INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY OF KAZAKHSTAN

The purpose of this article was to study the international aspects of taxation in Kazakhstan. What is relevant for Kazakhstan is that the country implements international standards in its national legislation, for example, the BEPS plan, information exchange, etc. In addition to the implementation of the 15 Actions of the BEPS plan, the country implements some special anti-avoidance rules (SAAR), for example, the transfer pricing rule, the thin capitalization rule, beneficial ownership concept, etc. In order to improve the international tax policy of Kazakhstan, the country needs to continue to implement all the Actions of the BEPS plan, conclude tax treaties, introduce general (GAAR) and targeted anti-avoidance rules (TAAR) into its legislation.

Main Tax Policy Matters for Establishing Chile as a Regional Operative Investment Hub

Unlike other OECD countries, Chile has not yet established a uniform tax policy toward foreign investment. Moreover, Chile had past experiences of unsuccessful legislation on specific exempted investment vehicles created with the purpose of establishing the country as a hub or platform for foreign investment. An effective international tax policy design requires taking a holistic view of the challenges and their corresponding solutions. As a country’s tax regime is a key policy instrument that may negatively or positively influence investment, Chilean tax policy is being oriented in this regard. This Article reviews the progress of those projects and current legislation, compares other OECD countries’ experiences in this matter, analyzing the main facts or elements to consider upon deciding the relevant tax policy, and finally proposes a tax regime that could make Chile more competitive when attracting foreign operative investment, focused on a more regional approach. Accordingly, this Article also intends to serve as guide or help to be considered by regulators on the hard road of designing tax standards.

Digital Taxes for Sustainable Development?

Whether digital or not, a fundamental paradigm shift in international tax policy is overdue in order to ensure adequate taxation of multinational corporations. The revenues lost through tax avoidance are urgently needed for investments in a socio-ecological transformation.

Policy Reform Effects in the Tax Ecosystem

International tax policy reforms such as Country-by-Country Reporting and Automatic Exchange of Information aim to increase tax compliance and revenues. Using a tax ecosystems perspective, this chapterapplies an agent-based simulation to assess the effects of these reforms. We demonstrate for EU Member States and selected European countries that reforms can be counteracted by tax competition and tax spillover effects which reduce their effectiveness. The model estimates European corporate tax revenue losses from tax avoidance and evasion of €104.9 billion in 2019. Without further reforms they would increase to €135.8 billion in 2029. A complete implementation of both Country-by-Country Reporting and Automatic Exchange of Information would help to decrease the total CIT gap by 16.4 per cent to €113.5 billion in the year 2029 The model explains why the seemingly small effect of CbCR is not so small and why the effect of AEoI may not be as promising as it seems.

INTER-NATION EQUITY REVISITED

States are on the verge of a new form of global competition. Some have taken unilateral measures to tax multinational profits that they would typically not be able to tax, at least not according to conventional international tax concepts and rules. Others have threatened to retaliate with economic countermeasures to protect their tax base and corporate residents. The recent attempt of the OECD to build consensus for a global tax compact has so far proven unsuccessful due to broad disagreement about how taxing rights should be equitably distributed between countries. As policymakers and tax scholars increasingly call into question long-standing theories of international taxation, the concept of inter-nation equity plays a pivotal role as a guiding principle in determining how to divide the international tax base among states. Inter-nation equity is one of the most ubiquitous concepts appearing in international tax policy discussions and yet one of the most understudied in tax scholarship. This Article introduces a comprehensive normative analysis of inter-nation equity by discussing how the concept should reconcile the two primary goals of international allocation of taxing rights: on the one hand, the concern of states to preserve their tax sovereignty and, on the other hand, the need to promote some degree of redistribution to address the challenges of global poverty and inequality. This Article further explains how a similar notion of inter-nation equity has developed in other areas of international law and discusses some practical implications for tax policy design.

Feeling GILTI: Tax Strategies for U.S. Multinational Corporations to Navigate the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act

The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act made significant changes to the U.S. taxation of foreign earnings. The most significant change is the 100 percent dividends-received deduction that generally applies to income earned by foreign subsidiaries. This represents a shift from U.S. tax deferral to U.S. tax exemption of foreign profits, which increases the potential benefit to shifting U.S. income to low-tax foreign jurisdictions. To limit this potential income shifting, Congress enacted new rules, known as GILTI, to supplement the already existing Subpart F rules. In this article, we briefly review the history of U.S. international tax policy and analyze the technical aspects of GILTI. We then discuss some general tax planning strategies and propose four specific tax strategies for companies to consider for minimizing the increased tax burden associated with GILTI. Lastly, we consider whether GILTI is good tax policy and make recommendations to improve the legislation.

Change and Stability in Global Tax Policy

This chapter takes a look at the ability of a great power like the United States to unilaterally effect fundamental change in international tax policy through coercion. It first shows that the structural constraints precluding a common interest in countermeasures to tax evasion were still in place when the US Congress passed the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). Second, the chapter reveals that there was no need for normative change, because regulative norms have never consistently prevented the United States from interfering with the legal systems of tax havens. From there, the chapter considers when a great power like the United States can effect fundamental change in international tax policy and the domestic tax policies of less powerful countries through coercion. It argues that a government reaches great power status if it controls an internal market large enough to reduce its dependence on international trade and investment relative to the government's negotiating partners and uses its regulatory capacity to effectively restrict market access for foreign firms or investors.