Moral Status and the Consciousness Criterion

The Consciousness Criterion is the claim that moral status requires consciousness, or that being conscious is a necessary condition for being a person. The idea that consciousness imbues an entity with special value, or moral status, is widely accepted in Western cultures. So much so that it is hardly questioned. It should be questioned. This chapter shows that the Consciousness Criterion fails for two reasons: 1) consciousness is not a moral property, and consciousness alone is not sufficient to ground moral properties (like being autonomous, or being a moral agent), and 2) conscious creatures cannot be identified with certainty, so consciousness is not epistemically robust enough to undergird personhood or moral status. Thus consciousness cannot be a necessary condition for being a person. The moral status project of deciding who is and is not a person is rejected as uninformative concerning what is ethically permissible.

Chimeras, Superchimps, and Post-persons

In the world of contemporary biotechnology, our thinking about species and moral status is being challenged in new ways. First, the creation of interspecies chimeras, in disrupting the human/non-human species boundary, forces us also to go beyond species boundaries in considering how to determine the moral status of these new beings. Second, the possibility of moral status enhancement (or at least enhancing the capacities that on some accounts give rise to moral status), both for non-human animals and for humans, may lead to members of existing biological species having new moral properties, or perhaps even the creation of new ‘moral species’. This chapter explores normative and conceptual challenges raised by the prospect of crossing both biological and moral ‘species boundaries’. It examines the implications of species transitions in relation to identity, obligations towards existing beings and beings that might be created via the species transition process; and reflects on how this might advance our thinking about moral status.

On Moral Properties

This paper is about the relation of resultance, signalled by the ‘because’ in ‘that was wrong because it was dishonest’. It distinguishes resultance from supervenience and uses that distinction to criticize R. M. Hare’s account of the logic of moral judgement in terms of his notion of universalizability. It considers the strengths and weaknesses of Ross’s novel notion of a prima facie duty and the distinction between prima facie duty and duty proper. And it argues that where one action’s rightness results from its having certain properties, it does not follow that all actions with those properties will be right, because other cases may have further properties acting as ‘defeaters’.

Metasemantics for the Relaxed

This chapter discusses how to meet the ‘generalized integration challenge’ as a relaxed moral realist by providing a metasemantics of moral vocabulary which is compatible with relaxing about moral metaphysics and epistemology. Employing normative inferentialism and focussing on evaluative moral terms in particular, it is suggested that evaluative moral terms function to explain proprieties of language exit transitions, where having this function amounts to systematizing language exit transitions through a process of reflective equilibrium. Crucially, this inferentialist take on explanatory function does not engender any substantive metaphysical commitments about moral properties. Moreover, the systematization process on which it is based is undertaken from within moral discourse. As such, understanding evaluative terms as tools that systematize language exits fits perfectly with the relaxed take on moral discourse.

Ethical Emergentism and Moral Causation

This paper focuses on a recently articulated, emergentist conception of ethical naturalism and its commitment to causal efficacy, or the idea that moral properties have causal powers, along with its supporting commitment to moral causation. After I reconstruct the theory, I explain how it offers some interesting theoretical benefits to moral realists in virtue of its commitment to causal efficacy. Then, after locating some examples of moral causation in support of this commitment, I present and respond to five objections to such causation, which all threaten to undermine this support. Lastly, I consider a very serious problem that the theory faces in virtue of positing emergent moral properties as responsible for moral causation – namely, the problem of downward moral causation. I describe this problem in detail and argue that, as it stands, it does not spell doom for the theory.

Is Moral Perception Essentially Rule-Governed? A Critical Assessment of Generalism and a Limited Defense of Particularism

Moral perception, for the purposes of this article, is taken to be the perception of moral properties, unless contexts dictate otherwise. While both particularists and generalists agree that we can perceive the moral properties of an action or a feature, they disagree, however, over whether rules play any essential role in moral perception. The particularists argue for a ‘no’ answer, whereas the generalists say ‘yes’. In this paper, I provide a limited defense of particularism by rebutting several powerful generalist arguments. It is hoped particularism can thus be made more attractive as a theory of moral perception. Positive arguments for particularism will also be provided along the way

Expressivism about delusion attribution

In this paper, I will present and advocate a view about what we are doing when we attribute delusion, namely, say that someone is delusional. It is an “expressivist” view, roughly analogous to expressivism in meta-ethics. Just as meta-ethical expressivism accounts for certain key features of moral discourse, so does this expressivism account for certain key features of delusion attribution. And just as meta-ethical expressivism undermines factualism about moral properties, so does this expressivism, if correct, show that certain attempts to objectively define delusion are misguided. I proceed as follows. I start by examining different attempts at defining delusion, separating broadly psychiatric attempts from epistemic ones. I then present a change of approach, according to which we question whether the term “delusion” is in the business of (merely) describing reality. I then support this proposal, first, by borrowing standard lines of argument from meta-ethics (including ontological reluctance, intrinsic motivation, and deep disagreement) but also, by inference to the best explanation of some the features we see when we try to theorise about delusion (namely that it is hard to define, and that our delusion attributions are elicited by a plurality of norms).

Alternatives

Consequentialists have long debated (as deontologists should) how to define an agent’s alternatives, given that (a) at any particular time an agent performs numerous “versions” of actions, (b) an agent may perform several independent co-temporal actions, and (c) an agent may perform sequences of actions. We need a robust theory of human action to provide an account of alternatives that avoids previously debated problems. After outlining Alvin Goldman’s action theory (which takes a fine-grained approach to act individuation) and showing that the agent’s alternatives must remain invariant across different normative theories, I address issue (a) by arguing that an alternative for an agent at a time is an entire “act tree” performable by her, rather than any individual act token. I argue further that both tokens and trees must possess moral properties, and I suggest principles governing how these are inherited among trees and tokens. These proposals open a path for future work addressing issues (b) and (c).