Sudan coup sets back Egypt’s GERD position

Significance Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi enjoys a strong relationship with Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Sudan’s top general who led the coup. Burhan has been a vocal ally of Cairo in the conflict with Addis Ababa over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Impacts Political instability in Sudan will delay the possibility of reaching a deal on the dam. If Burhan does not share power with civilian leaders, international mediation favouring the two downstream nations will be unlikely. Joint military action by Egypt and Sudan against Ethiopia is highly unlikely in the near future, despite posturing.

Sudan coup attempt may reopen political faultlines

Significance Military and civilian leaders within the current power-sharing government have since accused each other of creating the conditions that prompted the coup, in an escalating confrontation over security sector reform that risks becoming a greater threat to the transition than the coup attempt itself. Impacts The more aggressively the commission established to dismantle the former regime conducts its work, the more the risk of coups will rise. Concrete guarantees of immunity for past crimes could encourage some (but not all) military leaders to consider more serious reforms. Civilian leaders might revive discussions shelved last year about creating a new internal security organ under civilian control.

Politics or Performance? Leadership Accountability in UN Peacekeeping

International organizations face a trade-off between the need to replace poorly performing leaders and the imperative of preserving the loyalty of influential or pivotal member states. This performance-politics dilemma is particularly acute in UN peacekeeping. Leaders of peacekeeping operations are responsible for ensuring that peacekeepers implement mandates, maintain discipline, and stay safe. Yet, if leaders fail to do so, is the UN Secretariat able and willing to replace them? We investigate newly collected data on the tenure of 238 civilian and military leaders in thirty-eight peacekeeping operations, 1978 to 2017. We find that the tenures of civilian leaders are insensitive to performance, but that military leaders in poorly performing missions are more likely to be replaced. We also find evidence that political considerations complicate the UN’s efforts at accountability. Holding mission performance constant, military leaders from countries that are powerful or contribute large numbers of troops stay longer in post.

Civil–Military Relations And Grand Strategy

Civil–military relations affect three major dimensions of grand strategy. They first shape the core principles, or substance of a state’s grand strategy. For example, relations between military and political leaders may determine whether a state is inclined toward a grand strategy that entails significant global commitments and military ventures, one that is revisionist towards the regional or global order, or that is more cautious in its use of military power and foreign interventions. Second, civil–military relations affect the character of a state’s grand strategy. Specifically, they help determine whether a state is able to align its grand strategy’s political, diplomatic, military and economic components, or whether the state instead is prone to pursue a poorly integrated strategy composed of irreconcilable approaches across these different domains. Last, relations between military and civilian leaders influence the execution or implementation of a grand strategy and therefore, whatever its putative merits, whether the state can in fact achieve the promise of the principles they espouse.

What Makes a Military Professional? Evaluating Norm Socialization in West Point Cadets

Scholars have contended that norms of professionalism are critical to understanding how militaries interact with civilian leaders and when they intervene in politics. Yet, few studies have directly examined the normative structures of military officers. Through a survey of 1468 US Military Academy cadets, this study evaluates cadets’ views toward professionalism, and in particular what is often presumed to be the dominant framework of those norms based on Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the State. We identify five patterns of normative beliefs based on cadets’ views of civil–military interaction and the nonpartisan ethic: orthodox, unorthodox, inconsistent, non-committal, and motivated norms. Cadets fall into each of these categories, but approximately one-quarter demonstrate motivated norms, adhering when convenient, and otherwise dispensing with them when the rules they prescribe clash with their partisan identities. These findings, especially our novel conceptualization on norm adherence, contribute to a greater understanding of military culture and professionalism.

Soldiers, Pollsters, and International Crises: Public Opinion and the Military's Advice on the Use of Force

When advising civilian leaders on the use of force, are nonelected officials swayed by public opinion? Scholars have long debated whether public preferences affect foreign policy, but most studies focus on elected politicians, overlooking the nonelected officials who formulate policies and advise leaders. Bureaucrats and nonelected officials are expected to provide advice based on technical expertise, yet they may have institutional incentives and civic-minded reasons to recommend actions that align with popular preferences. This potentially creates additional channels through which public opinion influences policy decisions. An original survey experiment fielded on US military officers reveals that public opposition makes military leaders less likely to recommend the use of force. This article contributes to debates on the role of public opinion in foreign policymaking, integrates research on public opinion and civil–military relations, and yields broader insights for scholars studying the behavior of officials who are not subject to electoral incentives. Al asesorar a los dirigentes civiles sobre el uso de la fuerza, los funcionarios no electos ¿se dejan influir por la opinión pública? Los estudiosos llevan mucho tiempo debatiendo si las preferencias del público afectan a la política exterior, pero la mayoría de los trabajos se centran en los políticos electos, pasando por alto a los funcionarios no electos que formulan las políticas y asesoran a los líderes. Se espera que los burócratas y los funcionarios no electos ofrezcan un asesoramiento basado en la experiencia técnica, pero que puedan tener incentivos institucionales y razones de carácter cívico para recomendar acciones que se alineen con las preferencias populares. Potencialmente, esto crea canales adicionales a través de los cuales la opinión pública influye en las decisiones políticas. Una original encuesta realizada a oficiales militares estadounidenses revela que la oposición pública hace que los líderes militares sean menos propensos a recomendar el uso de la fuerza. Este trabajo contribuye a los debates sobre el papel de la opinión pública en la construcción de la política exterior, integra la investigación sobre la opinión pública y las relaciones cívico–militares, y aporta una visión más amplia para los estudiosos que evalúan el comportamiento de los funcionarios que no son objeto de incentivos electorales. Les officiels non élus sont-ils influencés par l'opinion publique lorsqu'ils conseillent des dirigeants civils sur le recours à la force? Des chercheurs ont longuement débattu pour déterminer si les préférences publiques affectaient la politique étrangère, mais la plupart des études se concentrent sur les politiciens élus en négligeant les officiels non élus qui formulent les politiques et conseillent les dirigeants. Les bureaucrates et officiels non élus sont supposés prodiguer des conseils reposant sur une expertise technique, mais ils peuvent toutefois avoir des motivations institutionnelles et des raisons d'ordre civique de recommander des mesures alignées sur les préférences populaires. Cela crée potentiellement des canaux supplémentaires par lesquels l'opinion publique influence les décisions politiques. Une expérience d'enquête originale menée sur des officiers de l'Armée américaine révèle que l'opposition publique rend les dirigeants militaires moins susceptibles de recommander le recours à la force. Cet article contribue aux débats sur le rôle de l'opinion publique dans l’élaboration de la politique étrangère en y intégrant des recherches sur l'opinion publique et sur les relations entre civils et militaires et en apportant des renseignements plus larges aux chercheurs qui étudient le comportement des officiels qui ne sont pas sujets à des motivations électorales.

Nazi Looting of Art

Adolf Hitler and the Nazis were not only the most systematic mass murderers in history, they were also history’s greatest thieves. Beginning with the duress sales of Jewish property starting in 1933 and escalating to expropriation as part of emigration in Austria to outright seizure in conquered nations during World War II, the Nazis carried out a plundering program that extended to millions of cultural objects. The Allied response began during the war: after concerned academics (such as the Harvard Defense Group) alerted military and civilian leaders to the dangers to Europe’s cultural patrimony, the United States created the Roberts Commission to study the issue, which in turn led to the creation of Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives section, where officers accompanied the invading armies and tried to mitigate the damage from combat, as well as track the looted works. The Monuments officers undertook a massive, international restitution effort, but could not complete the task: there is still much “unfinished business” from this era. The literature on Nazi plundering and Allied restitution is rich and varied: from the vivid accounts of the Monuments officers to the technical and occasionally arcane scholarly interventions (e.g., how to interpret labels on the backs of paintings). The opening of archives and the continued discovery of Nazi-looted works in museums and private collections has served as an impetus for continued research, and an international effort promises to yield further discoveries. This article is divided into twenty-two sections, with the entries in chronological order. It bears mentioning that there are four sections where the historiography is particularly rich: (1) plunder and restitution in France, (2) the literature on “degenerate art,” (3) Nazi-looted art and the law, and (4) anthologies. The first is likely due to the cultural riches of France, as well as the accessibility of archives. The scholarship on “degenerate art” took off in the late 1980s, with the observance of the fifty-year anniversary of the Aktion in 1987, and the public revelation of the Gurlitt cache in 2013 contributed to this impetus (Hildebrand Gurlitt had been one of the four official dealers of the purged art). Due to the emergence of myriad restitution cases starting in the early 2000s, the legal aspects of looting and recovery have attracted intense scholarly interest. And the international nature of the research, which has involved scholars from both North America and Europe, has led to many conferences, which in turn yielded a rich array of anthologies.

Enter the Army

This chapter examines how, when the People's Armed Department (PAD) took control of Feng County, factional rivalries in the county were still ill defined, and rebels competed to be the loudest and most militant in denouncing the party secretary and other top county leaders. After the PAD deposed the county's civilian leaders, local rebels began to align themselves for and against the PAD, sharpening the tensions between Paolian and the PAD. The intervention of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) troops dispatched from Xuzhou sharpened and broadened the emerging factional divisions, making them even more difficult to resolve. The PLA's growing support for Paolian and formation of a “great alliance committee” brought two rebel groups of junior county cadres into an alliance while excluding the vociferously anti-Paolian cadre rebels. This drove a wedge between the two groups of county-level cadres, one that deepened when Paolian later merged with supportive cadre rebels in a large new rebel alliance under PLA protection. Senior county officials also split, with most of them forming an affiliation with either Paolian or Liansi. Whatever the personal motives for their choice of factions, it clearly had the effect of offering protection from attacks by the other mass factions. Cadres in rural communes, however, almost uniformly stood on the side of Liansi.

Sharing Saddles: Oligarchs and Officers on Horseback in Egypt and Tunisia

Research on the military's removal from politics overemphasizes the attitudes and interests of officers. Civilians are portrayed as incapable of confronting refractory men with guns. This essay compares regime transitions in Egypt (2011–2013) and Tunisia (2011–2014) to show that unified civilian elites strengthen and polarized elites undermine civilian control of the armed forces. Research for the cases is based on interviews with Egyptian and Tunisian businesspersons, party members, and civil society activists; the International Consortium of Investigation Journalists's tax-offshoring database; loan disbursements from the IMF and World Bank; and secondary sources in Arabic, French, and English. The cases reveal novel insights about the military's removal from politics in fledgling democracies. Pleasing Egypt's officers did not shield President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood from a coup in July 2013 because Morsi and the Brotherhood threatened the wealth and power of civilian politicians and oligarchs. In Tunisia, Islamist and non-Islamist political and economic elites pushed democratization for fear of another Ben “Ali-style kleptocracy. Even during crisis in 2013, united civilian elites contained opposition calls for army intervention. The study's findings suggest that democratizers are not at the mercy of soldiers, but rather civilian leaders have the power to sideline their armies.