The Honour of the Crown: Giving Effect to the True Purpose of the Treaty of Waitangi

<p>The Treaty was a constitutional agreement entered into by Maori, then sovereign of New Zealand, and the British Crown. The purpose of intention of this agreement was to enable both parties – Maori and the Crown – to share public power over Aotearoa, New Zealand. This paper refers to this purpose as the kawanatanga-tino rangatiratanga relationship, or dual sovereignty. This purpose has been derived from the Maori version of the Treaty, according to the Maori legal system which governed New Zealand at the time. This purpose has not been given effect to, instead our constitution holds the Crown as the sovereign, and Maori are mere subjects of the Crown. This arrangement allowed the Crown to introduce their colonial legal system that enabled them to attain Maori land through war, confiscation and other means throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries. This in turn has created a “cycle of grievance” among our Maori community which keep Maori oppressed, claiming rights from the Crown which can be given, but are often taken away again or breached, depending on the political leanings of the day. The only way we can end this cycle of grievance, and restore legitimacy to our constitution, and restore Maori to their intended constitutional position of sovereign Treaty partner, alongside the Crown. While this proposal may seem very radical, it is argued that New Zealand has been heading towards dual sovereignty through an “organic” revolution known as the Maori Renaissance that began in the 1970s. This paper will trace this “organic” revolution pointing to three specific institutions as examples of movement towards dual sovereignty: the Waitangi Tribunal, the Treaty Settlements process and the Treaty Principles. It is argued that while these institutions have made some incredible advances for Maori rights, they remain confined by our current constitutional arrangements that recognise the Crown as the only sovereign. This paper argues that what is needed as the next step in this organic revolution, is to step outside of our current constitutional arrangements and give effect to the true intention of the Treaty. This paper thus reflects on the historical context in and the Maori legal system in which the Treaty was signed. This paper then explains how we might be able to achieve this through the courts by invoking the doctrine of the honour of the Crown and adopting Dr Carwyn Jones’ theory of a ‘constitutional korero’. The honour of the Crown is a common-law doctrine that requires the Crown to honour its constitutional obligations. It recognises colonial governments as part of a special nation-to-nation relationship with indigenous peoples and can therefore give effect to the indigenous legal system and world-view that our current institutions cannot do. In this way it can perform as a limit on the Crown and its Parliamentary Supremacy. It is argued that realistically the courts may invoke this doctrine to enforce obligations made by the Crown to iwi through the recent Treaty Claims Settlements legislation. It is argued, however, that in keeping with this organic revolution, an eventual court may one day invoke the doctrine to enforce Article 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi itself and dual sovereignty may be achieved.</p>

The Honour of the Crown: Giving Effect to the True Purpose of the Treaty of Waitangi

<p>The Treaty was a constitutional agreement entered into by Maori, then sovereign of New Zealand, and the British Crown. The purpose of intention of this agreement was to enable both parties – Maori and the Crown – to share public power over Aotearoa, New Zealand. This paper refers to this purpose as the kawanatanga-tino rangatiratanga relationship, or dual sovereignty. This purpose has been derived from the Maori version of the Treaty, according to the Maori legal system which governed New Zealand at the time. This purpose has not been given effect to, instead our constitution holds the Crown as the sovereign, and Maori are mere subjects of the Crown. This arrangement allowed the Crown to introduce their colonial legal system that enabled them to attain Maori land through war, confiscation and other means throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries. This in turn has created a “cycle of grievance” among our Maori community which keep Maori oppressed, claiming rights from the Crown which can be given, but are often taken away again or breached, depending on the political leanings of the day. The only way we can end this cycle of grievance, and restore legitimacy to our constitution, and restore Maori to their intended constitutional position of sovereign Treaty partner, alongside the Crown. While this proposal may seem very radical, it is argued that New Zealand has been heading towards dual sovereignty through an “organic” revolution known as the Maori Renaissance that began in the 1970s. This paper will trace this “organic” revolution pointing to three specific institutions as examples of movement towards dual sovereignty: the Waitangi Tribunal, the Treaty Settlements process and the Treaty Principles. It is argued that while these institutions have made some incredible advances for Maori rights, they remain confined by our current constitutional arrangements that recognise the Crown as the only sovereign. This paper argues that what is needed as the next step in this organic revolution, is to step outside of our current constitutional arrangements and give effect to the true intention of the Treaty. This paper thus reflects on the historical context in and the Maori legal system in which the Treaty was signed. This paper then explains how we might be able to achieve this through the courts by invoking the doctrine of the honour of the Crown and adopting Dr Carwyn Jones’ theory of a ‘constitutional korero’. The honour of the Crown is a common-law doctrine that requires the Crown to honour its constitutional obligations. It recognises colonial governments as part of a special nation-to-nation relationship with indigenous peoples and can therefore give effect to the indigenous legal system and world-view that our current institutions cannot do. In this way it can perform as a limit on the Crown and its Parliamentary Supremacy. It is argued that realistically the courts may invoke this doctrine to enforce obligations made by the Crown to iwi through the recent Treaty Claims Settlements legislation. It is argued, however, that in keeping with this organic revolution, an eventual court may one day invoke the doctrine to enforce Article 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi itself and dual sovereignty may be achieved.</p>

Democracy, Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law: Beholden to Constituent Power

<p>Democratic government serves two purposes, both requiring that the substantive element of the rule of law be adhered to. A living constitution is required by a government to able to maintain civil society, which is the main occupation of the rule of law and, secondly, the rule of law also vouchsafes rights and freedoms. Hence, the rule of law enforced by the courts is the factor that controls the constitution, and increasingly this includes controlling the government, both the legislature and executive. This paper considers the capacities of democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, in the context of both New Zealand’s unwritten and America’s written constitutions, with the view of locating the constitution making power (constituent power). The power that makes and changes the constitution was originally found with the people, parliament, and the executive. However, a modern formulation of the rule of law that seeks to replace parliamentary supremacy as the ultimate principle of legality appears to be arising. An egalitarian society is becoming the preferred option by all parties. In this context, the constitution making power will be with the vessel that is working towards creating such a society. To that end, the paper recommends a Constitutional Commission for New Zealand that would review legislation for constitutionality, including adherence to the rule of law. The objective of the Constitutional Commission would be to recommend the review of law for constitutionality, including adherence to the rule of law.</p>

Democracy, Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law: Beholden to Constituent Power

<p>Democratic government serves two purposes, both requiring that the substantive element of the rule of law be adhered to. A living constitution is required by a government to able to maintain civil society, which is the main occupation of the rule of law and, secondly, the rule of law also vouchsafes rights and freedoms. Hence, the rule of law enforced by the courts is the factor that controls the constitution, and increasingly this includes controlling the government, both the legislature and executive. This paper considers the capacities of democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, in the context of both New Zealand’s unwritten and America’s written constitutions, with the view of locating the constitution making power (constituent power). The power that makes and changes the constitution was originally found with the people, parliament, and the executive. However, a modern formulation of the rule of law that seeks to replace parliamentary supremacy as the ultimate principle of legality appears to be arising. An egalitarian society is becoming the preferred option by all parties. In this context, the constitution making power will be with the vessel that is working towards creating such a society. To that end, the paper recommends a Constitutional Commission for New Zealand that would review legislation for constitutionality, including adherence to the rule of law. The objective of the Constitutional Commission would be to recommend the review of law for constitutionality, including adherence to the rule of law.</p>

7. Parliamentary Supremacy

Titles in the Complete series combine extracts from a wide range of primary materials with clear explanatory text to provide readers with a complete introductory resource. Parliamentary supremacy means that the Westminster Parliament is legally entitled to pass, amend, or repeal any law it wishes. Consequently, if the House of Commons and the House of Lords pass the legislation and the monarch gives her royal assent, then no court or other body has the legal power to declare the legislation invalid. This explains why the term ‘parliamentary supremacy’ has been coined: (the Queen in) Parliament holds the supreme law-making power in the UK. This chapter sketches the history leading to parliamentary supremacy. It discusses the theories behind the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy; restrictions on the power of Parliament; how parliamentary supremacy compares with constitutional supremacy; and how parliamentary supremacy fits with the separation of powers and the rule of law.

9. Parliamentary Supremacy and Human Rights

Titles in the Complete series combine extracts from a wide range of primary materials with clear explanatory text to provide readers with a complete introductory resource. This chapter examines the legislative supremacy of the UK Parliament and its impact on human rights protection (and vice versa), discussing the history of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in a UK context and the ECHR’s legal standing. It considers the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998) and its operation in the UK. The chapter addresses how the ECHR and the HRA 1998 affect parliamentary supremacy and how the human rights context differs from the former EU context as regards parliamentary supremacy. Finally, it analyses whether parliamentary supremacy provides adequate protection of human rights.

8. Parliamentary Supremacy and Membership of the European Union

Titles in the Complete series combine extracts from a wide range of primary materials with clear explanatory text to provide readers with a complete introductory resource. This chapter provides an overview of the relationship between the European Union (EU) and the UK and the impact of this relationship on Parliament’s legislative supremacy. It begins by considering the nature of the EU and the sources of EU law. It then examines how EU membership affected the UK legal order during the UK’s membership and its implications for parliamentary supremacy. It considers the impact of Brexit and the UK–EU Trade and Co-operation Agreement on the UK’s constitutional framework.

10. Devolution and Parliamentary Supremacy

Titles in the Complete series combine extracts from a wide range of primary materials with clear explanatory text to provide readers with a complete introductory resource. Devolution can be defined as the conferral of powers by a central governing institution on a regional or national governing body, without the central institution having to concede legislative supremacy. Such devolved powers can be administrative, executive, or legislative in nature. The process of devolving such powers to three of the UK’s four nations—England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland—was initiated by the passing of the Devolution Acts of 1998. This chapter begins by tracing the history of devolution and then discusses the ways that power can be devolved and the roles and powers of the Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly, and the Northern Ireland Assembly. It addresses the question of whether there should there be an English Parliament and, finally, examines the effects of devolution on parliamentary supremacy, as well as the effects the UK’s exit from the EU has had on the devolution settlement.

The British Past in the Imperial Crisis

This chapter explores the use of the British past in the political writings of the imperial crisis. Primarily, it explores how colonists’ interpretations of the Glorious Revolution changed during the crisis and how their new understanding of that event helped shape patriot rhetoric after 1767. Having previously served as the foundation of their identities as British subjects, patriots came to understand the Glorious Revolution not as having restored the balance of the “ancient constitution” but as having given rise to the doctrine of “parliamentary supremacy,” which allowed Parliament, in colonists’ minds, to exert absolute authority over the colonies and act as arbitrarily as any seventeenth-century Stuart monarch. This fundamental shift in their historical understanding brought colonists’ cultural relationship to the Glorious Revolution, and hence the British past, into question and resulted in the turn toward more universal arguments based on natural law after 1773.

‘Maranga Ake Ai’ The Heroics of Constitutionalising Te Tiriti O Waitangi/The Treaty of Waitangi in Aotearoa New Zealand

In 1840, some of the sovereign nations of Māori signed te Tiriti o Waitangi (the Māori language version of the Treaty of Waitangi) with the British Crown. Hone Heke was the first Māori leader of the northern nation of Ngāpuhi to sign, but by 1844 he was leading a significant revolt against British colonialism in Aotearoa New Zealand by chopping down British flagpoles erected on his lands. While Māori may have initially welcomed the intent of te Tiriti as a means for seeking British help to protect their international borders, the British prioritised the English version of the Treaty which recorded the transfer of sovereignty from Māori to the British. As the British transposed their dominant legal traditions of governance, including bringing to the fore their doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, Māori have been seeking their survival ever since. We extend this by focusing on why the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty needs to adapt to the Treaty’s promise of bicultural power sharing.