The Hybrid Solution to the Problems of Error and Uncertainty

Chapter 10 investigates whether the combined Austere and Hybrid two-tier system, now re-labeled the “Hybrid solution,” provides an effective response to the problem of uncertainty. Criteria of adequacy for a solution to this problem are articulated, and versions of the approach offering a single decision-guide at the lower tier are assessed. Popular guides, such as “Perform the act most likely to be obligatory,” “Maximize expected value,” and “Try to perform the obligatory act,” along with more sophisticated guides proposed by Fred Feldman and John Pollock, are each shown to be inadequate, partly because they demand a richer set of beliefs than many agents possess. The chapter concludes that a Hybrid system offering multiple decision-guides for uncertainty seems far better positioned to solve the problem of uncertainty.

What Makes the Good Life Good? An Investigation into the Nature of Happiness

My research focuses on the nature of happiness as presented by contemporary philosopher Fred Feldman in his recent work, What is This Thing Called Happiness?(2010). Feldman offers an innovative theory of happiness that suggests happiness is contingent on a subject’s capacity to acquire more pleasure than displeasure in his or her surroundings. Feldman’s model is a valuable contribution to the study of happiness because it calls attention to the power a subject has in determining her own happiness. Like many of his predecessors including Aristotle, Feldman describes the happy life as the Good Life. However, where Aristotle measures the Good Life in terms of virtue, Feldman uses welfare as his metric. A problem with Feldman’s approach is that he rejects Aristotle’s arguments for why happiness is the Good without providing a suitable alternative. In this paper, I address the limitations of Feldman’s model by examining the implications of this omission. I will argue that Feldman lacks a conclusive argument for why the Good Life consists of welfare. Most significantly, Feldman’s account is problematic because it leads to the unusual conclusion that many of us are not in fact pursuing the Good Life for fear of becoming moral monsters. By reintroducing virtue into our description of happiness, and arguments for why happiness is our greatest good, I think that we can rescue contemporary theories of happiness from the repugnant moral conclusions that I have suggested are present in Feldman’s work.

Should Desert Replace Equality? Replies to Kagan

Many people are moved by the thought that if A is worse off than B, then if we can improve the condition of one or the other but not both that it is better to improve the condition of A. Egalitarians are buoyed by the prevalence of such thoughts. But something other than egalitarianism could be driving these thoughts. In particular, such thoughts could be motivated, instead, by a combination of the belief that desert should determine how people fare and the belief that, for the most part, people are equally deserving. Shelly Kagan has pushed this line of argument, suggesting that desert should replace equality as a normative ideal. He argues that desert theory and egalitarianism often agree, and when they don’t intuition favors desert theory. A number of authors have offered responses to Kagan, including Serena Olsaretti, Fred Feldman, and Richard Arneson. However, I maintain that their responses are inadequate, primarily because they simply fail to capture the compelling intuitions that Kagan appeals to in making his case. There are other responses, however, and I consider three, each of which offers an egalitarian position that is compatible with Kagan’s most compelling intuitions. Thus, I maintain that Kagan has not sufficiently established that desert should replace equality as a normative ideal. There is still room for a genuinely egalitarian position, though Kagan’s reflections helpfully force egalitarians to further develop and refine their thinking.

Fred Feldman, What is This Thing Called Happiness? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. xv + 286-ERRATUM.

The publishers regret to announce that some corrections in the article by Erik Angner1 were not incorporated in the final published version. The corrections are listed below.Page 459, line 52 – 53 should be Feldman's account hinges on a distinction between two kinds of pleasure.Page 461, line 142 should be George Mason University.