Competition and physician-induced demand in a healthcare market with regulated price: evidence from Ghana

Using panel data of administrative claims spanning 36 months (2017–2019) and an instrumental variable method, this study examines whether physician-induced demand for hypertension disease care exists in Ghana’s healthcare system where price is regulated, and there is no co-payment. We find that an increase in competition—measured as a high doctor-to-population ratio at the district level—leads to an increase in the number of physician visits, suggesting physician-induced demand exists, and that effects are greater for large hospitals and public health providers. This result is further supported by alternative measures and specifications showing that physicians’ revenue from medication and gross revenue increase as the physician density increases. These pattern suggest that physicians in high density areas, faced with a decrease in number of patients per physician, make up for the decline in income by inducing more patient visits.

PP18 Is there provider induced demand at emergency departments with primary care services? Patient, local and wider system factors described to influence demand for primary care in emergency departments: realist evaluation

BackgroundEvidence from evaluations of emergency departments (EDs) with co-located primary care services suggests that they influence additional demand for non-urgent care (provider-induced demand). In a realist review of the literature on the effects of primary care services in EDs we proposed a theory that when primary care services are distinct at an ED they may encourage additional primary care demand and when primary care clinicians work indistinctly in the ED there is no additional demand. We aimed to explore evidence for this theory and explain contexts, mechanisms and outcomes that influence such demand.MethodsWe used realist evaluation methodology and carried out observations of key processes. We interviewed 23 patients, 21 ED clinical directors, 26 other ED staff members and 26 GPs at 13 EDs (England & Wales). Field notes and audio-recorded interviews were transcribed and analysed by creating context, mechanism and outcome configurations to refine and develop theories relating to provider induced demand.ResultsEDs with distinct primary care services were perceived to attract more demand for primary care than EDs where primary care clinicians worked indistinctly because the primary care service was visible, widely known about, enabled direct access, and received NHS 111 referrals. Other influences on demand were patients’ experiences of accessing primary care, the capacity for urgent care in the community, location of the ED and public transport links, service design and developments (new buildings, renovations) and population characteristics (unfamiliarity with local healthcare services, not registered with a GP or different cultural perceptions of seeking health care).ConclusionsA range of patient, local-system and wider-system factors contribute to additional demand at an ED with co-located primary care services. Our findings can inform providers and policymakers in developing strategies to limit the effect of these influences on additional demand.

Medicolegal Perspective on Physician-Induced Demand Issue

<p>This study sheds light on the extent to which the medical law protects patients' rights from Physician-Induced Demand behavior. This study shows that the term of Physician-Induced Demand has not been recognized in health regulations. Meanwhile, some often fail to recall that medical law has protected patients’ right in the therapeutic transaction between doctor and patient through Act No. 29 of 2004; Minister of Health Regulations number 11 Year 2017; Act No. 44 of 2009, Civil Code and Act No. 36 of 2009. In order to reduce Physician-Induced Demand, establishing a guideline of good clinical practice, including the informed-consent guideline is urgently needed. Government should also control the quality and cost of healthcare providers as well as adequate payment system for physicians.</p><p><strong>Keywords:</strong> Physician-Induced Demand; Medical Law; Legal Protection of Patient.</p>

Physician induced demand for knee replacement surgery in Iran

Background The structure of the Iranian health system has raised this hypothesis that a part of the Knee Replacement Surgery (KRS) services are provided due to Physician-Induced Demand (PID). Methods This paper used an unbalanced individual panel data covering the steady-state 15,729 KRSs performed by 995 surgeons provided by the Armed Forces Insurance Organization at the provincial level over the 60 months (2014–2018). We use a generalized method of moment’s system (GMM-SYS) to obtain consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates, which provide a vital instrument for our dynamic panel data. Results The outcomes show that with unequal increasing orthopedic surgeons to population ratio, both the number and size of KRS services were increased significantly at a 1 % level. Given that the positive elasticity obtained for the service size was significantly larger than the number of services, the findings give strong support for the existence of PID in the Iran system for KRS care. Also, the raw and population-adjusted number of KRS, cost, and the surgery per active physician increased significantly at the monthly province level. Conclusions This is the first time that the existence of PID in the Iranian health system is investigated using approved econometric models. The findings indicate that the health system structure has been provided the conditions for aggressive, costly, and high-risk services such as KRS to be exposed to PID.