Living up to your codes? Corporate codes of ethics and the cost of equity capital

PurposePrevious literature provides mixed evidence about the effectiveness of a code of ethics in limiting managerial opportunism. While some studies find that code of ethics is merely window-dressing, others find that they do influence managers' behavior. The present study investigates whether the quality of a code of ethics decreases the cost of equity by limiting managerial opportunism.Design/methodology/approachIn order to test the hypothesis, the authors perform an empirical analysis on a sample of US companies in the 2004–2012 period. The results are robust to a battery of robustness analyses that the authors performed in order to take care of endogeneity.FindingsEmpirical results indicate that a higher quality code of ethics is associated with a lower cost of equity. In other words, firms with a more comprehensive code of ethics and better-designed implementation procedures limit managerial opportunism and pay a lower cost of equity because they are perceived by investors to be less risky.Research limitations/implicationsPractical implicationsSocial implicationsOriginality/valueThe authors contribute to the literature in two ways. First, by looking at the market reaction to the code of ethics, thus capturing all its indirect possible benefits and second, by measuring not only the existence but also the quality of a code of ethics. Based on the results, policymakers may choose to further promote codes of ethics as an effective corporate governance mechanism.

Visuals and attention to earnings news on twitter

We propose the visual attention hypothesis that visuals in firm earnings announcements increase attention to the earnings news. We find that visuals in firms’ Twitter earnings announcements are associated with more retweets, consistent with greater user engagement with announcements that have visuals. This result holds for earnings tweets sent by the same firm and on the same day in firm-level and tweet-level analyses. Consistent with managerial opportunism, firms are more likely to use visuals in their earnings tweets when performance is good but less persistent. Consistent with visuals increasin g investor attention, the initial return response to earnings news is stronger and the post-announcement response is lower when visuals are used. Our evidence of a post-announcement return reversal indicates that visuals can be a double-edged sword. Furthermore, the higher earnings response coefficient from visuals is more pronounced on days with high investor distraction (when many other firms are also announcing earnings). Graphical abstract

CSR Disclosures: Role and Relationship to Accounting Conservatism in Improving Earnings of Quality

Several research issues argue, in general, companies that focus and are oriented towards the implementation of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). It is relative to accounting conservatism to suppress information asymmetry and/or managerial opportunism to provide higher quality earnings information as a reflection of the actual condition of the company. This study was conducted to look at the effect of CSR disclosure on earnings quality by adding accounting conservatism as a mediating variable. This study uses path analysis techniques in 90 manufacturing companies for an observation period of 4 (four) periods from 2016 to 2019. The results of this study indicate that CSR disclosure influences Accounting Conservatism. Then, CSR affects earnings quality. Furthermore, earnings quality is influenced by accounting conservatism, and finally, CSR disclosure does not affect earnings quality according to accounting conservatism. CSR Disclosure, Accounting Conservatism, Earnings Quality.DOI: 10.26905/jkdp.v25i3.5030

Long-term performance following share repurchase, signaling costs and accounting transparency: Korean evidence

Purpose Existing studies show that firms may have an incentive to use share repurchases opportunistically, thereby taking advantage of market participants’ confirmation bias that share repurchase is a signal of undervaluation. This study aims to investigate whether signaling costs and accounting transparency can serve as tools to identify opportunistic share repurchases. Design/methodology/approach The authors measure signaling costs by using two share repurchase methods (direct and indirect share repurchase) with different share repurchase costs, and measure accounting transparency using the history of earnings timeliness. The authors further measure long-term performance following share repurchases using operating performance and stock returns. Lastly, the authors compare the long-term performances between the groups defined by share repurchase method and earnings timeliness level. Findings The authors find that indirect share repurchase firms with a history of poor earnings timeliness experience unfavorable long-term performance, while other share repurchase firms do not. This finding reinforces the view that some share repurchases may be driven by managerial opportunism. In particular, when firms with a history of poor earnings-reporting behavior choose a low-cost repurchase method, their share repurchases may be motivated by managerial opportunism. Originality/value The findings suggest that past earnings timeliness and the signaling costs of a repurchase together are useful predictors of false signaling. Moreover, they suggest that investors can – at least in part – predict opportunistic share repurchases by using signaling costs and accounting transparency.

Does a Company’s Profitability Influence the Level of CSR Development?

The objective of this paper is to analyze the effect of economic and financial performance on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). For this reason, we have used the data from a sample made up of 662 companies, 146 registered as medium-sized or large and 516 as small or micro, highlighting the significant weight of small companies in the sample. CSR has been measured using an indicator estimated from the data gathered by way of a questionnaire containing information related with the economic, environmental, and social dimensions. The analysis has been conducted by estimating panel regression models with robust errors. The results show a negative relationship between economic performance and more CSR activities implemented, supporting the Managerial Opportunism Hypothesis. Furthermore, large companies under the pressure of stakeholders are more prone to implementing certain CSR actions than small ones, meaning that a minimum size is essential according to this research.

Scoring Sufficiency Economy Philosophy through GRI Standards and Firm Risk: A Case Study of Thai Listed Companies

The purpose of this study is to evaluate sufficiency economy philosophy (SEP) performance through annual reports and voluntary sustainable development reports and examines the relationship between SEP performance and firm-specific risk of Thai listed companies from 2013 to 2018. Based on global reporting initiative (GRI) standards, the SEP performance was measured by aligning each GRI topic with each of the SEP elements to create an SEP scoring system. The scoring system was applied and tested by evaluating 34 firms for six years. The outcome scores were recorded in panel data structure and used to test two competing hypotheses of risk reduction and managerial opportunism. The regression results supported the risk reduction hypothesis and thus practicing SEP reduced firm-specific risk. Since our sample was limited to 34 firms, a two-stage least squares instrumental variable (2SLS-IV) analysis was performed to estimate the causal relationship between SEP performance and firm-specific risk. The result remained negatively and significantly correlated, indicating that SEP practice stimulated business sustainability. The finding suggested that the SEP scoring system was able to capture SEP performance and practicing SEP appeared to reduce firm-specific risk, which was consistent with the risk reduction hypothesis of the stakeholder theory.

Does managerial entrenchment affect audit report lag?

We examine the association between audit report lag (ARL) and managerial entrenchment using data spanning 2008-2016. We use regression analysis and data obtained from publicly available sources to construct our sample consisting of 5,155 firm-year observations and 807 unique firms to investigate whether the behavior of entrenched managers influences the time it takes auditors to complete an audit. The length of the annual audit is the most critical determinant of the timeliness and relevance of the financial reports. Our proxy for managerial entrenchment is the entrenchment index (EINDEX) as constructed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Farrell (2009). We find a negative relation between audit report lag and the entrenchment index. We stratify the entrenchment provisions in line with existing literature and find a negative association between the provisions that restrict shareholder rights and the provisions that discourage hostile takeovers. Overall, our findings suggest that management entrenchment curtails managerial opportunism and reduces the auditors’ efforts, and the time auditors spend to complete the audit.