A Note on Kant’s First Antinomy
An interpretation of Kant’s first antinomy is defended whereby both its thesis and its antithesis depend on a common basic principle that Kant endorses, namely that there cannot be an ‘infinite contingency’, by which is meant a contingent fact about how an infinite region of space or time is occupied. The greatest problem with this interpretation is that Kant explicitly declines to apply counterparts of the temporal arguments in the antinomy to the world’s future, even though, if the interpretation is correct, such arguments are clearly there to be applied. This problem, it is argued, is surmountable.
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2010 ◽
Vol 161
(8)
◽
pp. 311-315
2020 ◽
Vol 27
(40)
◽
pp. 6815-6824
◽