Provar algo não significa convencer o público: lições de pensadoras ‘feministas’ do século XVII

O presente artigo traz algumas reflexões da filósofa e feminista decolonial Elsa Dorlin sobre o que chamou de feminismo-lógico-filosófico do século XVII, presente nas posições de Marie de Gournay, Anna Maria Van Schurman, François Poullain de la Barre e Gabrielle Suchon. Neste artigo, esse tipo de filosofia é classificado como lógico-igualitarista e recebe uma quinta representante: Mary Astell. Estas filósofas e la Barre defenderam uma igualdade entre os ‘sexos' por meio de argumentos lógicos que visavam demonstrar a igualdade como algo verdadeiro e irrefutável. É nossa intenção apresentar ao público brasileiro algumas das estratégias utilizadas por essas filósofas, e apontadas por Dorlin, no debate sobre a desigualdade ou igualdade entre os sexos. Por fim, focaremos nos motivos pelos quais as estratégias utilizadas não chegaram a atingir seu objetivo: um contexto de juízos e juízes corrompidos.

Mary Astell on the Social Nature of the Cartesian Passions

Scholars have long recognised that Mary Astell builds her feminist critique of society on a foundation of Cartesian views about human nature and the passions. At the same time, the full extent of the influence of Descartes’ view of embodiment on the solution Astell proposes in her Serious Proposal to the Ladies is only beginning to come to light. In this paper, I contribute to this ongoing project by arguing that Astell builds on Descartes’ ideas by addressing a blind spot in his view, namely, that that the embodied self is socially situated, and that therefore, our social context plays a crucial formative role in the development of our passions. In doing so, I show Astell extends Cartesian philosophy beyond an egalitarian feminist critique of society, but also to a positive political theory offering a solution to the problems she identifies. Thusly, Astell shows the political potential of Cartesian philosophy as a framework for social critique and to seek solutions to the problems such a critique can bring out.

There’s Something about Mary: Challenges and Prospects for Narrative Theodicy

This paper explores the constraints of narrative theodicy to account for the misery of the powerless and uses Mary of Bethany as a case study as evaluated through the early modern theodical writings of Mary Astell and Mary Hays. Eleonore Stump has pointed out that Mary of Bethany’s misery is interesting because it is so personal; it results from losing her heart’s desire. But, Mary of Bethany’s case fails as narrative theodicy because it cannot (unlike other cases, such as Job) sufficiently demonstrate the power of God in situated expressions of suffering, speak to plight of the powerless, nor put the sufferer in a stronger epistemic position. Astell and Hays provide a solution for the problem of lived experiences of systemic oppression for the project of narrative theodicy (it must be for and about suffering), and in so doing, remind us of the continued significance of their work to the philosophical canon. To succeed, narratives used for theodicy must speak directly to the plight of those who suffer, and must allow the powerless, miserable, unprivileged, and oppressed to have access to religious knowledge of the relationship between God and the one in misery, the one powerless.

Introduction

This introduction provides an overview of the main philosophical themes and issues in the selected letters of three eighteenth-century English women: Mary Astell, Elizabeth Thomas, and Catharine Trotter Cockburn. It is argued that by bringing their letters to light, it is possible to gain a fuller appreciation of women’s involvement in philosophical debates of the 1690s and early 1700s. Their letters demonstrate not only that men engaged with women’s ideas in this time but that women engaged with other women about topical issues in philosophy, especially issues related to practical-ethical and religious affairs. The introduction concludes with a brief survey of the main philosophical themes in the texts, ranging from ethics and moral theology to metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of religion, and the concerns of women as a sociopolitical group.

Women Philosophers of Eighteenth-Century England

This volume is an edited collection of the philosophical correspondences of three English women of the eighteenth century: Mary Astell, Elizabeth Thomas, and Catharine Trotter Cockburn. The selected correspondence includes letters to and/or from John Norris, George Hickes, Mary Chudleigh, Richard Hemington, John Locke, Ann Hepburn Arbuthnot, and Edmund Law. Their epistolary exchanges range over a wide variety of philosophical subjects, from questions about the love of God and other people to the causes of sensation in the mind, the metaphysical foundations of moral obligation, and the importance of independence of judgement in one’s moral choices and actions. The volume includes a main introduction by the editor, which explains some of the key themes and developments in the eighteenth-century letters, including an increased awareness of other women’s writings and of the concerns of women as a sociopolitical group. It is argued that if we look beyond printed treatises to the content of these letters, it is possible to gain a fuller appreciation of women’s involvement in philosophical debates of the 1690s and early 1700s. To situate each woman’s thought in its historical-intellectual context, the volume includes original introductory essays for each principal figure, showing how her correspondence relates either to her contemporaries’ ideas or to her own published views. The text also provides detailed scholarly annotations, explaining obscure philosophical ideas and archaic words and phrases in the letters. Among its critical apparatus, the volume includes a note on the texts, a bibliography, and an index.

Mary Astell (1666–1731)

This chapter includes selected letters from the correspondence of early English feminist Mary Astell. It includes Astell’s letters to and from John Norris, George Hickes, and an unknown religious woman, spanning the period from 1693 to 1705. It begins with an introductory essay by the editor, showing that Astell’s letters contain a number of the same philosophical commitments found in her later published works, including the same rigorous method of thinking and a high value for intellectual integrity and impartiality. The topics of the letters range from issues to do with the love of God and the causation of sensation to the value of female friendship and the importance of exercising independent judgement in religious matters. The text includes editorial annotations to assist the reader’s understanding of early modern words and ideas.

Cartesian Social Epistemology? Contemporary Social Epistemology and Early Modern Philosophy

Kartezjańska epistemologia społeczna? Współczesna epistemologia społeczna a wczesna filozofia nowożytna Wielu współczesnych epistemologów społecznych uważa, że tocząc batalię z indywidualistycznym podejściem do wiedzy, walczy tym samym z podejściem do wiedzy opisanym przez Kartezjusza. Choć wypada się zgodzić, że Kartezjusz przedstawia indywidualistyczny obraz wiedzy naukowej, niemniej trzeba dodać, że wskazuje on na istotne praktyczne funkcje odnoszenia się do świadectw i przekonań innych osób. Jednakże zrozumienie racji Kartezjusza za zaangażowaniem się w indywidualizm pozwala nam na identyfikację kluczowych wyzwań, z jakimi spotka się epistemologia społeczna, m.in., że poleganie na świadectwach innych może propagować uprzedzenia oraz hamować autentyczne zrozumienie. Implikacje zawarte u Kartezjusza zostały opracowywane i rozwinięte przez niektórych z jego bezpośrednich spadkobierców. W prezentowanym tekście zostanie przedstawione, jak np. François Poulain de la Barre oraz w pewnym skrócie przez Mary Astell analizują uwarunkowania społeczne kształtujące podmiot epistemiczny rozumiany w duchu Kartezjusza.