How rebel groups form in genocide: The Warsaw Ghetto fighters

The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising is emblematic of armed Jewish resistance to the Holocaust; it should also be emblematic of rebel organization formation and capacity building in the most extreme power asymmetry. The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising happened because civilians who were directly experiencing a genocide formed rebel organizations that gained the capacity to hold territory. Drawing from video testimonies and memoirs of survivors, diaries of witnesses, and the work of historians, this study analyzes the formation and evolution of the Jewish Fighting Organization (ŻOB) to create and begin to validate a generalizable theory on how rebel organizations form in genocide, and how they create the capacity to hold territory from the genocidal opponent. The ŻOB evolved from a violent resistance organization to a rebel organization with a military infrastructure that could hold territory against the Nazis; further, it was this capacity to hold territory that allowed the ŻOB to win the survival of many Jews. These findings offer important insights on the possibility of rebel group mobilization against genocidal persecution, and can be used to understand contemporary genocide resisters.

Rebel Fragmentation and the Recruitment of Child Soldiers

The recruitment and use of children in armed conflict remains a prevalent feature of modern civil war. But which conflict actors are more likely to recruit children? We argue that the process by which rebel groups form shapes their recruitment strategies. Specifically, we contend that rebels that form as splinter factions from the ranks of pre-existing rebel organizations are more likely to recruit child soldiers than other rebel groups. Splinter groups face unique constraints as they materialize in the midst of an active conflict environment, necessitating that they mobilize a sufficient force to contend with existing competitors. As a result, rebel factions are more likely to pursue recruitment strategies that are low cost vis-à-vis alternatives, focusing on their immediate survival. Under such conditions, children become especially attractive recruits. Leveraging the Foundations of Rebel Group Emergence Dataset, our cross-national investigation of 237 rebel groups active between 1989 and 2011 provides robust support for our hypothesis that splinter factions are strongly associated with the recruitment of children.

When Disasters Hit Civil Wars: Natural Resource Exploitation and Rebel Group Resilience

Existing literature on the relationship between natural disasters and conflicts provides mixed findings. In this article, we argue that whether natural disasters hurt rebel group resilience depends on their funding source and the mode of resource extraction. Rebel groups that obtain their funding from natural resources are more susceptible to natural disasters because this funding source could be easily disrupted by rapid-onset disasters. How rebel groups exploit natural resource wealth also conditions the effect of natural disasters on rebel group resilience. Rebel groups that depend on extorting resource production, despite having a seemingly stable revenue stream, are more likely to face funding cuts after a severe natural disaster. In contrast, rebel groups that rely on smuggling natural resources, due to a higher level of flexibility and mobility, are more likely to survive natural disasters. We test our arguments using data on armed groups, natural disasters, and rebel contraband, and the results of the logit models with interaction terms support our hypotheses. Our findings bridge the environmental conflict literature and the resource curse literature, and offer important policy implications.

Conflict-Related Sexual Violence and the Re-Escalation of Lethal Violence

To what extent does sexual violence influence the likelihood of re-escalating lethal violence after a period of inactivity? Despite a substantive body of research that explores conflict recurrence, the literature has largely neglected the role of rebel group dynamics. I address this gap arguing that reports of rebel sexual violence in periods deemed inactive because of low numbers of casualties are associated with greater risks of escalating lethal violence. Specifically, building on research that shows an association between recruitment and rape as a socialization method during civil war, I argue that reports of sexual violence indicate that rebels are maintaining and mobilizing fighters in inactive conflict years. I systematically test this argument on all inactive intrastate conflict years from 1989 to 2015 using the updated Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict dataset and Armed Conflict Termination dataset. The results provide robust support for the argument that a re-escalation of lethal violence following inactive periods is more likely when rebels are reported to perpetrate sexual violence in both active and subsequent inactive periods.

Rebel Rivalry and the Strategic Nature of Rebel Group Ideology and Demands

How does the presence of multiple combatants affect rebel groups’ ideological and demand positioning? Although violent forms of inter-group conflict have been widely studied in the civil war literature, rebel groups’ strategic use of ideology and demands has received scarce scholarly attention. We argue that the pressure of competition forces rebel groups to differentiate themselves ideologically and demand-wise from their rivals to maximize their chances of survival and success. Rebel groups strive to set themselves apart by offering unique products to their supporters and recruits. Thus, we contend that rebel groups are more likely to modify their ideologies and demands from the government in the face of competition from rival groups. We test this theory using novel data collected from rebel group manifestos and public statements. Our findings suggest that groups are more likely to shift their ideology and modify their demands as the number of rival groups increases.

Conflict Externalization and the Quest for Peace: Theory and Case Evidence from Colombia

I study the relationship between the likelihood of a violent domestic conflict and the risk that such a conflict “externalizes” (i.e. spreads to another country by creating an international dispute). I consider a situation in which a domestic conflict between a government and a rebel group has the potential to externalize. I show that the risk of externalization increases the likelihood of a peaceful outcome, but only if the government is sufficiently powerful relative to the rebels, the risk of externalization is sufficiently high, and the foreign actor who can intervene in the domestic conflict is sufficiently uninterested in material costs and benefits. I show how this model helps to understand the recent and successful peace process between the Colombian government and the country’s most powerful rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).