The Horse behind the Text: Animal Agency in Early Medieval Historiography

Early medieval authors frequently used horses as narrative devices. Therefore, when working with historiographical sources, one is confronted with a vital question: how can we reconstruct the horses’ agency without knowing whether their depiction is a mere narrative device? Combining praxeological approaches with the analysis of narrative structures, this paper offers a glance “beyond the text.” It shows how analysing the underlying knowledge of the medieval reader contributes to reconstructing a contemporary image of early medieval horses and their (perceived) agency in human society and thereby develops a new perspective for the future of historical human-animal studies.

Oysteropolis: Animals in coastal gentrification

Gentrification scholars have increasingly acknowledged the importance of socio-nature in encouraging the revaluation of place. Yet relatively little has been said about the role that non-human animals play in changing the material, sensory and affective qualities of place and the ways that they provoke capital investment. In this paper, we provide a corrective by exploring the role of the oyster in the ongoing gentrification of a coastal community (Whitstable in Kent, South East England). The complex natural and social history of oysters in Whitstable shows that how animal agency has contributed to processes of gentrification. Oysters are visceral objects whose affective qualities create hierarchies of taste and distaste through processes of desire and disgust. This animal is a marker of class change that positions the ‘local’ within wider circuits of consumption. Further, oysters are labouring bodies that reconstitute the coastal ecosystem on which the town depends. The arguments illustrate that non-human animals can be – economically, culturally and ecologically – vital and lively components within the dynamic material processes that support gentrification.

“Agents of Description”. Animals, Affect, and Care in Thalia Field’s Experimental Animals: A Reality Fiction (2016)

In this article, I explore questions of laboratory animal agency in dialogue with Thalia Field’s literary text “Experimental Animals: A Reality Fiction” (2016). Using the framework of “care” (understood, following María Puig de la Bellacasa 2017, as a multi-dimensional concept comprising affect, ethics, and practice), I consider how Field’s synaesthetic descriptions of animal suffering create an affective response in readers, alerting them to a shared carnal vulnerability. Indeed, rather than anthropomorphizing animals through narration or focalization, Field “stays with the body” to consider how animals call to us not as experimental objects, but as ethical subjects, how they become – in other words – agents of the description (Stewart 2016). To develop this idea, I introduce the “practiced” dimension of care. More specifically, I explore how Field uses narrative strategies like first-person narration and second-person address, “bridge characters” (James 2019), and juxtaposition to morally structure the text and encourage “transspecies alliances” between readers and represented animals. I argue that such devices direct and train affect, allowing us to better appreciate how conceptions of nonhuman animal agency are always contextualized within particular sets of social, cultural, historical, and disciplinary frames and practices.

Agency and Choice in Evolution

Denis Noble has produced a succinct analysis of the ‘Illusions of the Modern Synthesis’. At the heart of the matter is the place of agency in organisms. This paper examines the nature of conscious agent action in organisms, and the role of affects in shaping agent choice. It examines the dual role these have in shaping evolution, and in the social worlds of scientists that shape evolutionary theory. Its central claim follows Noble, that agency is central to the structure of organisms, and raises careful consideration for the role animal agency and affective evaluations in biology, and in biologists.

Hamster numbers: biopolitics and animal agency in the dutch fields, circa 1870-present

Numbers of European hamsters (Cricetus cricetus) in the Dutch Province of Limburg have been subject to much scrutiny and controversy. In the late nineteenth century, policymakers who considered them too numerous (and invasive) set up eradication programs. In the second half of the twentieth century, even when its domestic relative (Mesocricetus auratus) increasingly circulated as a pet in urban spaces, the numbers of European hamsters in the rural areas collapsed. Large-scale preservation campaigns and reintroduction programs ensued. According to some media, all this has turned the European hamster into the most expensive undomesticated animal of the Netherlands. A whole network of institutions became involved to save the species – ranging from local activist organizations, over zoos and universities, to federal ministries and international organizations. The interactions between the Dutch and ‘their’ hamsters, this article argues, were inscribed in various forms of biopolitics. The article highlights the changing discursive framings and spatial practices that have shaped the management of Cricetus cricetus over time and calls attention to the diversity of living and non-living agents that produced the multispecies choreographies of the present-day Limburg landscape. Finally, it alerts us to the (sometimes-paradoxical) kinds of agency that reside in the numbers of non-human animals.

The Inner Animal View

In this chapter, I put forward the core of my “inner animal” view. When you are inclined but not determined to φ‎, you are relating to a part of yourself that has already determined itself to φ‎. This part of you as the structure of a creature of instinct. I find a suggestion of this view in Kant’s idea that what necessitates the arbitrium brutum merely affects the arbitrium sensitivum liberum. I develop the idea by relying on Korsgaard’s conception of animal agency. When you are in the moment of drama, I claim, part of you is already active, under the guidance of the instinctive part of your mind, while the rest of you has not yet determined itself to act. You are “drawn out of yourself.” I then address initial worries about my view, namely that it is objectionably dualistic, metaphorical, or biological.

Turning to Animal Agency in the Anthropocene

Agency is central to humans’ individual rights and their organization as a community. Human agency is recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights through guaranteed rights, such as the right to life, basic education, freedom of expression, and the freedom to form personal relationships, which all protect humans from tyranny and oppression. Though studies of animal agency consistently suggest that we grossly underestimate the capacity of animals to make decisions, determine and take action, and to organize themselves individually and as groups, few have concerned themselves with whether and how animal agency is relevant for the law and vice versa. Currently, most laws offer no guarantee that animals’ agency will be respected, and fail to respond when animals resist the human systems that govern them. This failure emerges from profound prejudices and deep-seated anthropocentric biases that shape the law, including law-making processes. Law and law-making operating exclusively as self-judging systems is widely decried and denounced—except in animal law. This chapter identifies standpoint acknowledgement as a means to dismantle these tendencies, and provides instructions on how to ask the right questions. It concludes by calling for an “animal agency turn” across disciplines, to challenge our assumptions about how we ought to organize human-animal relationships politically and personally, and to increase our civic competence and courage, empathy, participation, common engagement, and respect for animal alterity.