events are past, present and future (A-determinations). It is often claimed that these theories make better sense of our experience of dynamicity than their rival, the B-theories; according to the latter, dynamicity is grounded solely in the irreducible earlier-than relations (B-relations) which obtain between events or states of affairs. In this paper, I argue that the experience of time's dynamicity, on the contrary, cannot be accounted for solely in terms of representations of irreducible A-determinations, because any representation which is adequate to ground these experiences must itself involve representation of irreducible B-relations, while it needs not involve representation of A-determinations. Even if, as a matter of contingent fact, our experiences of dynamicity consisted of representations of successions of A-determinations, what would account for them being experiences of dynamicity would be solely the B-theoretic relations of succession, rather than the irrelevant A-theoretic nature of the relata.


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