The Trans-Asian Pathways of ‘Oriental Products’: Navigating the prohibition of narcotics between Turkey, China, and Japan, 1918–1938

Patterns of opium production and distribution shifted immensely over the course of the twentieth century, with output falling by three-quarters, almost nine-tenths of which now takes place in Afghanistan. Supporters of drug prohibition trumpet the success of this long-term decline and hail the withdrawal of the four largest opium producers—India, China, Iran, and the Ottoman empire—from the non-medical market, but this seemingly linear trend conceals numerous deviations of historic significance. Among the most notable and little known is Turkey's prolonged resistance to international restrictions on the narcotics trade and the efforts of state and non-state networks to substitute Turkish opium for the diminishing supply of once-dominant Indian exports to a still opium-hungry China in the first half of the twentieth century. This article uses neglected League of Nations and Turkish government sources alongside international newspapers and diplomatic reports to demonstrate the extent of connections forged by state and non-state actors between Turkey and East Asia, expanding on recent research on trans-Asian connections in commerce and political thought.

Crossing Lines

This chapter exemplifies both the strengths and shortcomings of Beijing’s orchestration approach. It begins by describing how Yunnan province officials utilized Beijing’s support for expanding economic ties in ways that exacerbated the pernicious effects of gambling, logging, and illicit mining in Myanmar’s loosely governed border regions. The second case covers a policy initiative designed to advance multiple interests at modest cost: China’s opium substitution program. The initiative succeeded economically, as Chinese firms earned profits while securing a foothold in Myanmar’s agricultural sector. Yet it failed to stem opium production, instead exacerbating popular distrust of China and feeding instability across the border region. The final case reveals similar problems with several controversial Chinese infrastructure projects in Myanmar. Overall, moral hazard problems, policy stretching, and enterprise malfeasance all proved far more severe in Myanmar than in North Korea or Europe. I conclude by evaluating Beijing’s responses to these challenges.

PENYALAHGUNAAN NAPZA DI INDONESIA

Drug Abuse in the world consistently increases where almost 12% (15.5 million people up to 36.6 million people) of users are heavy addicts. According to the World Drug Report of 2012, the productions of drugs increased, one of which was opium production. It increased from 4,700 tons in 2010 to 7,000 tons in 2011. Drug abuse in Indonesia also increased from year to year proven according to BNN survey results with UI and other universities that in 2005 the prevalence percentage was 1.7% in Indonesia, in 2008 prevalence percentage was 1.99%, in 2012 prevalence percentage was 2.2%. Furthermore, the number of drug use according to Head of BNN actually increased significantly in the period of June to November 2015 that is 1.7 million people. In June 2015 the number of users was 4.2 million and in November 2015 the number of users was 5.9 million. Today the problem of drug abuse already becomes a national disaster. Drug abuse has been the concern of all people for several reasons; first, the use of drugs by various societies has been in critical condition. Second, the impacts are not only generated to the users but also damage the people’s lives and nation’s life. Thirdly, Indonesia is not only a consumer country but a producer country as well, so the Indonesian government firmly declares that Indonesia is Drug emergency or declares war on Drugs. The impact of drug abuse is very complex starting from victims, families, peer victims, until the community. So the view of Islam associated with the abuse of these drugs is that drugs are goods which damage the mind, memory, heart, soul, mental and physical health such as khomar. Therefore, drugs are also included in the category which is forbidden by Allah SWT and the scholars agree that drugs are illicit when people are not in an emergency situation. As a helping profession, social work has a fundamental mission to solve social problem whether it is a problem experienced by individuals, families, groups, or communities. In its development, social workers reflect relief efforts to vulnerable groups. Drug addicts are one part of Indonesian societies who has equal position, rights, obligations and roles with other Indonesian societies in all aspects of life and the life which in essence still has potential that can be developed through a special program, namely the social welfare effort program for the addicts of Drugs with social rehabilitation. Here social workers play a role in helping / assisting the recovery of victims in realizing their social function.

Illegal Markets and the Formation of a Central Asian Borderland: The Turkestan–Xinjiang opium trade (1881–1917)

This article utilizes material from archives in Kazakhstan, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan as well as published Chinese sources to explore the opium trade between Tsarist Turkestan and Xinjiang from the early 1880s to 1917. It focuses on two different levels: the borderlands economy and society, and state policies towards illegal (or ‘grey’) markets. The main groups active in the trade were Hui/Dungan and Taranchi migrants from China, who had fled Qing territory after the repression of the great anti-Qing Muslim revolts during the 1860s and 1870s. After settling in Tsarist territory, they grew poppies and exported opium back across the border to China. This article shows how the borderland economy was influenced by the late-Qing anti-opium campaign, and especially by the First World War. During the war, the Tsarist government tried to create a state opium monopoly over the borderland economy, but this attempt was botched first by the great Central Asian revolt of 1916, and later by the 1917 revolution. Departing from the prevailing historiography on borderlands, this article shows how the international border, far from being an obstacle to the trade, was instead the main factor that made borderland opium production and trade possible. It also shows how the borderland population made a strategic use of the border-as-institution, and how local imperial administrators—in different periods and for different reasons—adapted to, fostered, or repressed this most profitable borderland economic activity.

Determining the Socio-Economic Importance of Saffron as an Alternative Product to Opium Production in Afghanistan

The objective of this work is to determine the socio-economic importance of saffron production as an alternative to opium production in Afghanistan, and to determine if saffron production could influence farmers’ incomes. The primary data for the survey was obtained via direct interviews with farmers of 4 saffron leader districts in Herat, where 95% Saffron production was noted during 2016-2017. Factor analysis was used to determine the factors that influence saffron producers. Cluster analysis was used further, to separate farmer income groups. According to the first cluster, the most important factors affecting agricultural production were: negative climatic conditions while market instability was the second factor. Saffron producers’ annual average yield is 6.6 kg/ha in results that showed that if opium production is permitted, saffron farmers would produce opium due to the high revenue associated with opium production in Afghanistan.

All Goods are Dangerous Goods

This chapter discusses the impact of the Helmand Valley Development Project, the largest American investment project in Afghanistan prior to the Afghan-Soviet War, and the impact on the development of the illicit opium trade. During the 1950s and 1960s, American development projects (through USAID) aimed to transform the Helmand Valley into a rich agricultural zone by building dams, and improving irrigation and farming techniques, to prepare farmers to grow crops for regional and global markets. By the 1970s, shifts in the global supply of illicit opium led drug traffickers to Afghanistan in search of new supply, and farmers in Helmand and surrounding areas began to shift to opium cultivation. In the course of the analysis, the chapter explores the relationship between globalization and development projects, and why the Helmand Valley project played a critical role in the growth of illicit opium production in Afghanistan.