TRANSHUMANISM AS A PHILOSOPHY OF MATERIAL TRANSFIGURATION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

This paper is a critical expository analysis of the controversial philosophy of transhumanism. The method adopted in this philosophical paper is the expository analytic method. The analysis established that transhumanism is both a biotechnological aspiration as well as a philosophical vision of a material transfiguration of human condition and experience which ultimate culmination is the man-technology singularity or convergence. This paper concludes that notwithstanding contending voices and the pertinent questions raised regarding the moral standing of transhumanist philosophy and their radical dreams for humanity; one fact remains incontestable- the fact that their promises are relishing, enticing and impressive. With regard to whether or not humanity can attain the height envisioned by transhumanist, we confidently hold that the unprecedented legacies and achievements of science and technology overwhelmingly affirm the high probability of the realization of the material transfiguration of humanity.

Responsibility and Robot Ethics: A Critical Overview

This paper has three concerns: first, it represents an etymological and genealogical study of the phenomenon of responsibility. Secondly, it gives an overview of the three fields of robot ethics as a philosophical discipline and discusses the fundamental questions that arise within these three fields. Thirdly, it will be explained how in these three fields of robot ethics is spoken about responsibility and how responsibility is attributed in general. As a philosophical paper, it presents a theoretical approach and no practical suggestions are made as to which robots should bear responsibility under which circumstances or how guidelines should be formulated in which a responsible use of robots is outlined.

Naturalism’s maxims and its methods. Is naturalistic philosophy like science?

This paper argues that naturalistic philosophy does not meet its own empiricist mandate. It argues from an empiricist perspective. Naturalists either claim that philosophy is like science in significant ways, or they claim that philosophy ought to be like science. This paper, being chiefly focused on the former claim, argues that naturalistic philosophy is nothing like science. Using Papineau’s markers for the similarities between naturalistic philosophy and science, I argue, counter Papineau, that the method employed in naturalistic philosophy is not a posteriori and its claims are certainly not synthetic in the same way as that of science. This methodological distinction between science and philosophy is one made by Carnap. To show how the methods are distinct I compare two papers; I compare the method employed by Andy Clark in his philosophical paper on the brain as a prediction error minimisation machine with that employed by Rees and Haynes in their neuroscientific paper on mental content.

Consensus or Disharmony in African Philosophy Conversations?

This philosophical paper enters the contested arena of the African Philosophy debate in which scholars have been engaging each other from the late 1950s to this date. African Philosophy, as a movement, attempts to assert and affirm the identity and dignity of Africans, who felt insulted, despised, and trodden by western ideologies and worldviews. Practitioners in African philosophy in contemporary times have developed fundamental interest in, often much to their frustration, the existence and nature of an African philosophy. On the other hand, non-Africans (including Africans of western persuasion) have often raised questions about African philosophy’s existence resulting in an embedded dismissal of Africa and African thought systems. This paper surveys and synthesises the murky conversations on the nature and character of African Philosophy in an effort to expose some of the areas of consensus and disharmony.

The Technicity Paradigm and Scientism in Qualitative Research

This philosophical paper suggests that almost all academic research, including qualitative research, is conducted under the influence of a "technicity paradigm" which values objectivity, generalisability and rationality. This paper explores, from a Heideggerian perspective, the fundamental characteristics of research under the influence of technicity and discusses how these characteristics manifest in qualitative research. It includes a reflection on what qualitative research might be like if it could escape the influence of technicity and realise its potential for inclusive and relevant knowledge making.

Editorial

This edition of the Journal is the first publication under our new publications management system. It presents an eclectic mix of papers ranging from papers with results dawn from analyses of survey data from small business, to strategic decisions about the factors affecting investment. It concludes with a more philosophical paper which addresses the ethical issues of cultural and moral behaviour in the Australian Defence Force.

Self-deception and emotion

Drawing on recent empirical work, this philosophical paper explores some possible contributions of emotion to self-deception. Three hypotheses are considered: (1) the anxiety reduction hypothesis: the function of self-deception is to reduce present anxiety; (2) the solo emotion hypothesis: emotions sometimes contribute to instances of self-deception that have no desires among their significant causes; (3) the direct emotion hypothesis: emotions sometimes contribute directly to self-deception, in the sense that they make contributions that, at the time, are neither made by desires nor causally mediated by desires. It is argued that (1) is false and that (3) is defensible and more defensible than (2).

Immanent Transcendence

The form of this paper is unconventional. Just as composers sometimes want a change from the traditional sonata form and write a movement in the form of theme and variations, so I would like to depart from the orthodox form of philosophical paper, which contains a closely reasoned discussion of some particular problem, by stating a theme which will be a principle of pure logic, then sketching a number of applications of it in different areas of philosophy. But the variations on my theme will not be entirely disconnected with each other, for I suspect that it is a theme which could have especially important applications in philosophical theology. So my later variations on it will be increasingly oriented to concepts of God, and I will close with a coda which will consist of some controversial remarks about the controversial concept of transcendence.