Constructing a Moorean ‘Open Question’ Argument: The Real Thought Move and the Real Objective

How Moore’s open question argument works, insofar as it does, remains a matter of controversy. The author’s purpose here is to construct an open question argument based on a novel interpretation of how Moore’s argument might work. In order to sidestep exegetical questions, he does not claim to be offering Moore’s own argument. Rather, the author offers a reconstruction, making use of important elements of Moore’s methodology and assumptions that could be reasonable within a Moorean viewpoint. The crucial role within the argument is played by what the author calls the real thought move. He shows that the reconstructed argument is more defensible from some standard objections than the common construction. The author finishes by drawing attention to a neglected objective that would make sense within Moore’s viewpoint, showing that it fits with a major commitment of Bonjour’s moderate rationalism, and showing how the package might be important for the non-naturalist today.

Normative Principles are Synthetic A Priori

I argue for the claim that there are instances of a priori justified belief – in particular, justified belief in moral principles – that are not analytic, i.e., that cannot be explained solely by the understanding we have of their propositions. §1–2 provides the background necessary for understanding this claim: in particular, it distinguishes between two ways a proposition can be analytic, Basis and Constitutive, and provides the general form of a moral principle. §§3–5 consider whether Hume's Law, properly interpreted, can be established by Moore's Open Question Argument, and concludes that it cannot: while Moore's argument – appropriately modified – is effective against the idea that moral judgments are either (i) reductively analyzable or (ii) Constitutive-analytic, a different argument is needed to show that they are not (iii) Basis-analytic. Such an argument is supplied in §6. §§7–8 conclude by considering how these considerations bear on recent discussions of “alternative normative concepts”, on the epistemology of intuitions, and on the differences between disagreement in moral domains and in other a priori domains such as logic and mathematics.

Non-natural natural law: bridging the gap between Aristotle and Ross

Aristotelianism is often considered to be a version of naturalism. As a result, non-naturalism is often considered to be incompatible with Aristotelianism. In this paper, I will show that the Aristotelian can actually accept much of what the non-naturalist wants to say. I will show that the Aristotelian can accept a non-natural account of the good, need not be concerned by G. E. Moore’s Open Question Argument and that, as long as we carefully consider and define our terms, they can accept much of non-naturalism in abstract. This then paves the way for the possibility of a non-natural natural law and should go some way to challenging the prevailing orthodoxy that Aristotelianism is a version of naturalism. I do not go so far as to label Aristotelianism a form of non-naturalism as there are some important areas of disagreement. Instead, I think that Aristotelianism should count as its own label and that it will resist any attempts to label it a form of naturalism, non-naturalism or, indeed, supernaturalism.

What Is Meaning: Reference or Something Else?

The debate over the meaning of referential terms has a long history in both linguistics and language philosophy. Moore applied referential theory of meaning in two famous arguments: The Refutation of Idealism and The Open Question Argument. The validity of referential theory is key point to decide whether these two arguments are successful or not. This paper argues that the plausibility of referential theory is subject to controversy and thus the conclusions of these two arguments are logically invalid. This research firstly demonstrates the logic behind Moore’s two arguments and explain how Moore reached his conclusions by assuming the referential theory of meaning, then discusses problems that referentialism inevitably confronts, proving the solutions that Moore proposed to solve these problems are unfeasible, and concludes that these arguments fail for it doesn’t comply with our rational intuition, providing linguistic perspective to examine philosophical problems.

Realism, Objectivity, and Evaluation

This chapter discusses “realist pluralism” in mathematics and morality. It argues that, under the assumption of pluralism, factual questions get deflated while practical -- i.e., what-to-do -- questions do not. It then uses this contrast to formulate a radicalization of Moore’s Open Question Argument. Practical questions remain open even when the facts, including the evaluative facts, come cheaply. The chapter concludes that practical realism must be false, but practical questions are objective in a paradigmatic respect. Conversely, mathematical realism is true, but mathematical questions fail to be objective. An important upshot of the discussion is that the concepts of realism and objectivity, which are widely identified, are actually in tension.

Rupert Schreibers Deskriptionsthese

This paper deals with the ‚description-thesis‘ (R. Schreiber 1962) according to which normative or prescriptive legal statements are reducible to, or translatable into, descriptive propositions. The arguments Schreiber produced in support of his thesis are briefly presented, followed by a discussion of the thesis against the background of Hume’s law and G. E. Moore’s open-question argument. In order to broaden the perspective, some other philosophical views are examined; emphasis is placed on how the is-ought relation was conceived, in conflicting ways, by Hans Kelsen and Friedrich Müller respectively, as compared to the current state of discussion, and what are, according to Ernst Tugendhat and Christoph Möllers, the constituents of (social) norms. As a result, the paper suggests that the description-thesis can not be maintained in its entirety. A special version is presented which seems to respond to the criticism discussed while implying at least part of what Schreiber’s original version claimed.

Defending the Moral/Epistemic Parity

Do irreducible moral and epistemic facts stand or fall together? In his critical engagement with Cuneo’s The Normative Web, Chris Heathwood maintains that they do not. Appealing to a version of the Open Question Argument, Heathwood argues that while reductionism in the moral domain is not feasible, it is so in the epistemic domain. Heathwood presents non-reductive realists with what appears to be a difficult choice: give up on either The Normative Web’s argument for non-reductive realism or the Open Question Argument. In this chapter, it is contended that non-reductive realists do not face this difficult choice. Central to the case is the claim that, while analyzing epistemic concepts in terms of descriptive ones has its attractions, it is considerably more challenging than Heathwood maintains. Some wider lessons are drawn by identifying the difficulties that face those who wish to defend a broadly reductive view of the epistemic domain.

Open question argument

The open question argument is the heart of G.E. Moore’s case against ethical naturalism. Ethical naturalism is the view that goodness, rightness, etc. are natural properties; roughly, the sorts of properties that can be investigated by the natural sciences. Moore claims that, for any candidate naturalistic account of an ethical term according to which ‘good’ had the same meaning as some naturalistic term A, we might without confusion ask: ‘I see that this act is A, but is it good?’ Moore claimed that the existence of such open questions shows that ethical naturalism is mistaken. In the century since its introduction, the open question argument has faced a battery of objections. Despite these challenges, some contemporary philosophers claim that the core of Moore’s argument can be salvaged. The most influential defences link Moore’s argument to the difficulty that naturalistic ethical realists face in explaining the practical role of ethical concepts in deliberation.

Posible respuesta tomista a la ley de Hume y a la pregunta abierta de Moore

Este artículo se refiere a la doctrina práctica de Aquino sobre dos dificultades filosóficas que subyacen en gran parte del debate ético contemporáneo. Una es la Is-ought thesis de Hume y la otra es su consecuencia radical la Open-question argument de Moore. Estas paradojas éticas parecen tener sus raíces en un scepticismo epistemológico y en una antropología deficiente. La posible respuesta a ellas se puede encontrar en que: a) Tomás de Aquino defiende la esencial racionalidad y unidad del ser humano; b) La ley natural tomista es una consecuencia natural del ser racional; c) La razón humana es esencialmente teórica y práctica al mismotiempo. El intelecto humano de Aquino naturalmente realiza tres operaciones principales: 1º) Aprehender las nociones inteligidas y universales ens, verum y bonum. 2º) Formular los primeros principios teóricos y prácticos. 3º) Ordenar que se haga el bien inteligido y universal y se evite lo contrario. Por estas razones,la respuesta filosófica de Aquino a ambas dificultades no es exclusivamente ética, sino que abarca armónicamente la ontología, antropología y epistemología. La ética de Tomás de Aquino es fundamentalmente diferente de las éticas que califican las acciones como buenas o por mero consenso social (contractualismo) o simplemente calculando sus consecuencias (consecuencialismo).