Turning Over the Keys: Public Prisons, Private Equity, and the Normalization of Markets Behind Bars

In recent decades, public prisons and jails have increasingly outsourced operational functions by “turning over the keys” to private business and, more recently and specifically, to private equity. By the early 2000s, private equity-owned corporations had entered the core sectors of prison and jail operations, creating “markets behind bars” in telecommunications, commissary sales, health provision, and a range of other services. Two decades later, they have become a quasi-oligopolistic market force across the carceral economy. Reacting to these developments, scholars and activists have explored how private firms generate profits by extracting resources from families of the incarcerated. Less explored is the fact that it is often and particularly private equity firms that partner with public carceral institutions in these extractive practices. In this reflection, we propose a three-part schematic for understanding how such partnerships, with their attendant predation on the poor and people of color, have become normalized. We focus, first, on the mechanism of bureaucracy through which mutual profit-making by public and private entities becomes regularized; second, we explore the legal mechanisms—the apparently small but potent and politically unexamined legal maneuvers—that enable the redirection of family resources beyond the support of a loved one to the operational needs of jails and prisons; finally, we trace the role of gender as a social mechanism through which private equity and its prison/jail partners rely simultaneously on women’s traditional role as caretaker and non-traditional role as primary breadwinner. We show that all three mechanisms are crucial to the economic functioning of the carceral state.

To keep or divest a division: Canon’s strategy in an oligopolistic market

The issue in this teaching case is the future of the Lithography Division of Canon. The case is situated in 2015 when this division represents around 7.5% of the company’s assets, 13.8% of its sales, and 10% of its capital expenditures. The division is loss-making. This issue is faced by two persons in the organization: the CEO and the CFO of Canon. The CEO would like to keep the division, while the CFO prefers to divest it. The case is particularly interesting because of the market structure: the division operates in the lithography market, which is a clear example of an oligopoly. The case can be used in Strategy, Technology, or Digital Business courses in MSc or MBA programs. The learning objectives of the case are (1) combining information provided via academic journals with facts from the case and the collective knowledge and creativity of a team of students, (2) analyzing the collected information and building a case with strong arguments, (3) creating a convincing strategic plan including a persuasive presentation, and (4) practicing the skills of presenting. The information provided in this case is based on the annual reports of Advanced Semiconductor Materials Lithography (ASML), Canon, and Nikon, and on other publicly available information on the lithography industry. The case itself is fictional. The authors are not aware of any discussions within Canon about the future of the company’s lithography division.

Senior leadership succession and market share: An econometric case study on Native American casinos

Little is known on how turnover and senior leadership attributes affect the long-term performance of a casino resort. The ability to longitudinally measure the turnover effect on market share has been problematic due to most gaming markets exhibiting dynamic conditions with exogenous factors that provide competitive advantages. This study analyzed the effect the turnover rate and successor attributes of the CEO and Chairman of Tribal Council positions have on their casinos’ market share within a balanced oligopolistic market of Connecticut. Additionally, this study investigated which attributes amplify the sensitivity of the CEO tenure status to market share growth. The results suggest increased CEO turnover and CEO hires who already had prior CEO casino experience hinder long-term market share. Moreover, the tenures of more experienced CEOs were less susceptible to market share performance. The results can be leveraged for improved hiring practices at the senior levels of Native American casinos.

Revisited: Monopoly and Long-Run Capital Accumulation in Two-Sector Overlapping Generation Model

In this paper, we investigate if an increasing competition in an oligopolistic market will enhance the real incomes and consumer surplus in the long run. For this purpose, we apply a two-sector overlapping generation model in which members of the young generation own the oligopolistic firms. We show that increasing competition in the oligopolistic market leads to ambiguous outcomes regarding the real income and consumer surplus in the long run. However, we show that the distribution of income will become fairer if the competition increases, but it is possible that the price for a fairer distribution is a lower income for all members of the economy.

Krasnoselski–Mann-type inertial method for solving split generalized mixed equilibrium and hierarchical fixed point problems

In this paper, we present Krasnoselski–Mann-type inertial method for solving split generalized mixed equilibrium and hierarchical fixed point problems for k-strictly pseudocontractive nonself-mappings. We establish that the weak convergence of the proposed accelerated iterative method with inertial terms involves a step size which does not require any prior knowledge of the operator norm under several suitable conditions in Hilbert spaces. Finally, the application to a Nash–Cournot oligopolistic market equilibrium model is discussed, and numerical examples are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of our iterative method.

Offensive, Defensive, and Generic Advertising Strategies in a Dynamic Oligopolistic Market

In today’s highly competitive business environment, advertisement plays an influential role in attracting customers and increasing market share. Companies adopt different advertising strategies in a competitive market, such as offensive, defensive, and generic, to keep and increase their market share. Researchers have generally modeled this problem using a dynamic differential game. All previous research studies have focused on finding these strategies in a duopoly market. Also, to simultaneously determine the optimal equilibrium strategy for these three strategies, the model is designed as a symmetric game due to the ease of solving. In contrast with the previous researches, the purpose of this paper is to present and solve an asymmetric game model to determine the optimal offensive, defensive, and generic advertising strategies in an oligopoly market. The proposed model’s objective is to obtain the maximum equilibrium profit for each company at any moment regarding the market share of each company and those of competitors. A numerical solution method based on the Pontryagin’s maximum principle is developed to solve the model. Then, the proposed model is solved for a triopoly market. Also, the sensitivity of the results to changes in model parameters has been investigated. The obtained results denote that in markets with more than two players under the asymmetric game, the proposed model can prescribe the optimal type of offensive, defensive, and generic advertising strategies.

Using threshold co-integration to estimate asymmetric price transmission in the Turkish milk market

We investigate the price dynamics between retail milk price and raw milk price in the Turkish fluid milk market. The study uses monthly fluid milk prices for 14 years between January 2003 and December 2016. We analyze the price adjustment in the fluid milk market through an asymmetric error correction model with threshold co-integration. We find that the transmission between the two prices has been asymmetric in both the long term and short term period. Differences between the farm milk prices and retail milk prices may exist due to marketing costs across the supply chain and pricing policies associated with the market structure. Results of the long-run analysis indicate a significant market power in the fluid milk market. Therefore, in this asymmetric case, the deviations are likely to be the reason for the market power of the processors/retailers and the reason for the oligopolistic market structure in the sector.

A Dynamic Model of Cournot Competition for an Oligopolistic Market

This paper studies firms’ dynamic interaction in a Cournot market. In each period of the game, the firm decides whether to make a stochastic positioning investment (establishing or maintaining its position in market competition). The market demand is also stochastic (high or low). By adopting symmetric Market perfect Nash equilibrium, firms choose strategies to maximize the discounted present value of cash flow. By considering the cases with one, two, and three active firms in the market, respectively, we present the stage game market outcome, show the transition probabilities, find the steady state of the system, and discuss the speed of convergence. Our work allows for two types of uncertainty in firms’ interactions, which contribute to the dynamic oligopoly literature.

Corporate Governance and the Environmental Politics of Shipping

A handful of companies dominate the world’s shipping industry. These firms have gained political leverage over the global governance of container shipping in particular. Intriguingly, in recent years the Danish conglomerate Maersk—the world’s biggest container and shipping vessel company since the mid-1990s—has been using its influence to push for higher environmental standards for the industry as a whole. To some extent these initiatives are helping to promote environmental efficiencies, cleaner fuels, and greener technology. But they are also raising costs for small and midsized companies with extremely low profit margins, further enhancing the competitiveness of the biggest shipping conglomerates in an increasingly oligopolistic market. While voluntary self-governance by companies such as Maersk is incrementally improving the environmental management of global shipping, it is also further concentrating governance power within a few transnational corporations, potentially taking more ambitious regulation off the agenda.