Mentalizing Mistakes: Distinguishing Mentalizing Ability from Bias in God Beliefs

The claim that religions are by-products of evolutionary adaptations has been at the center of the cognitive science of religion since its inception nearly three decades ago. It has been argued that religious beliefs are manifestations of evolved hyperactive agent detection and other mentalizing biases, whose development required pan-human mentalizing abilities. Much of the current research on the cognitive underpinnings of religiosity seems to rest on the assumption that not only mentalizing biases but also mentalizing abilities give rise to god beliefs in the minds of contemporary individuals. However, this presupposes that the higher capacity an individual has for mentalizing the more likely he or she is to make mentalizing mistakes. We illustrate the conceptual confusion that results from this way of framing the discussion and point to empirical evidence that challenges this notion.

Religion and Nature in the Light of Rosa’s Resonance Theory

German sociologist Hartmut Rosa has developed an integral resonance theory, which is a theory of our relationship to the world. This theory has aroused much interest in recent years not only among sociologists but also among representatives of other humanities and social sciences, including representatives of the science of religion. Therefore, the author considers it worth discussing. The article deals with religion and nature in light of Rosa’s theory. Rosa understands religion and nature as two of the main axes and areas of man’s search for vertical resonance in modernity. In the section devoted to religion, the author presents Rosa’s view that the essence of religion is man’s need for a response. In light of resonance theory, the author examines phenomena such as prayer, worship, religious rites, certain holidays (Christmas), and sin. Schleiermacher, Buber, Gerhardt, Luther and Camus are singled out as particularly relevant thinkers and creators. On this basis, he discusses existential violence, which stems from the need for resonance and the rejection of alienation as its opposite. The section devoted to nature is mainly focused on the problems that hinder modern man in their quest to fulfil their longing for resonance with nature. The author explains Rosa’s thesis that the ecological crisis is, at its core and origin, an existential and cultural crisis and not a crisis of resources. The author draws conclusions concerning the importance of religion and modern man’s fear of the loss of resonance.

Cognitive Science of Religion and Classical Theism: A Synthesis

Launonen and Mullins argue that if Classical Theism is true, human cognition is likely not theism-tracking, at least, given what we know from cognitive science of religion. In this essay, we develop a model for how classical theists can make sense of the findings from cognitive science, without abandoning their Classical Theist commitments. We also provide an argument for how our model aligns well with the Christian doctrine of general revelation.

Minding the pandemic

This article analyses clusters of Muslim responses to the COVID-19 pandemic in a theoretical framework provided by the cognitive science of religion. The responses include theological reflections on the origin, nature, and religious significance of the disease, religious justifications for restrictions on communal worship, apologetics in the light of COVID-19, and how aspects of the COVID-19 pandemic relate to issues of purity, impurity, and contagion. This article places the responses in a wider theoretical context that contributes to explaining their emergence as cultural representations, and, as a consequence, may promote further comparative research into responses to the COVID-19 pandemic in other religious traditions.

Complicating Classification: Cognitive Science Comes to Religion

In this chapter Kathryn Lofton and Jeppe Sinding Jensen debate the merits of the cognitive science of religion and its role in defining religion. Lofton argues that Jensen’s initial definition is problematic since the study of religion has always been a humanistic and cultural as opposed to a biological and cognitive activity. To this Jensen replies that, while true, the cognitive science of religion adds another dimension with which to understand religion and religious behavior.

Did a Little Birdie Really Tell Odin? Applying Theory of Mind to Old Norse Religion

Theory of mind, the theory that humans attribute mental states to others, has become increasingly influential in the Cognitive Science of Religion in recent years, due to several papers which posit that supernatural agents, like gods, demons, and the dead, are accredited greater than normal knowledge and awareness. Using Old Norse mythology and literary accounts of Old Norse religion, supported by archaeological evidence, I examine the extent to which this modern perspective on religious theory of mind is reflected in religious traditions from the Viking Age. I focus especially on the extent to which superperception and superknowledge were attributed to Old Norse supernatural agents and the impact of this on expressions of religion; how the attribution of theory of mind varied with circumstances and the agents to which it was being attributed; and the extent to which features of religious theory of mind common in other societies were present in the historical North. On this basis, I also evaluate the usefulness of Old Norse historiography to Cognitive Science of Religion and vice versa.