Temporal loudness weights: Primacy effects, loudness dominance and their interaction

Loudness judgments of sounds varying in level across time show a non-uniform temporal weighting, with increased weights assigned to the beginning of the sound (primacy effect). In addition, higher weights are observed for temporal components that are higher in level than the remaining components (loudness dominance). In three experiments, sounds consisting of 100- or 475-ms Gaussian wideband noise segments with random level variations were presented and either none, the first, or a central temporal segment was amplified or attenuated. In Experiment 1, the sounds consisted of four 100-ms segments that were separated by 500-ms gaps. Previous experiments did not show a primacy effect in such a condition. In Experiment 2, four- or ten-100-ms-segment sounds without gaps between the segments were presented to examine the interaction between the primacy effect and level dominance. As expected, for the sounds with segments separated by gaps, no primacy effect was observed, but weights on amplified segments were increased and weights on attenuated segments were decreased. For the sounds with contiguous segments, a primacy effect as well as effects of relative level (similar to those in Experiment 1) were found. For attenuation, the data indicated no substantial interaction between the primacy effect and loudness dominance, whereas for amplification an interaction was present. In Experiment 3, sounds consisting of either four contiguous 100-ms or 475-ms segments, or four 100-ms segments separated by 500-ms gaps were presented. Effects of relative level were more pronounced for the contiguous sounds. Across all three experiments, the effects of relative level were more pronounced for attenuation. In addition, the effects of relative level showed a dependence on the position of the change in level, with opposite direction for attenuation compared to amplification. Some of the results are in accordance with explanations based on masking effects on auditory intensity resolution.

Toddlers’ causal interventions reveal a grasp of the temporal priority principle

This study investigated whether one- and two-year-olds (N=133, 72 female, Western) grasp that causes must precede their effects (the temporal priority principle). Toddlers watched an adult perform action A on a puzzle-box, following which a sticker dispensed (effect E); following which action B was performed. In line with the temporal priority principle, toddlers were significantly more likely to manipulate A than B (Experiment 1), even when A was spatially disconnected from the sticker dispenser and further from it than action B (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 ruled out that toddlers acted based on a primacy effect in Experiments 1—2. A lack of evidence for any age effects suggests children grasp temporal priority from the second year of life.

Party-related primacy effects in proportional representation systems: evidence from a natural experiment in Polish local elections

We study the primacy effects that occur when voters cast their votes because a candidate or party is listed first on a ballot. In the elections that we analyzed, there are three potential types of such effects that might occur when voters vote for (1) the first candidate listed on the ballot in single-member district (SMD) elections (candidate primacy); (2) the first party listed on the ballot in open-list proportional representation (OLPR) elections (party primacy); or (3) the first candidate on a party list in OLPR elections (list primacy). We estimated the party primacy effect (2) and established that there was no interaction between (2) and (3). A party primacy effect is especially difficult to estimate because parties’ positions on ballots are typically fixed in all multi-member districts (MMDs) and it is impossible to separate the first-position “bonus” from a party’s normal electoral performance. A rare natural experiment allowed us to estimate the primacy party bonus between 6.02 and 8.52% of all votes cast for the 2014 Polish local elections. We attribute the large size of such bonus to the great complexity of voting in the OLPR elections, especially the much longer ballots, voting in many simultaneous elections, and ballot design as a booklet rather than a sheet.

Reading and analysing short story collections. An empirical study of readers’ interpretation process of Benni’s Il bar sotto il mare

This article confronts the theoretical tenets of reader-oriented short story collection theory and its implications for a literary analysis of Benni’s Il bar sotto il mare (1987) with the results of an empirical study of 12 readers. Through free recall tasks and open questions, we collected their recall of stories, specific passages, recurring topics and general interpretation to assess the processes of reticulation (i.e. searching for recurring elements in stories) and modification (i.e. modifying initial hypotheses based on the identification of new elements) advanced by Audet (2014). This confrontation revealed noticeably disagreeing results. Our findings suggest that flesh-and-blood readers adopt a more straightforward and intuitive approach when reading and interpreting collections as they are subject to a strong primacy effect, privilege personal appreciation of specific stories and passages, and rely on a disinclination to alter initial interpretative hypotheses. The findings pave the way for further investigation into the readers of SSCs.

Adaptation to recent outcomes attenuates the lasting effect of initial experience on risky decisions

Both primarily and recently encountered information have been shown to influence experience-based risky decision making. The primacy effect predicts that initial experience will influence later choices even if outcome probabilities change and reward is ultimately more or less sparse than primarily experienced. However, it has not been investigated whether extended initial experience would induce a more profound primacy effect upon risky choices than brief experience. Therefore, the present study tested in two experiments whether young adults adjusted their risk-taking behavior in the Balloon Analogue Risk Task after an unsignaled and unexpected change point. The change point separated early “good luck” or “bad luck” trials from subsequent ones. While mostly positive (more reward) or mostly negative (no reward) events characterized the early trials, subsequent trials were unbiased. In Experiment 1, the change point occurred after one-sixth or one-third of the trials (brief vs. extended experience) without intermittence, whereas in Experiment 2, it occurred between separate task phases. In Experiment 1, if negative events characterized the early trials, after the change point, risk-taking behavior increased as compared with the early trials. Conversely, if positive events characterized the early trials, risk-taking behavior decreased after the change point. Although the adjustment of risk-taking behavior occurred due to integrating recent experiences, the impact of initial experience was simultaneously observed. The length of initial experience did not reliably influence the adjustment of behavior. In Experiment 2, participants became more prone to take risks as the task progressed, indicating that the impact of initial experience could be overcome. Altogether, we suggest that initial beliefs about outcome probabilities can be updated by recent experiences to adapt to the continuously changing decision environment.

Temporal Loudness Weights Are Frequency Specific

Previous work showed that the beginning of a sound is more important for the perception of loudness than later parts. When a short silent gap of sufficient duration is inserted into a sound, this primacy effect reoccurs in the second sound part after the gap. The present study investigates whether this temporal weighting occurs independently for different frequency bands. Sounds consisting of two bandpass noises were presented in four different conditions: (1) a simultaneous gap in both bands, (2) a gap in only the lower frequency band, (3) a gap in only the higher frequency band, or (4) no gap. In all conditions, the temporal loudness weights showed a primacy effect at sound onset. For the frequency bands without a gap, the temporal weights decreased gradually across time, regardless of whether the other frequency band did or did not contain a gap. When a frequency band contained a gap, the weight at the onset of this band after the gap was increased. This reoccurrence of the primacy effect following the gap was again largely independent of whether or not the other band contained a gap. Thus, the results indicate that the temporal loudness weights are frequency specific.

Counterfactual Thinking and Recency Effects in Causal Judgment

People tend to judge more recent events, relative to earlier ones, as the cause of some particular outcome. For instance, people are more inclined to judge that the last basket, rather than the first, caused the team to win the basketball game. This recency effect, however, reverses in cases of overdetermination: people judge that earlier events, rather than more recent ones, caused the outcome when the event is individually sufficient but not individually necessary for the outcome. In five experiments (N = 5507), we find evidence for the recency effect and the primacy effect for causal judgment. Traditionally, these effects have been a problem for counterfactual views of causal judgment. However, an extension of a recent counterfactual model of causal judgment explains both the recency and the primacy effect. In line with the predictions of the extended counterfactual model, we also find that, regardless of causal structure, people tend to imagine the counterfactual alternative to the more recent event rather than to the earlier one (Experiment 2). Moreover, manipulating this tendency affects causal judgments in the ways predicted by this extended model: asking participants to imagine the counterfactual alternative to the earlier event weakens (and sometimes eliminates) the interaction between recency and causal structure, and asking participants to imagine the counterfactual alternative to the more recent event strengthens the interaction between recency and causal structure (Experiments 3 & 5). We discuss these results in relation to work on counterfactual thinking and causal modeling.

The Primacy Effect in Impression Formation: Some Replications and Extensions

Individuals described as “fun, witty, and vicious” are typically rated more favorably than those described as “vicious, witty, and fun” despite the semantic equivalence of these statements. This is known as the primacy effect in impression formation. We tested whether these effects emerge from pragmatic inferences about communicative intentions (e.g., that communicators should relay the most important information first). Participants heard a list of descriptors, with the most positive adjective listed either first or last; they also learned either that (a) the list was compiled by a human (licensing the inference that the most important information should be conveyed first) or (b) randomly ordered by a computer (thus blocking such an inference). Across five experiments (total N = 2,882), we found support for a small primacy effect in impression formation, but found no evidence of a pragmatic explanation for primacy effects.

There Is No Primacy Effect in Interpersonal Perception: A Series of Preregistered Analyses Using Judgments of Actual Behavior

First impressions are commonly assumed to be particularly important: Information about a person that we obtain early on may shape our overall impression of that person more strongly than information obtained later. In contrast to previous research, the present series of preregistered analyses uses actual person judgment data to investigate this so-called primacy effect: Perceivers ( N = 1,395) judged the videotaped behavior of target persons ( N = 200) in 10 different situations. Separate subsamples of about 200 perceivers each were used in moving from exploratory to increasingly confirmatory analyses. Contrary to our expectations, no primacy effect was found. Instead, judgments of the targets in later situations were more strongly associated with overall impressions, indicating an acquaintance effect. Relying on early information seems unreasonable when more comprehensive information is readily available. Early information may, however, affect perceivers’ behavioral reactions to the targets and thus their future interactions, if such interactions are possible.

Determinants of diagnostic and pseudodiagnostic information selection

Pseudodiagnosticity refers to the tendency to select impoverished information in preference to equally available diagnostic data. Mynatt, Doherty, and Dragan (1993) reported that pseudodiagnostic reasoning was attenuated in problems in which the information selection had consequences for the reasoner’s future actions in contrast to problemsin which it did not. Girotto, Evans and Legrenzi (1996) denied that such “action” problems fostered better information selection because they argued that in Mynatt’s et al.’s study action and non-action or inferencevaried in how the decision task was framed. It was predicted that for action problems there will be a higher frequency in informative data selection vs. both inference problems. In addition to that, a primacy effect for inference problems would occur irrespective of sequence of data presentation but not for action problems. We re-examined the way people reasoned about action problems and inference problems taking into consideration Girotto et al.’s criticisms. We found that even when the presentation and salience of the information was equated in both kinds of problems, diagnostic information selection was more likely foraction that for inference problems.