What Does Codetermination Do?

The authors provide a comprehensive overview of codetermination, that is, worker representation in firms’ governance and management. The available micro evidence points to zero or small positive effects of codetermination on worker and firm outcomes and leaves room for moderate positive effects on productivity, wages, and job stability. The authors also present new country-level, general-equilibrium event studies of codetermination reforms between the 1960s and 2010s, finding no effects on aggregate economic outcomes or the quality of industrial relations. They offer three explanations for the institution’s limited impact. First, existing codetermination laws convey little authority to workers. Second, countries with codetermination laws have high baseline levels of informal worker voice. Third, codetermination laws may interact with other labor market institutions, such as union representation and collective bargaining. The article closes with a discussion of the implications for recent codetermination proposals in the United States.

Why Informal Workers Organize

Informal workers make up over two billion workers or about 50 percent of the global workforce. Surprisingly, scholars know little about informal workers’ political or civil society participation. An informal worker is anyone who holds a job and who does not pay taxes on taxable earnings, does not hold a license for their work when one is required, or is not part of a mandatory social security system. For decades, researchers argued that informal workers rarely organized or participated in civil society and politics. However, millions of informal workers around the world start and join unions. Why do informal workers organize? In countries like Bolivia, informal workers such as street vendors, fortune-tellers, witches, clowns, gravestone cleaners, sex workers, domestic workers, and shoe shiners come together in powerful unions. In South Africa, South Korea, and India, national informal worker organizations represent millions of citizens. The data in this book find that informal workers organize in nearly every country for which data exists, but to varying degrees. This raises a related question: Why do informal workers organize in some places more than others? The reality of informal work described in this book and supported by surveys in 60 countries, over 150 interviews with informal workers in Bolivia and Brazil, ethnographic data from multiple cities, and administrative data upends the conventional wisdom on the informal sector. The contrast between scholarly expectations and emerging data underpin the central argument of the book: Informal workers organize where state officials encourage them to.

Why did informal sector workers stop paying for health insurance in Indonesia? Exploring enrollees’ ability and willingness to pay

Indonesia faces a growing informal sector in the wake of implementing a national social health insurance system—Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN)—that supersedes the vertical programmes historically tied to informal employment. Sustainably financing coverage for informal workers requires incentivising enrolment for those never insured and recovering enrolment among those who once paid but no longer do so. This study aims to assess the ability- and willingness-to-pay of informal sector workers who have stopped paying the JKN premium for at least six months, across districts of different fiscal capacity, and explore which factors shaped their willingness and ability to pay using qualitative interviews. Surveys were conducted for 1,709 respondents in 2016, and found that informal workers’ average ability and willingness to pay fell below the national health insurance scheme’s premium amount, even as many currently spend more than this on healthcare costs. There were large groups for whom the costs of the premium were prohibitive (38%) or, alternatively, they were both technically willing and able to pay (25%). As all individuals in the sample had once paid for insurance, their main reasons for lapsing were based on the uncertain income of informal workers and their changing needs. The study recommends a combination of strategies of targeting of subsidies, progressive premium setting, facilitating payment collection, incentivising insurance package upgrades and socialising the benefits of health insurance in informal worker communities.

Keamanan Manusia dalam Implementasi SDGs Tujuan ke 5: Kekerasan Berbasis Gender di Kabupaten Malang

This paper discusses violence against women in Malang district (Kabupaten) in implementing SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals) and human security. Women are one of the objects of violence by men due to the pressure of the situation and economic conditions. Apart from economic factors, the absence of access to information and inadequate education means that women are always at a point of structural and social subordination. Therefore women's violence is always a victim. To see this, the author uses a human security perspective. The results of this study are that the factors of violence against women in the Malang district are an economic factor because most of the population of Malang District is an informal worker. Then, access to information becomes an obstacle for women as victims of violence because there is no access to information obtained from the government as a function of good governance. Finally, the limited education becomes an obstacle for women as victims to get information so that women's violence is considered taboo. Keywords: Access to Information, Economy, Violence, Education, SDGs.

Estimation Analysis and Mapping the Need for ‘Agen Perisai’ in Expanding the Membership of BP Jamsostek (A Case Study of West Java Province, Indonesia)

Social security is one indicator of human development efforts to achieve Indonesia's 2045 vision plan. One of the challenges in social security is the limited coverage and involvement of the population. In 2019, data of the BP Jamsostek West Java Province showed that the involvement of workers in the informal sector in social security was still low (around 3%). One of the efforts to increase the participation of informal workers is through Perisai agents. However, the number of active agents in West Java Province was still low and not comparable to the number of informal workers which reached 10 million people. Meanwhile in 2024, the government is targeting the participation of informal workers to be around 30% and universal coverage by 2029. For this reason, this article will form a scenario for estimating the need for Perisai agents to achieve universal coverage for informal worker participation. Based on the result, if the government want to achieve the target of 30% of informal workers' participation in 2024, the best scenario is to recruit 626 agents, while to achieve the universal coverage participation in 2029, the need for agents is 928 people. The highest agent needs are in the agriculture, wholesale trade, and accommodation sector. According to regency/city, the highest demand for agents is in the regencies of Bogor, Bandung, Garut, and Sukabumi. Furthermore, the mapping results by sector and regency/city can be used by relevant stakeholders to help formulate a Perisai agent recruitment policy to achieve universal coverage of BP Jamsostek membership in the coming year.

Reformulation of regulation of giving subsidy of equitable health care and social security

Is giving the subsidy in the implementation of national health care security in line with the purpose of arrangement of Law of Republic of Indonesia Number 40 of 2004 on System of National Social Security? Health care security is a basic right of all citizens of Indonesia as regulated in Article 28 H paragraph (3) and Article 34 Article (3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. This writing makes an analysis of the arrangement of subsidy of implementation of national health care security. Argumentation in this writing gives an analysis in doing reformulation of an arrangement of giving subsidy in implementation of national health care security as regulated in Article 14 paragraph (2) of Law of Republic of Indonesia Number 40 of 2004 on System of National social security, the program of national health care security is a program in the form of security done by the government, but in the implementation, it is done by using social insurance method. Premiums of poor people and deprived citizens are guaranteed by the state, formal premium is paid by the worker and employer while the informal worker pays the premium independently, by this system it makes injustice in the society. All costs of National health care security should be covered by the state as the aim of implementation of the Law of System of National Health Care Security and the government should use the method of system of security and not social insurance system.

Analisis perpindahan tenaga kerja informal Kabupaten Pasuruan

The uneven economic growth causes regions to experience economic and social inequalities, which in the end they choose to look for a place that is expected to be able to meet their physical and spiritual needs. This study aims to determine the dominant factors that influence the decisions of informal workers to migrate to Pare District, Kediri Regency. The method of collecting direct data is by conducting interviews with respondents. The data obtained were then analyzed by the SPSS program using logistic regression analysis. The independent variables studied include: age (X1), an education level (X2), land ownership (X3), marital status (X4), employment status (X5), income (X6) and the dependent variable in this study is the decision to migrate. (Y). Based on the data collected from 102 respondents, it is known that the variables age (X1), land ownership (X3), and income (X6) have a significant effect on the reasons a person decides to migrate to Sukorejo District, Pasuruan Regency. While the education variable (X2), marital status (X4), and employment status (X5) were not significant. The income variable (X6) is the variable that most dominantly influences the decision of an informal worker to migrate to Sukorejo District, Pasuruan Regency