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Significance The meetings yielded an investment to expand Barcelona’s El Prat airport, but they have exacerbated divisions between Catalonia’s governing pro-independence parties: the moderate Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) supports dialogue as an eventual route to independence; the hard-line Together for Catalonia (JxCat) wants independence sooner and belives dialogue will not deliver it. Impacts The prospect of major economic projects for Catalonia is boosting the prominence of employment and the environment in Catalan politics. Support for independence will remain high but it will lose priority as a popular concern in the short- to medium-term. The ERC, which provides parliamentary support to Sanchez’s government in Madrid, is likely to support the 2022 budget.


Significance Polls suggest that Conservative Party, which has led government for eight years, will not be re-elected. The smaller parties which the Conservatives usually rely on for parliamentary support are also polling poorly. The opposition Labour Party appears in poll position to lead the next government. Impacts Stable oil prices and rising gas prices will help drive Norway’s economic recovery in the short term. The Green Party, which adopts the most hard-line position against oil and gas, is unlikely to be in the next government. A strong result for the Centre Party could see Norway become more critical of the European Economic Area and Schengen regime.


Significance The result led Pablo Iglesias, the founder of Unidas Podemos (UP), which is part of Sanchez’s minority left-wing government, to resign from politics. It also reinforced the national decline of the centre-right Ciudadanos (Cs) party, on which Sanchez has sometimes relied for parliamentary support. Impacts A fresh independence push in Catalonia would boost the electoral prospects of the PP and the far-right Vox party across Spain. Whether to cooperate with Vox in government could become the main issue of division within the PP. The return to traditional two-party competition between the PP and PSOE would increase the prospect of more stable governments.


Significance The moderate pro-independence Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC), which also provides occasional parliamentary support to Spain’s minority government, appears to win the most seats. The more radical pro-independence parties are struggling to regain the appeal they had in 2017. Impacts The lack of stable government in Catalonia could last longer if the second wave of COVID-19-19 were to postpone the election. With the ERC in campaign mode, hopes of approving a new Spanish budget in January will probably be set back by several months. The longer-term social and economic impact of COVID-19 could strengthen support for Catalan independence.


Significance The lack of coordination between regions, an inefficient system of testing and tracing and the rapid reopening of society and the economy have contributed to this poor performance. However, the number of deaths has not increased significantly, sparing the healthcare system from the pressure it faced earlier this year. Impacts The disproportionate impact of COVID-19 on Spain's economy will prompt Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez to seek more assistance from the EU. The government can no longer expect parliamentary support from the Republican Left of Catalonia party. Pressures to expand investment in public health care will grow, but resource constraints will limit the government's response.


Significance There is still widespread political party commitment to the monarchy but the consensus once supporting it across the country has disappeared. Rising anti-monarchist sentiment has given renewed impetus to pro-independence forces in Catalonia. Impacts Coalition tensions between the Socialist Party and Unidas Podemos will increase given Sanchez’s lack of interest in monarchy reforms. By antagonising anti-monarchy parties, Sanchez will have to rely more on the centre-right Ciudadanos for parliamentary support. After two years of disunity among pro-independence parties in Catalonia, the question of the monarchy is now helping them realign.


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 208-232
Author(s):  
Moh. Ilham A. Hamudy ◽  
M. Saidi Rifki

The Multi-Party Presidential Government in Indonesia has reached a critical point. The 2.5 percent parliamentary threshold rule in the 2009 Election was incapable to address the issue. The parliamentary threshold was raised to 3.5 percent in 2014, in the hope to reduce the number of party joining the election, but it failed to do so. There were 9 national parties participating in the 2009 election, and it will be increased to 16 in the 2019 election. Theoretically, the combination of multi-party parliament in a Presidential Government is rather strange. It is not surprising that the "conflict" between the president and parliament often occurs. There suppose to be a coalition supporting the government in parliament, but the coalition is not a firm one. The coalition did not have a significant influence in strengthening the presidential government. Therefore, this study intends to provide a complete picture of multi-party system practices while trying to provide solutions for strengthening the presidential government in Indonesia. To achieve this goal, this study uses the literature study method in collecting relevant information, using a qualitative approach. This approach is considered appropriate because multi-party phenomena and presidential systems are multidimensional. In contrast to previous research which was limited to the description and problems of multiparty systems, this research besides describing the system of government also provided moderate solutions that were considered to be in accordance with the Indonesian context. This study assumes that strengthening presidential systems can be done if the political parties are more modest. In addition, parliamentary support for the president must be optimized. The results of the study concluded that the strengthening of presidential systems must be carried out through the purification of the government system contained in the constitution, forming and strengthening the ranks of government coalitions in parliament, and carrying out a number of institutional engineering through various forms. These three things must be wrapped in a constitutional frame (amendments to the 1945 Constitution) and regulations (revisions to laws and government regulations). The amendments and revisions can be done through three corridors, namely the intra-parliamentary movement, the extra-parliamentary movement, and the referendum.


Author(s):  
Brasilio Sallum

In December 1989, Fernando Collor was elected President of Brazil, in the first election after the 1988 democratic Constitution. The election occurred under the threat of hyperinflation. The winner did not have strong parliamentary support, but the urgency for fighting high inflation gave to the President some time to govern without Judiciary and Legislative resistance. Soon after his inauguration, on March 15, the President launched heterodox stabilization measures—the Collor Plan—to “liquidate inflation.” This plan froze prices, changed the currency, and retained part of checking and saving accounts and other financial assets in Central Bank accounts, to be returned to the owners from September 1991 on. The government also started liberal reforms, privatizing state-owned enterprises and reducing barriers to international trade. The Collor Plan reduced the high inflation, but prices soon increased. On March 31, 1991, the government launched the Collor Plan II, once more against inflation. Having had bad results with the original plan, the government adopted economic orthodoxy, but high inflation remained. The center and left-wing party opposition grew, claiming legal protection for lower salaries and other demands for a substantive democracy. The conservatives pressed for more participation in the Executive in exchange of parliamentary support. President Collor resisted these pressures but finally made a ministerial reform in April 1992, to please the conservative parties and to strengthen his power. However, in May, a magazine published two interviews where the President’s younger brother accused him of corruption. In reaction, the center and left opposition parties made a coalition, and the Congress decided to organize a Mixed Parliamentary Inquiry Commission (CPMI) to investigate the accusation. After three months of inquiry, the CPMI approved, on August 26, a report saying that the President had committed crimes that allowed Congress to impeach him. Since August 16, the CPMI had been supported by a huge mass mobilization for impeachment. The mobilization continued until the Chamber of Representatives decided, on September 27, to allow the judgment of the President by Senate. This decision was achieved because conservative parties were included in the alliance around Vice President Itamar Franco. In December 1992, the Senate voted for Collor’s impeachment.


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