The PLA and Taiwan Policy under Xi Jinping: One Joint Actor without Its Own Agenda

After the Chinese Communist Party’s 18th Party Congress was held in the fall of 2012, frequently asked questions were: Is Xi Jinping able to rein in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and what is the state of Chinese party-military relations? What are the implications of this status for the PLA in China’s Taiwan policy-making? What is the potential impact of Taiwan’s leadership transition on China’s Taiwan policy and on the PLA’s role?This author argues that through a stick and carrot approach, Xi has become the leader of China, and has been able to rein in the PLA. His proactive and assertive approach in the context of China’s growing capabilities has empowered him to control the discourse of Taiwan policy. In these circumstances, the PLA will continue to be one joint actor within the relevant apparatus executing Taiwan policy without its own agenda. Uncertainty as a result of the ruling party rotation in Taiwan is unlikely to change the PLA’s role.

KEEPING YOUR HEAD DOWN: PUBLIC PROFILES AND PROMOTION UNDER AUTOCRACY

During recent party congresses in China and Vietnam, two highly anticipated candidates for promotion were sidelined. In China, Bo Xilai was arrested for corruption and stripped of his party membership. In Vietnam, Nguyen Ba Thanh remained a provincial leader with little opportunity for promotion to the Politburo. Existing arguments about promotions under authoritarian rule are unable to explain these outcomes. In particular, both candidates were competent and well connected. This cuts contrary to the expectations of both performance-based promotion and factional promotion theories. We argue that these candidates were sidelined due to a previously under-theorized factor in promotion contests—their ability to mobilize personal followings. Amidst a literature that has focused almost exclusively on intra-elite conflict, we argue that elite–mass linkages are critical. In particular, the public profile of top leaders is important for regime legitimacy and mobilization. However, when individuals become exceptionally well known they become threats to the single-party system. We test this argument on promotions in China's 18th Party Congress in 2012 and Vietnam's 11th Party Congress in 2011, using original data on Internet search queries and media coverage among contenders for promotion. Our approach offers new insights into the strategies authoritarian politicians use to stay afloat as well as the mistakes that sink them when competing for power under one-party rule.

Chongqing under Sun Zhengcai

Chongqing is the latest and largest municipality directly under the administration of the central government and the only one in China's vast inland regions. Sun Zhengcai, a new Politburo member at the 18th Party Congress, became Chongqing's party secretary in November 2011. The former minister of agriculture and later party secretary of Jilin, Sun has demonstrated a down-to-earth working style. Policy-wise, he continues but refines what Chongqing has been doing, with possible breakthroughs in some areas.

From 17th to 18th Party Congress: Implications for Intra-Party Democracy

Growing intra-party pluralism and intensified factional rivalry have pressured the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) to adjust the authoritarian official-selection system by resorting to an 'intra-Party democracy' mechanism based on informal polls among influential party officials and retirees. The progress, albeit slow and opaque since the 17th Party Congress in 2007, is increasingly seen as the CPC's only solution to intensified factional rivalry at various levels and the decline of legitimacy associated with the corrupt and inept officialdom. With backroom straw polls setting new norms for the CPC to settle factional infighting over power transfer at the 18th Party Congress, this intra-party democracy procedure has been gradually routinized at both the central and local levels to make the appointment process more consultative and to fend off democratic outcries from the public. In the past few years, cautious but substantial experiments with contested polls have been introduced by CPC's organizational departments to the monolithic political system, in which key party/government officials are facing increasingly competitive voting tests before they can be promoted to higher levels.

Leadership Changes and Structural Reform After the 18th Party Congress in China

During the 18th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012, and the 12th National People's Congress in March 2013, the Chinese leadership in Party organs and the state apparatus underwent a significant reshuffle. During this leadership change, virtually all leaders of the central organs were reappointed. While the actual structural and political reforms the new leadership is willing—and able—to make remain to be seen, an initial review of the top leadership in Party and state organs, including the ministries and provincial governments, reveals a relatively conservative team leading China in the coming five years. This article attempts to give a comprehensive review of the leadership changes, along with an initial analysis of the announced structural changes and the implications these changes could have for China's political recalibration and development.

A Note on the 18th Party Congress of the CCP: Personnel Changes and Factional Alliances

The 18th Party Congress was more dramatic than anticipated due to the completely non-transparent process of selecting new leaders as well as a number of scandals involving leaders competing for the top posts. This contrasts with 2002 when Hu Jintao became secretary general in a comprehensive change of power that took place without much drama.

Chinese Society: Rebuilding the Momentum of Social Reform

The Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress is determined to deepen reform in a wide range of areas. On the social front, three broad areas have received substantial attention. One is the urbanisation programme, or integrated ruralurban development; the second is the development and reform of “social sectors”, a broad term encompassing education, employment, income distribution, social security, healthcare and population policy; and the third is the innovation of “social governance”.