Rules and Military Regimes

This chapter evaluates the way in which three types of rules—operational, relational and constitutive—have functioned in three corporate military regimes, Argentina (1976–83), Brazil (1964–85), and Chile (1973–88). These regimes are compared one with another and with the communist single-party states. The chapter shows how the different rules operated in these different regimes, drawing out the different patterns of operation and thereby showing the variations that can occur within the one regime type. The chapter also raises the question of the relationship between observance of rules and regime survival.

The Relationship between Foreign Aid and Democratization in Myanmar in respect to Civil Society

<p>Since 2010, Myanmar has been making a transition to a democratic country after 40 years under successive military regimes. The semi-civilian government led by President U TheinSein has been in charge of Myanmar since the democratic reform is carried out. After Myanmar's new government has carried out its democratic reform for 2 years, international assistance has come in Myanmar to assist Myanmar's democratization in 2012 unlike before 2010. Western donors who were not active in providing aid in Myanmar became enthusiastic to help Myanmar's democratization in various ways. Civil society in Myanmar is still small and informally organized to participate as a strong actor in Myanmar's democratization. Democratic aid to nurture civil society in Myanmar, which has been repressed for long time, became an important aid to strengthen democracy in Myanmar. This thesis will analyse the relation between democratic aid through civil society and democratization in Myanmar. It is based on recently completed in-country research involving document analysis and semi-structured interviews. The paper investigates what is the impact of democratic aid through civil society on Myanmar's democratization process. The findings of this thesis indicate that democratic aid was not delivered in Myanmar under the successive military regimes to impose democratization. Democratic aid has started to be delivered again after the Myanmar government started its process of democratization mostly due to domestic factors, such as people's dissatisfaction with the military governments. When western donors started supporting the democratization process in Myanmar, they provided democratic assistance to sustain local civil society organisations in Myanmar in order to act as a check and balance to the Myanmar government and to make it more accountable to the citizens. Democratic assistance towards civil society has been promoting the role of civil society organisations in politics, creating a platform for communication between the government and local civil society organisations to increase the all-inclusiveness in Myanmar's democratization process. With the democratic assistance from western donors, local civil society organisations became more developed and started working as one of the check and balance actors in Myanmar's politics. Thus, democratic assistance to civil society has increased the sustainability of local civil society organisations in Myanmar to participate in the democratization process. However, democratic assistance to civil society has only started recently, in 2012, and there are challenges in providing assistance to civil society to promote democratization. If those challenges can be avoided in delivering aid to civil society, the assistance towards civil society can have a better impact on democratization in Myanmar.</p>

The Relationship between Foreign Aid and Democratization in Myanmar in respect to Civil Society

<p>Since 2010, Myanmar has been making a transition to a democratic country after 40 years under successive military regimes. The semi-civilian government led by President U TheinSein has been in charge of Myanmar since the democratic reform is carried out. After Myanmar's new government has carried out its democratic reform for 2 years, international assistance has come in Myanmar to assist Myanmar's democratization in 2012 unlike before 2010. Western donors who were not active in providing aid in Myanmar became enthusiastic to help Myanmar's democratization in various ways. Civil society in Myanmar is still small and informally organized to participate as a strong actor in Myanmar's democratization. Democratic aid to nurture civil society in Myanmar, which has been repressed for long time, became an important aid to strengthen democracy in Myanmar. This thesis will analyse the relation between democratic aid through civil society and democratization in Myanmar. It is based on recently completed in-country research involving document analysis and semi-structured interviews. The paper investigates what is the impact of democratic aid through civil society on Myanmar's democratization process. The findings of this thesis indicate that democratic aid was not delivered in Myanmar under the successive military regimes to impose democratization. Democratic aid has started to be delivered again after the Myanmar government started its process of democratization mostly due to domestic factors, such as people's dissatisfaction with the military governments. When western donors started supporting the democratization process in Myanmar, they provided democratic assistance to sustain local civil society organisations in Myanmar in order to act as a check and balance to the Myanmar government and to make it more accountable to the citizens. Democratic assistance towards civil society has been promoting the role of civil society organisations in politics, creating a platform for communication between the government and local civil society organisations to increase the all-inclusiveness in Myanmar's democratization process. With the democratic assistance from western donors, local civil society organisations became more developed and started working as one of the check and balance actors in Myanmar's politics. Thus, democratic assistance to civil society has increased the sustainability of local civil society organisations in Myanmar to participate in the democratization process. However, democratic assistance to civil society has only started recently, in 2012, and there are challenges in providing assistance to civil society to promote democratization. If those challenges can be avoided in delivering aid to civil society, the assistance towards civil society can have a better impact on democratization in Myanmar.</p>

Montevideo Crisscrossed. Two Novels by Mario Benedetti: The Truce and Thanks for the Fire

This essay is a rereading of two novels by Mario Benedetti published first in Montevideo in the 1960’s and subsequently in Mexico around the 1970’s, receiving changing receptions over the years. Both have Montevideo as their setting, but the topographical perspectives and writing strategies are different. It traces the networks of writers, publishers and readers in Latin America developed during the 20th century and their obliteration by the military regimes in the 1970’s. Reviewing the fluctuating moods in Benedetti’s later reception, this essay compares opposite sets of aesthetic values developed during the second half of the last century, which are taken for granted even today, studying their initial hypotheses and showing how literary works are distorted by prejudiced sets of critical perspectives that pigeonhole works and authors in boxes established in advance.

The role of superior judiciary in protecting its independence: A case study of judicial legitimization of military regimes in Pakistan

Pakistan has faced four military regimes, in three out of it, the military rulers were not declared illegitimate by the supreme judiciary, on the contrary, the doctrine of necessity became the quoted terms as causes of accepting those extra-constitutional moves. While adjudicating these cases, the establishment either used their personal influence or manured the judiciary to take afresh oath of allegiance of the military rulers under the provisional constitutional orders (PCO). Thus, the cases before these judges were just hoodwinking or a lip service of endorsing and affixing a stamp of validity. Even then the superior judiciary had authorized the military rulers to amend the constitution, which is the role prerogative of the parliament not only as per Pakistan constitution. Thus, superior judiciary was unable to stand in front of power dynamic, except in the case of Asma Gillani vs federation of Pakistan, but it was adjudicated, when General Yahya was not in power. While applying heterogeneous sampling research techniques the study has attempted to accumulate a variety of expert opinions on the role and independence of the judiciary. Findings show that the judges, to assure smooth running of the country, sacrificed the very spirit of the constitution. The apex court decisions only tried to maintain the statuesque and to pave the way to let the system run.

Variations among North African Military Regimes

This article explores the differences between two North African military regimes—Egypt and Algeria—which have been selected due to the continuity of military dominance of the political systems. Still, variations have marked their political development. In particular, the Algerian army’s approach to civilian institutions changed after a civilian president was chosen in 1999. This was not the case in Egypt after the demise of the Hosni Mubarak regime of 2011. Other important variations are to be found in the way power has been distributed among the military apparatuses themselves. In the case of Egypt, a principle of collegiality has been generally preserved within a body, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which is absent in the case of Algeria, where conflicts between military opposed factions are more likely to arise in case of crisis. How differences generally impact the stability of military rule in these two cases is the main contribution of this paper.

Religion and Party Politics in India and Pakistan

Until the 1990s, religious influence on party politics in India and Pakistan was primarily through street protests and pressure on mainstream nonreligious parties rather than by religious parties winning power directly. In India, such influence was constrained by the secular constitutional structure and the dominant role of the Congress Party. In Pakistan, however, politically deinstitutionalized parties, weakened by military interference, have never been strong enough to take on the clerics. Instead, party leaders and military regimes have increasingly tried to co-opt or accommodate Islamist parties and pressure groups to strengthen their own positions. Civilian and military governments in the 1970s and 1980s institutionalized much of the Islamist agenda within the state in a way that now seems impossible to reverse. Ironically, the very fact that much of the Islamist agenda is now institutionalized, makes it difficult for Islamist parties to expand much beyond the 10–20% of the votes they now receive. India’s secular consensus, which many observers saw as its greatest achievement, has been profoundly disrupted by the decline of the Congress Party over the past three decades and the rise of the BJP, headed by the dominant figure of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who has deep roots in the Hindu Nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and its Hindu nationalist family (Sangh Parivar) of organizations. Modi, especially in his second term (2019–), has used his majority in parliament to try to radically remake India along Hindu nationalist lines, even though that was not central to his campaign platform, nor the reason why most development- and governance-minded voters elected him to office.

A time to throw stones, a time to reap: how long does it take for democratic transitions to improve institutional outcomes?

We study the impact of democratic transitions on institutional outcomes. Using an event study method and a sample of 135 countries over the period 1984–2016, we observe that democratic transitions improve institutional outcomes. The effect appears within 3 years after the transition year. The results are robust to alternative definitions of transitions, alternative codings of pre- and post-transition years, and changing the set of control variables. We also find that both full and partial democratizations improve institutional outcomes. Transitions out of military regimes or communist autocracies do not. The effect of democratization depends on GDP per capita, education, and the regularity of the transition. Finally, the evidence suggests that the effect is particularly clear on the corruption, law and order, and military in politics dimensions of the index.

Myanmar: Civil–Military Relations in a Tutelary Regime

Myanmar has had one of the longest ruling military regimes in the world. Ruling directly or indirectly for more than five decades, Myanmar’s armed forces have been able to permeate the country’s main political institutions, its economy, and its society. Myanmar is a highly revealing case study for examining the trajectory of civil–military relations over the past seven decades. Myanmar ended direct military rule only in 2011 after the military had become the most powerful institution in society, weakened the political party opposition severely, coopted several ethnic armed groups, and built up a business empire that allowed it to remain financially independent. The new tutelary regime—established in 2011 after proclaiming a roadmap to “discipline flourishing democracy” in 2003, promulgating a new constitution in 2008, and holding (heavily scripted) elections in 2010—allowed a degree of power-sharing between elected civilian politicians and the military for a decade. Although policymaking in economic, financial, and social arenas was transferred to the elected government, the military remained in firm control of external and internal security and continued to be completely autonomous in the management of its own affairs. As a veto power, the military was also able to protect its prerogatives from a position of strength. Despite this dominant position in the government, civil–military relations were hostile and led to a coup in February 2021. The military felt increasingly threatened and humiliated as civilians destroyed the guardrails it had put in place to protect its core interests within the tutelary regime. The military also felt increasingly alienated as the party the military had established repeatedly failed to perform in the elections.