Conclusion

The book concludes that the pattern of communalism and riots in the 2000s marks a new chapter in UP society. The reasons lie in momentous changes within UP society, and a ‘new’ BJP, its leadership, re-invented ideology and strategies. Our model of ‘institutionalization of everyday communalism’ suggests that the relationship between communalism and riots has undergone profound change: it is not riots that promote communalism; rather it is the steady and long-term work at the grass roots by right-wing forces that promotes the growth of constant communal tension. Rather than big riots, the aim is to communalize trivial, daily incidents and create small, low-intensity, calibrated incidents whose purpose is to create deep-seated Hindu–Muslim polarization. UP with its divisive communal past, economic backwardness, pervasive social inequalities, continuing conservative outlook and entrenched caste/communal identities, has produced a specific variant of communalism that will impact on the democratic fabric of our country.

Communal Mobilization and Riots in Western Uttar Pradesh

This chapter based on fieldwork in Muzaffarnagar and Shamli districts describes the communal incidents from 2011 onwards and the riots in September 2013. Contrasting narratives emerged from discussions with community leaders in Muzaffarnagar town and selected Jat-dominated and Muslim-majority villages forming the epicentre of the riots, which indicate high levels of aggression, a pogrom and Muslim exodus in some villages. The fieldwork revealed the deeply implicating role of political parties: local BJP leaders were aware of and in some cases involved in the rioting; SP leaders remained largely silent hoping to gain Muslim support in the 2014 elections. As the BSP’s support base and cadre straddles the Hindu, that is, Dalit and Muslim community, local leaders found it difficult to deal with the rioters. These developments indicate the successful creation in these districts particularly in the sample villages, of a system of institutionalized everyday communalism, visible two years after the riots.

Communal Mobilization and Riots in Eastern Uttar Pradesh

Chapter 3 based on fieldwork in Mau and Gorakhpur provides a rich description of everyday communalism and communal riots in 2005 and 2007, respectively. In Mau, incidents of everyday communalism have a distinct socio-cultural form visible in the confrontation around the Bharat-Milap ceremony. But, fieldwork revealed that the reasons lie in underlying tensions from the desire to protect religio-cultural practices, economic distress due to decline of the weaving industry, heightened political consciousness, and the role of the mafia within the Hindu and Muslim community, which the BJP has been able to exploit and engineer the 2005 riots. In Gorakhpur, communalism has a more distinctly political colour, the result of sustained religion-based mobilization by Yogi Adityanath and his HYV responsible for creating communal polarization, tension, and incidents culminating in the 2007 riots. In both towns a characteristic is mobilization to saffronize the Dalits taking them away from the BSP.

Introduction

Examining the resurgence of communal riots, the authors argue that UP is experiencing in the 2000s a post-Ayodhya phase different from the early 1990s. To understand this new phenomenon, they move beyond riots and offer a model of institutionalized everyday communalism whose defining features are: shift of riots from earlier classic/endemic sites to new ones, recruitment of local BJP-RSS cadres/leaders who carry out sustained, everyday grassroots mobilization using local, mundane issues and imaginary threats, and spread of communalism and riots into villages. Also, a second round of experimentation with ‘non-Brahminical Hindutva’ incorporating lower castes to consolidate a Maha-Hindu identity. The aim is to create a bias against the Muslim among the Hindus rendering them the ‘other’. Fusion of rising cultural aspirations and deep economic anxieties in an economically backward state, where a deepening agrarian crisis, unemployment and inequalities are widespread, has created fertile ground for a new kind of communalism.

Communal Politics in Uttar Pradesh from Independence to the 1990s

The chapter provides a historical narrative of Hindu–Muslim relations in UP from independence till the early 1990s. The 1950s witnessed gradual emergence of a composite culture and relative peace with the adoption of a secular, democratic constitution and the leadership of Nehru and other nationalist leaders. The Muslim community supported the Congress viewing it as a secular party that would protect their interests. There was some improvement in the economic condition of the Muslim community. However, from the mid-1960s, communal forces kept under check by Nehru’s leadership, revived. The brief period of interreligious peace and promise of increasing communal harmony and secularization of society and polity did not materialize. A trajectory began of estrangement of the Muslim community, a feeling of being deprived and of insecurity due to the reappearance of communal tension and riots which reached a peak by the early 1990s with the destruction of the Babri Masjid.

Agrarian Crisis, Changing Jat–Muslim Relations, and Everyday Communalism in Western Uttar Pradesh

This chapter analyses the reasons underlying the revival of communalism in western UP in the 2000s, culminating in one of the most extremely violent riots in recent decades in UP in Muzaffarnagar and adjoining districts in 2013. Two longer-term developments played a key role: sustained construction of everyday communalism by the BJP–RSS at the grass roots from the early 2000s, followed by the long and divisive electoral campaign for the 2014 national elections under Narendra Modi; a deepening agrarian crisis which contributed to the breakdown of the relatively harmonious, socioeconomic relationship between Hindus—primarily Jats—and Muslims in the rural areas, making them highly vulnerable to communal feelings. These shifts allowed the BJP through well-organized and sustained mobilization to deepen the sociopolitical divide between these communities, leading to communal tension and riots. While the former constitutes the political and aggressively visible form, the latter constitutes the underlying political economy aspect.

Politics, Culture, and the Political Economy of Everyday Communalism in Eastern Uttar Pradesh

Chapter 2 describes the beginnings of everyday communalism in eastern UP since the late 1990s/early 2000s. Two developments underlie the renewed incidents of communal violence in the 2000s: emergence of new patterns of communal mobilization by the BJP–RSS and the HYV; significant changes in the economy of the region, especially in Mau. Four significant, political strands underlie resulting communal tension and riots: shift from class-based mobilization by left/socialist parties to identity politics, and to criminalization and rise of mafia dons in the Mau-Azamgarh area; the emergence of the backward Muslims movement, leading to rise in political consciousness, fragmented Muslim identity, and autonomous politics; changes following globalization in the weaving industry that have affected the Muslim-Ansari community causing confrontation with Hindu traders. These have provided fertile ground for aggressive everyday communal mobilization by an independent power centre under Yogi Adityanath; the activities of the Gorakhnath Math are also examined.