Siły polskie pod Zbarażem 10 lipca 1649 roku

The article presents the size and composition of the Polish forces near Zbaraż, with a breakdown into individual regiments and banners, at the beginning of the fights that began on 10 July 1649. In addition to repeating and arranging what was already known, many new findings have been introduced and errors contained in older literature have been corrected.

„To jest firmamentum potestatis regia”. Wojsko kwarciane w latach 1587–1588

The article discusses the numbers and functioning of the wojsko kwarciane (Quartered Army) in the turbulent third interregnum and in the first year of the reign of Sigismund III. Thanks to the access to the previously unused fiscal and military materials, it was possible to determine the size of this army in individual quarters of the period of interest and the names of the captains. No less important aspect is the political context of the use of wojsko kwarciane in a situation of the election parliament being split and attempts made to weaken the position of the Grand Hetman of the Crown, Jan Zamoyski, and the subjecting of his prerogatives to a nationwide discussion.

Remembering the Finnish sharp-shooter battalion’s involvement in the 1831 Polish-Russian War The controversial legacy of Finland’s first military campaign in the service of Russia

Among the Russian military units assembled for the suppression of the Polish November Uprising was also the Finnish Sharp-Shooter Battalion. The war in Poland was the first combat experience of Finnish soldiers in Russian service. The service of the unit was hailed as a testimony of Finnish loyalty towards the Empire, but it left a mixed legacy. This article discusses the complicated place of the Polish Uprising and Finnish sharp-shooters in Finnish historical memory during the 19th century.

Rosyjska Armia Czynna feldmarszałka Iwana Dybicza w wojnie z Polską (luty–czerwiec 1831 r.) Struktura i liczebność

The article discusses selected issues related to the Acting Army, which was the main Russian force in the war with Poland in 1831. It was created from the troops that Tsar Nicholas I originally intended to send to the Rhine on an intervention mission in France and Belgium. Based on the archival materials preserved in Poland, the strength and structure of this army are presented for the period from December 1830 to mid-June 1831, i.e. when it was commanded by Field Marshal Ivan Dybicz.

Eugeniusz Quirini de Saalbrück, Kartki z działalności żołnierzy polskich we Francji i ich ewakuacja do Wielkiej Brytanii w czerwcu 1940 r.

Memoirs of Eugeniusz Quirini de Saalbrück illuminate his activity as a cultural and educational clerk in 1940 at the Officers’ Rallying Station in Camp de Carpiagne, the unexpected surrender of France was a great tragedy, Polish soldiers wanted to fight and refused to lay down their arms. The Polish government-in-exile decided to continue the fight with English allies and to evacuate soldiers, including those from Camp de Carpiagne to the port of Saint Jean de Luz, from where they reached Plymouth on ship „Batory”.

Od Czechosłowackich Sił Zbrojnych do Czechosłowackiej Armii Ludowej. Armia czechosłowacka w trakcie zimnej wojny 1950–1956. Plany rozbudowy i przekształcenia organizacyjne

The article attempts to characterize the organizational transformations of the Czechoslovak army in 1950–1956. Plans for the expansion of the Czechoslovak army were formulated in September 1950. Its numbers in 1953 – the peak period of its development – reached 300,000 soldiers, and the expansion was carried out under the constant supervision of the Soviet General Staff and Soviet military advisers. The membership of Czechoslovakia in the Warsaw Pact from 1955 was in fact the legalization of the facts – the submission of the Czechoslovak army to an external disposition center, and its combat value and capabilities were questionable.

Plany odtworzenia fortyfikacji Wrocławia z lat 1807–1830

In 1807 French troops demolished fortifications of Wrocław. This paper presents the ideas and designs for the rebuilding of this fortress from the period 1807– 1830. In designing process participated following Prussian officers: Grawert, Rode, Pullet, Harroy, Boyen, Grolman, Liebenroth, and Schubert. The only today existing remains of this forgotten period of fortress Wrocław is the new city moat with a promenade, built after 1807.

When Typhus Rode a Red Horse: Weaponizing Disease During the Polish-Bolshevik Wa

This work explores the role of the Red Army in the spread of typhus on Polish lands during the Polish-Bolshevik War, 1919–1920. As a result of the Bolshevik style of war, one of the results of the Soviet advance into Poland was the anti-typhus effort along the border and throughout the country. Polish efforts, supported by American humanitarian groups, had made great strides in eradicating typhus however, much of this was undone with the Bolshevik offensive of 1920. Through both active and passive means the Bolshevik advance drove typhus victims and refugees across the Polish lines, while at the same time Bolshevik forces destroyed or removed sanitation equipment and supplies across the frontier.

Powstanie listopadowe w świetle wspomnień Erazma Rozwadowskiego

Like many of his contemporaries, Erazm Rozwadowski, who served as an officer in the 5th Mounted Riflemen Regiment of the Royal Polish Guard, left behind an account of his service career. Importantly, Rozwadowski only presented what he witnessed himself, in the way he remembered the event. Rozwadowski’s account includes personal details, such as his view of the uprising as seen through the eyes of a student at the Riding Cadet School, his stay at the camp of Grand Duke Konstantin near Wierzbno, and the financial difficulties he faced in order to properly equip himself upon becoming an officer.

Carl von Clausewitz’s Last Campaign: Clausewitz’s Role as Chief of Staff for the Prussian Army of Observation in the Polish-Russian War of 1831

Relatively little is known about Carl von Clausewitz’s involvement in the November Uprising as the Chief of Staff for the Prussian Army of Observation. This article argues that in Prussia’s strategy of no direct involvement in the Polish-Russian conflict, Clausewitz’s formidable skills as a military planner played an integral role. The tightened control over the borders deprived the Polish army of critical manpower and resources, while not giving Great Powers sympathetic to the Polish independence like France a clear cause for intervention. Additionally, Clausewitz’s visceral opposition to the November Uprising stemmed from his fears about Prussia’s strategic vulnerabilities.