plant biosecurity
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2022 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angus J. Carnegie ◽  
Francisco Tovar ◽  
Susie Collins ◽  
Simon A. Lawson ◽  
Helen F. Nahrung

Australia has a comprehensive plant biosecurity system, with the Australian Government responsible for pre-border (e.g., off-shore compliance) and border (e.g., import inspections) activities, while state governments undertake a variety of post-border activities (e.g., post-border surveillance, management of pest incursions, and regulation of pests) designed to reduce alien pest and pathogen arrival and establishment. Once an alien pest or pathogen has established and spread, its management becomes the responsibility of the land manager. There has been a growing understanding among plant industries of the need to be more engaged in post-border biosecurity activities, including resourcing and undertaking early detection surveillance and contingency planning. Here we summarize Australia’s broader plant biosecurity system along with current forest-specific biosecurity surveillance activities. We describe the development of a proposed forest biosecurity partnership between the Australian Government, state governments and the forest sector to establish a post-border, risk-based National Forest Pest Surveillance Program. We outline why there is a recognized need for such a program, how it would improve biosecurity outcomes in relation to forests, its component activities, and key stakeholders and beneficiaries.


Forests ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (12) ◽  
pp. 1741
Author(s):  
Mariella Marzano ◽  
Michael Dunn ◽  
Sarah Green

It is widely acknowledged that a major threat to tree health biosecurity comes from trade, particularly through the importation of containerised live plants and associated growing media. Nurseries can collectively play a key role in mitigating pests and diseases through attention to their daily practices (e.g., procuring plants, storage and management). More widespread adoption of best practices in the sector could be promoted through the introduction of a UK-wide accreditation scheme. However, the success of such a scheme would depend not only on its uptake by nurseries but also on the attitudes of key consumers in the plant supply chain. To date, the perspectives of the nursery sector on the feasibility of plant biosecurity, as well as the sensitivity of these sectors to consumer opinion, have remained under-researched. Using the COM-B [Capability, Opportunity, Motivation—Behaviour] model as a framework, we draw on qualitative results to assess the appetite for a hypothetical accreditation scheme amongst UK nurseries and the capability, opportunities and motivations to enhance their biosecurity practices. Nineteen semi-structured interviews were conducted with plant nurseries and 22 with their consumers. Overall a plant health accreditation scheme should have actions that are: (1) viable within the confines of the site and supply chain; (2) affordable where the benefits of changes/improvements outweigh the costs; (3) beneficial in that they promote biosecurity; (4) attractive to consumers looking to purchase products from accredited nurseries; (5) fair and inclusive where everyone has responsibility for biosecurity; (6) transparent with the scheme involving a strong monitoring and auditing component. This study provides important insights that will feed into the development of plant biosecurity-focussed accreditation or certification.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kavita Gupta ◽  
K. V. Sankaran

Biological invasions continue unabated across the globe despite all efforts to manage the problem by implementing biosecurity regulations and associated management methods. In this context, this paper reviews the plant biosecurity legislation applicable to agriculture and forestry sectors in India to prevent/manage invasions, with the objective of identifying limitations in the legislation or lapses in implementing it and propose corrective measures. The legislation can be improved by: (1) revising and updating the Destructive Insects and Pests Act (1914) and Plant Quarantine Order 2003 and (2) establishing a National Sanitary and Phytosanitary Database Center to promote exchange of information. Establishing more plant quarantine stations with state-of-the-art facilities and a Biosecurity and Trade Unit may support implementation of legislation. Some of main gaps in information and research in biosecurity are identified. The plant biosecurity legislation, though meant to be common, mainly addresses the agriculture sector; its application in the forestry context is currently scarce. Hence, it is suggested that India may enact forest biosecurity scrupulously especially in the context of introducing the REDD + strategy and a Forest Certification Scheme. It is proposed that an integrated pest management (IPM) system involving e-pest surveillance, establishment of pest-free areas and use of biocontrol may help tackle emerging pest threats. The use of new technologies for remote sensing and detection and mapping of vegetation may help bio-surveillance, forecasting, and monitoring of pests. However, successful implementation of all management options demands formation of an exclusive national policy to manage invasive alien species and an action plan governed by a single agency. To realize the plant biosecurity goals, India may also strengthen regional cooperation to: (1) harmonize regulations for sanitary/phytosanitary and plant quarantine/biosafety measures and (2) use a common pest risk analysis (PRA) for unknown pests in the region. Capacity-building of officials to identify risky goods and verify conformity with Import Health Standards is raised. Also, raising awareness on biosecurity among all stakeholders and involving them in implementing the legislation would be helpful. The proposed National Agricultural Biosecurity System and the Agricultural Biosecurity Bill currently considered by the Indian Parliament is expected to address the inadequacies.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melissa J. Welsh ◽  
James A. Turner ◽  
Rebecca S. Epanchin‐Niell ◽  
Juan J. Monge ◽  
Tarek Soliman ◽  
...  

2021 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Kirsty S.H. Boyd-Wilson ◽  
M. Virginia Marroni ◽  
Mark R. McNeill ◽  
David A.J. Teulon

The use of sentinel or expatriate plants is a growing concept for risk assessment in plant biosecurity. This approach involves ascertaining the presence and impact of pests and pathogens on plants foreign to a given location but planted in international botanic gardens or arboreta. The data obtained provide information on the potential pest status of these pests and pathogens, as invasive alien species (IAS), to plant species in their native or indigenous range. Assessment of the biosecurity threat from IAS for indigenous plants not found within the geographic distribution of these pests and pathogens is challenging, however, as they may be relatively taxonomically distinct from plants found in the distribution of the IAS and can be in different climates and environments. We examine the sentinel/expatriate concept in relation to risk assessment for myrtle rust (Austropuccinia psidii) on New Zealand Myrtaceae on these plants found in botanic gardens and arboreta outside New Zealand. Between September 2017 and September 2018, we identified and then contacted 65 botanic gardens or arboreta that putatively had New Zealand Myrtaceae and were within the known distribution of myrtle rust. We asked for information on the presence of New Zealand Myrtaceae species in their collections and whether these plants were infected by myrtle rust. Sixteen gardens/arboreta responded; most were in Australia or the United States. Only one of these gardens provided information that was useful for biosecurity risk assessment for myrtle rust on New Zealand Myrtaceae. The results are discussed in the context of plant biosecurity risk assessment and the broader sentinel/expatriate plant concept.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 87
Author(s):  
Alexandra Puertolas ◽  
Peter J. M. Bonants ◽  
Eric Boa ◽  
Steve Woodward

Numerous Phytophthora and Pythium disease outbreaks have occurred in Europe following inadvertent introduction of contaminated ornamental plants. Detection and identification of pathogens are crucial to reduce risks and improve plant biosecurity in Europe and globally. Oomycete diversity present in roots and compost was determined in 99 hardy woody plants bought from nurseries, retailers and internet sellers, using both isolations and molecular analyses. Oomycete DNA was quantified using real-time PCR of environmental DNA from the plants using three loci: ITS, trnM-trnP-trnM and atp9-nad9. At least one oomycete species was isolated from 89.9% of plants using classical techniques. In total, 10 Phytophthora spp., 17 Pythium spp. and 5 Phytopythium spp. were isolated. Oomycetes were isolated from 86% of asymptomatic plants, but real-time PCR demonstrated that oomycetes were associated with all plants tested. More oomycete DNA occurred in composts in comparison with roots and filters from baiting water (a mean of 7.91 ng g−1, 6.55 × 10−1 ng g−1 and 5.62 × 10−1 ng g−1 of oomycete DNA detected in compost with ITS, trnM and atp9 probes, respectively); the ITS probe detected the highest quantities of oomycete DNA. No significant differences were found in quantities of oomycete DNA detected using real-time PCR in plants purchased online or from traditional retailers.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (5) ◽  
pp. 463-471 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan MacLeod ◽  
Simon Lloyd

The management of risk is fundamental to biosecurity. Potential pest risks must be recognised early, with appropriate measures taken to prevent or reduce the potential damage a non-native species can cause. Risk registers are a recognised tool to support risk management, especially in project management or governance of corporate risk. The use of risk registers and risk prioritisation systems in the plant health biosecurity sphere has emerged in recent years driven by the recognition that resources to assess pest risks in detail are scarce, and biosecurity actions need to be targeted and prioritised. Individual national plant protection organisations have consequently developed a variety of tools that prioritise and rank plant pests, typically taking likelihood of pest entry, establishment, spread and impact into account. They use expert opinion to give scores to risk elements within a framework of multi-criteria decision analysis to rank pests based on the prioritisation aims of users. Knowing that biosecurity extends beyond national borders we recognise that such systems would add value to global efforts to detect and share information on emerging pests to better target actions against pests to protect plant biosecurity.


2020 ◽  
Vol 56 ◽  
pp. 127-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yiheng Hu ◽  
Salome Wilson ◽  
Benjamin Schwessinger ◽  
John P Rathjen

2019 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thi Tam Duong ◽  
Tom D Brewer ◽  
Jo Luck ◽  
Kerstin K Zander

Plant biosecurity threats such as pest, weeds and disease occurrences cause substantial economic damage to the agricultural sector, worldwide and in Australia. How smallholder farmers choose biosecurity management strategies remains poorly understood, particularly of smallholder cultural minority groups. In this study, we explore how Vietnamese smallholder farmers in Australia assess their biosecurity risk management strategies and the factors that explain their choice of different strategies. To do so, we conducted a survey of 101 Vietnamese farmers in the Northern Territory, South Australia and Western Australia. Based on the protection motivation theory, we assessed farmers’ perceived self-efficacy, response efficacy and response costs (all elements of their coping appraisal) using descriptive statistics, factor analysis and stepwise regression. Information sources related to biosecurity and farmers’ trust in public management explain how farmers assess their risk management strategies. Previous experience with biosecurity issues does not influence how farmers appraise their biosecurity risk coping capacity. Farmers use four types of biosecurity risk management strategies: chemical control, plant growth strategies, on-farm strategies and asset investment strategies. The first two are the most frequently used. We recommend tailoring relevant government policies to better support farmers’ adoption of risk management strategies based on their specific needs, more investment into biosecurity information dissemination and into trust building.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Morgan G Pinkerton ◽  
Sage M Thompson ◽  
Nicole A Casuso ◽  
Amanda C Hodges ◽  
Norman C Leppla

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