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Author(s):  
Zaka Firma Aditya ◽  
Sholahuddin Al-Fatih

Judicial corruption practices in Indonesia have been going on for long time. Even, according to Transparency International survey (2007), the judiciary in Indonesia ranks highest for corruption perception index. Not only that, the mode used by the judicial mafia is also increasingly modern and occurs almost in all aspects of judiciary. This research has two aims, namely: (1) to know and analyze the mode of corruption in the judicial process in Indonesia, and (2) to know and analyze the model of litigation cost control in the judicial process in Indonesia. This research is juricial-normative research which are using the statute approach and conceptual approach. From this research, it can be seen that, Typically, corrupt practices have been initiated since the registration of the cases, the establishment of judges panel, summoning witnesses and experts, negotiationg decisions and cost of copy of the decisions. Ironically, many parties are involved in the judicial corruption practices ranging from clerks, officials and employess in the judiciary and the judges themselves. However, the more modern technology can be used as an alternative solution in combating the practices of judicial corruption. One of them, by applying litigation cost control that can be integrated through whistleblowing system. In this way, the public can monitoring in real-time the trial process starting from registration fee litigation, the process of litigation until post-verdict.


Construction is one of the most important employment sectors in India with very minimal research being done to identify the delay factors and causes that affect the construction Industry. The opinions of the construction professional required for the research was obtained by conduction interviews. A set of questions were circulated between the professionals working on the site to acquire the causes and effects of delays faced by them. To resolve the issues various studies and researches have been done by various researchers. The data analyzed in the research was done by using Relative Important Index (RII) which helpsto categories and rank the causes of delays according to the importance of the causes with respect to its contribution towards time delays, arbitration, litigation, cost overrun and total abandonment. Spearmen’s rank correlation coefficient was used compare the effect of delays between contractors, owners and consultants. In this paper, the research is aimed towards finding the effects of various causes on the various parties on construction sites of coastal parts of Mumbai and methods of minimization of the same.


Author(s):  
Colleen V. Chien ◽  
Jorge L. Contreras ◽  
Thomas F. Cotter ◽  
Brian J. Love ◽  
Christopher B. Seaman ◽  
...  

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 395-415
Author(s):  
Ünsal Sığrı ◽  
Hakan Karabacak

Purpose This paper aims to manage better the conflicts in labor disputes by improving the understanding of mediation dynamics from a game-theoretical perspective. Design/methodology/approach Signaling game model is adapted to a hypothetical labor dispute based on the legislative regulations on the mandatory mediation system in Turkey. Findings The paper determines mediation equilibria in which both players get positive payoffs. Analysis of the mediation equilibria helps to improve the understanding about the litigation and mediation dynamics depending on the variables. The variables are clearly separated from each other due to their reverse effects on strategy choices of the parties. Mediation payoff and litigation cost are characterized by their incentive effects on mediation preferences, whereas mediation fee and litigation payoff are characterized by their disincentive effect. While increasing amounts of incentive variables strengthen the mediation tendency of the employee, increasing amounts of disincentive variables reveal the opposite effect. Furthermore, the analysis also indicates that if the litigation payoff is too small to recover litigation costs, accepting the mediation becomes the optimal strategy. This prediction is contrary to that of traditional game-theoretic litigation/settlement models, in which small-claim disputes typically cannot be settled. Practical implications The assumption that the mediation fee is not a part of the litigation cost eliminates the disincentive effect of mediation fee and makes it neutral on the strategy choice of employee. Originality/value This paper first analyzes the strategic role of mediation in labor disputes by using a signaling game. Despite its mediation focus, the paper also provides practical insights for litigation.


Author(s):  
Ana Lukić Vidojković

This paper examines the legal consequences of mass tort litigation where the amount of damages is multiple times lower than the litigation cost. In the context of current judicial practice, the author observes this phenomenon from the aspect of prohibition of abuse of rights, and offers proposals for improving the existing regulation in order to effectively prevent the abuse of rights.


Author(s):  
Bruce Kobayashi

This chapter examines the basic model of the law and economics of litigation, focusing on private civil litigation, in particular the litigation value of a lawsuit and the incentives for filing a suit. It begins with the one-stage single plaintiff/single defendant investment model of litigation, and describes the conditions for filing, default, settlement, and litigation. It examines the effects of litigation cost- and fee-shifting and the effects of percentage contingency fee arrangements within the standard one-stage model. The model is modified to take into account sequencing and option value. It is shown how litigation with multiple stages and the revelation of information alter the investment value of litigation, and the effects of litigation reform proposals such as fee-shifting. The chapter discusses third party or external effects and how these complications affect the outcome of litigation, the viability of a lawsuit, and the predictions of the standard model of litigation.


2015 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 142-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Harrison ◽  
Ashley W. Newton ◽  
Graham Cheung

Author(s):  
Zhefeng Frank Liu ◽  
Daniel B. Thornton ◽  
Fayez A. Elayan

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