Columbia Journal of Tax Law
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2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Susannah Kroeber

The W-4 tax withholding form has been used by individual taxpayers for decades to calculate their tax withholdings. It is based, however, on the faulty assumption that most U.S. workers have a single source of income. This assumption has caused millions of taxpayers to incur unnecessary tax debt. The formula for calculating federal income tax withholding for employees routinely under-withholds for low-income workers who have multiple sources of income because, without substantial documentation and calculation by the employee, employers withhold as if they are the employee’s single source of income. Taxpayers may therefore see their income tax withheld at too low a marginal rate, oftentimes zero percent, and can have significant balances due on short notice at the end of the tax year.This Note documents that reality and proposes a solution. It proposes a reconception of the Form W-4 and the withholding formula through the lens of low-income filers and aims for a policy of over-withholding from those filers in order to reduce surprise tax due and related penalties. The proposed solution removes the bias towards achieving a “zero refund” from the form design by eliminating the tax-free threshold—for most filers, the equivalent of their standard deduction—from the withholding scheme. As discussed in the Note, the proposed policy would also have the benefit of increasing tax compliance, minimizing bureaucratic burdens, and providing a revenue-neutral solution for the government. This Note further suggests an extension of the proposed policy to provide a much-needed savings mechanism for low-income filers.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry Ordower

Under the guise of compelling multinational enterprises (MNEs) to pay their fair share of income taxes, the OECD and other multinational agencies have introduced proposals to prevent MNEs from eroding the income tax base of developed economies by continuing to shift income artificially to low or zero tax jurisdictions.  Some of the proposals have garnered substantial multinational support, including recent support from the new U.S. presidential administration for a global minimum tax.  This Article reviews many of those international proposals.  The proposals tend to concentrate the incremental tax revenue from the prevention of base erosion into the treasuries of the developed economies although the minimum tax proposal known as GloBE encourages low tax countries to adopt the minimum rate.  The likelihood that and zero tax countries will transition successfully to imposing the minimum tax seems uncertain. Developed economies lack a compelling moral claim to incremental revenue so this Article argues that collecting a fair tax from MNEs and other taxpayers should be a goal that is independent of claims on that revenue.  The Article maintains that to prevent tax base erosion, the income tax base and administration must be uniform across national borders and the Article recommends applying uniform rules administered by international taxing agency.  The Article explores the convergence of tax rules under such an international taxing agency. Distribution of tax revenue by the international agency should follow contextualized need.  In addressing the conundrum of absolute poverty in the undeveloped and developing world vis á vis relative poverty in the developed world, the Article proposes that the taxing agency should distribute all incremental revenue from the uniform tax where the need is greatest to ameliorate absolute poverty and improve living standards without regard to income source.  The location of income production, destination of the produced goods and services generating the income, and residence of the income producers should not determine the tax revenue distribution.  Rather, the use of contextualized need for distribution determination will enable developed economies to receive sufficient revenue to maintain their existing infrastructures and governmental services.  Developed economies should forego new revenue, for which they have not budgeted, in favor of improving worldwide living conditions for all.  The proposals for uniform, worldwide taxation and revenue sharing based on contextualized need are admittedly aspirational and utopian but designed to encourage debate on sharing of resources in our increasingly globalized world.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Hasen

The federal income tax conceptualizes the standard loan transaction as an exchange of cash for promises to pay interest and to repay the amount borrowed by the end of the term. This formulation is subtly incorrect in ways that have led to a weaker foundation for existing tax rules than they merit. Conceptualizing loans instead as closely akin to leases places most of the tax rules for debt on sounder footing because it clarifies that interest is the consideration paid for the use of the loan proceeds. If interest is the cost of the use of money, then simple borrowing is a fully-paid-for transaction, full basis credit in the loan proceeds for the period for which interest is paid is appropriate, and cancellation of debt is a straightforward accession to wealth in the period in which it occurs. These conclusions hold whether the interest is deductible or not and are consistent with current law, which has come under fire from some quarters.Although the proposed reconceptualization of loan as lease supports a number of longstanding income tax rules, one area in which it counsels significant reform is the taxation of partnerships. If loans are like cash leases made in exchange for interest qualifying as rent, Treasury should provide for the allocation of basis credit among partners for the partnership’s debt based on who bears the economic burden of the interest expense. The rule should apply regardless of whether the debt is recourse or nonrecourse and regardless of who would have discharge of indebtedness income on default. Such an approach differs markedly from the existing rules for recourse obligations but is closer to the rules for certain nonrecourse obligations. A modification of the rules applicable to partnership debt consistent with the loan-as-lease theory, therefore, would remove a significant discontinuity in the current tax treatment of partnership debt.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-57
Author(s):  
Gregg Polsky

The 2017 Tax Act was the most sweeping federal tax legislation in over a generation. While many of its reforms, from dramatically lowering the corporate tax rate to altering the international tax rules, have already received significant attention, comparatively little attention has been paid to the 2017 Tax Act’s effects on personal injury plaintiffs. This Article explores those impacts. The 2017 Tax Act added a new provision that indirectly affects plaintiffs who allege sexual harassment or abuse. The new provision disallows the defendants’ deductions if the parties enter into a nondisclosure agreement. While targeted at defendants, the provision likely unwittingly harms plaintiffs by reducing settlement offers. The provision also suffers from a host of ambiguities that the Treasury Department and Internal Revenue Service will need to resolve. The 2017 Tax Act also eliminated so-called miscellaneous itemized deductions. In certain types of personal injury claims, such as defamation or emotional distress, this development causes the plaintiff to be taxed on the full settlement amount even if, as is often the case, one-third or more of the settlement is paid as a contingent fee to the plaintiff’s attorney. Legislative or administrative action is required to remedy this patent unfairness.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-88
Author(s):  
Ivan Ozai

States are on the verge of a new form of global competition. Some have taken unilateral measures to tax multinational profits that they would typically not be able to tax, at least not according to conventional international tax concepts and rules. Others have threatened to retaliate with economic countermeasures to protect their tax base and corporate residents. The recent attempt of the OECD to build consensus for a global tax compact has so far proven unsuccessful due to broad disagreement about how taxing rights should be equitably distributed between countries. As policymakers and tax scholars increasingly call into question long-standing theories of international taxation, the concept of inter-nation equity plays a pivotal role as a guiding principle in determining how to divide the international tax base among states. Inter-nation equity is one of the most ubiquitous concepts appearing in international tax policy discussions and yet one of the most understudied in tax scholarship. This Article introduces a comprehensive normative analysis of inter-nation equity by discussing how the concept should reconcile the two primary goals of international allocation of taxing rights: on the one hand, the concern of states to preserve their tax sovereignty and, on the other hand, the need to promote some degree of redistribution to address the challenges of global poverty and inequality. This Article further explains how a similar notion of inter-nation equity has developed in other areas of international law and discusses some practical implications for tax policy design.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Steven Sheffrin

The 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act eliminated the alternative minimum tax for corporations and sharply eviscerated the alternative minimum tax for individuals. Yet recently there has been a resurgence of interest in minimum taxes both for the international tax systems and in certain domestic contexts. This Article argues that there should be a role, but a very minimal one, for minimum taxes in our tax system. While reasonable arguments have been put forward for minimum taxes, on closer examination, many of these arguments are found wanting. This Article, however, does make a second-best case for one type of minimum tax, namely as a backstop for a potentially flawed or deficient tax. That is the “minimal role for a minimum tax.” To develop this argument, I explore three distinct theoretical rationales for minimum taxes that have been put forward. First, I discuss the distinction between unilateral and multilateral minimum taxes and the potential role that multilateral minimum taxes can play in alleviating concerns that arise from tax competition and the presence of tax havens. While unilateral minimum taxes may have a strong rationale, the rationale for multilateral minimum taxes is not compelling. Second, I show how considerations of fairness, public perception, and alternative views of the corporation create a demand for minimum taxes. This demand, however, can be satisfied in other ways. Finally, I discuss how the imperfect targeting of tax preferences and practical limitations in the design and effectiveness of the most common taxes can provide a potential, but limited, efficiency rationale for the use of minimum taxes. I lastly provide an example of the use of minimum taxes for reforming state corporate taxation.


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