scholarly journals The proteome, not the transcriptome, predicts that oocyte superovulation affects embryonic phenotypes in mice

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Leila Taher ◽  
Steffen Israel ◽  
Hannes C. A. Drexler ◽  
Wojciech Makalowski ◽  
Yutaka Suzuki ◽  
...  

AbstractSuperovulation is the epitome for generating oocytes for molecular embryology in mice, and it is used to model medically assisted reproduction in humans. However, whether a superovulated oocyte is normal, is an open question. This study establishes for the first time that superovulation is associated with proteome changes that affect phenotypic traits in mice, whereas the transcriptome is far less predictive. The proteins that were differentially expressed in superovulated mouse oocytes and embryos compared to their naturally ovulated counterparts were enriched in ontology terms describing abnormal mammalian phenotypes: a thinner zona pellucida, a smaller oocyte diameter, increased frequency of cleavage arrest, and defective blastocyst formation, which could all be verified functionally. Moreover, our findings indicate that embryos with such abnormalities are negatively selected during preimplantation, and ascribe these abnormalities to incomplete ovarian maturation during the time of the conventional superovulation, since they could be corrected upon postponement of the ovulatory stimulus by 24 h. Our data place constraints on the common view that superovulated oocytes are suitable for drawing general conclusions about developmental processes, and underscore the importance of including the proteins in a modern molecular definition of oocyte quality.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leila Taher ◽  
Steffen Israel ◽  
Hannes Drexler ◽  
Wojciech Makalowski ◽  
Yutaka Suzuki ◽  
...  

Abstract Superovulation is the epitome for generating oocytes for molecular embryology in mice, and it is used to model medically assisted reproduction in humans. Yet whether a superovulated oocyte is normal, is an open question. This study establishes for the first time that superovulation is associated with proteome changes that bear on phenotypic traits in mice, whereas the transcriptome is far less predictive. The proteins that were differentially expressed in superovulated mouse oocytes and their derived embryos relative to their naturally ovulated counterparts were enriched in ontology terms describing abnormal mammalian phenotypes: a thinner zona pellucida, a smaller oocyte diameter, increased cleavage arrest, and defective blastocyst formation, which we could all verify functionally. Moreover, our findings indicate that embryos with such abnormalities are negatively selected during preimplantation, and ascribe these abnormalities to incomplete ovarian maturation during the time of the conventional superovulation, since they could be corrected upon postponement of the ovulatory stimulus by 24 h. Our data place constraints on the common view that superovulated oocytes are suited to draw conclusions of general validity about developmental processes, and underscore the importance of including the proteins in a modern molecular definition of oocyte quality.


2003 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
KARSTEN KLINT JENSEN

It is common to define egalitarianism in terms of an inequality ordering, which is supposed to have some weight in overall evaluations of outcomes. Egalitarianism, thus defined, implies that levelling down makes the outcome better in respect of reducing inequality; however, the levelling down objection claims there can be nothing good about levelling down. The priority view, on the other hand, does not have this implication. This paper challenges the common view. The standard definition of egalitarianism implicitly assumes a context. Once this context is made clear, it is easily seen that egalitarianism could be defined alternatively in terms of valuing a benefit to a person inversely to how well off he is relative to others. The levelling down objection does not follow from this definition. Moreover, the common definition does not separate egalitarian orderings from prioritarian ones. It is useful to do this by requiring that on egalitarianism, additively separable orderings should be excluded. But this requirement is stated as a condition on the alternative definition of egalitarianism, from which the levelling down objection does not follow.


Author(s):  
Wendell Bird

This book discusses the revolutionary broadening of concepts of freedoms of press and speech in Great Britain and in America during the quarter century before the First Amendment and Fox’s Libel Act. The conventional view of the history of freedoms of press and speech is that the common law since antiquity defined those freedoms narrowly. In that view, Sir William Blackstone in 1769, and Lord Chief Justice Mansfield in 1770, faithfully summarized that common law in giving very narrow definitions of those freedoms as mere liberty from prior restraint and not as liberty from punishment after printing or speaking (the political crimes of seditious libel and seditious speech). Today, that view continues to be held by neo-Blackstonians, and remains dominant or at least very influential among historians. Neo-Blackstonians claim that the Framers used freedom of press “in a Blackstonian sense to mean a guarantee against previous restraints” with no protection against “subsequent restraints” (punishment) of seditious expression. Neo-Blackstonians further claim that “[n]o other definition of freedom of the press by anyone anywhere in America before 1798” existed. This book, by contrast, concludes that a broad definition and understanding of freedoms of press and speech was the dominant context of the First Amendment and of Fox’s Libel Act. Its basis is hundreds of examples of a broad understanding of freedoms of press and speech, in both Britain and America, in the late eighteenth century. For example, a book published in London in 1760 by a Scottish lawyer, George Wallace, stated that it is tyranny “to restrain the freedom of speculative disquisitions,” and because “men have a right to think for themselves, and to publish their thoughts,” it is “monstrous … under the pretext of the authority of laws, which ought never to have been enacted … attempting to restrain the liberty of the press” (seditious libel law). This book also challenges the conventional view of Blackstone and the neo-Blackstonians. Blackstone and Mansfield did not find any definition in the common law, but instead selected the narrowest definition in popular essays from the prior seventy years. Blackstone misdescribed it as an accepted common law definition, which in fact did not exist, and a year later Mansfield inserted a similar definition into the common law for the first time. Both misdescribed that narrow definition and the unique rules for prosecuting sedition as ancient. They were leading a counter-revolution, cloaked as a summary of a narrow and ancient common law doctrine that was neither.


Author(s):  
Wendell Bird

The narrow understanding of freedoms of press and speech, adopted by Sir William Blackstone and Lord Chief Justice Mansfield, defined those freedoms as no more than liberty from a government-issued license or other prior restraint, with no liberty from punishment of sentiments once printed or spoken. In doing that, the last volume of Blackstone’s Commentaries in 1769 summarized a narrow common law definition of freedoms of press and speech that did not exist in common law. Mansfield’s decisions introduced a similar definition into the common law for the first time the year after that. Besides describing a new definition as ancient, both Blackstone and Mansfield described the related framework for prosecuting sedition as being ancient and universally accepted, when in fact it was a collection of unique rules adopted and manufactured seventy years before and recently revised. Blackstone and Mansfield were not declaring ancient law but were creating new law.


Author(s):  
BABASAN D. TSYRENOV ◽  
◽  
MARINA B.-O. KHAIDAPOVA ◽  

The article discusses the patterns of expressing the concept "thick" in two typologically and genetically unrelated languages - Buryat and Chinese. The research of different concepts manifestation in unrelated languages has recently become widespread, and the comparative study of Buryat and Chinese in this regard is conducted for the first time. Translation dictionaries and electronic corpora of the languages were taken as sources for the material from which the necessary tokens were selected using continuous sampling method. To interpret the obtained examples in various contexts, we applied a general scientific method and comparative analysis techniques. As a result, it was discovered that despite the difference in the genesis and typology of Buryat and Chinese, common patterns in the concept expression were found. The common pattern is the differentiation by "topological type", which dictates the use of synonymous words to denote the thickness of objects with different geometric parameters. According to the topological parameter, the objects can be classified as relatively flat (zuzaan, Chinese 厚 hou) or relatively cylindrical (buduun and粗 si), and this can also be applied to the parameters of the human body. Another common feature is the expression of human fatness (fat) in correlation with domestic animals’ fatness degree: targan and 肥 fei. In this context, the definition of fatness has negative connotation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 446-452
Author(s):  
Jared W. Keeley

Diagnostic classifications of mental disorders are complex systems that integrate both scientific and social priorities. The Task Force on Developing Humanistic Approaches to Psychological Diagnosis of the Society for Humanistic Psychology has released a set of guidelines intended to guide the development of mental health classifications. This commentary argues that the attention paid in the guidelines to social processes is a desirable and inherent component of the development of any classification. Social influences regarding the definition of the concepts and the processes by which people develop them are integrally intertwined, contrary to the common view that nonscientific factors should be excluded from classification systems as much as possible. These guidelines offer a much needed resource for developing future mental health classifications.


1961 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 119-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. R. Lander

Attainder was the most solemn penalty known to the common law. Attainder for treason was followed not only by the most savage and brutal corporal penalties and the forfeiture of all possessions, but in addition the corruption of blood passing to all direct descendants, in other words, by the legal death of the family. Before proceeding to an examination of the effects of parliamentary acts of attainder in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries it is necessary first of all to define the scope of forfeiture for treason as it affected landed property. Bracton's classic definition of forfeiture had involved for the traitor ‘the loss of all his goods and the perpetual disinheritance of his heirs, so that they may be admitted neither to the paternal nor to the maternal inheritance’. Feudal opinion had always been very much opposed to the stringency of this conception and the Edwardian statute De Donis Conditionalibus, confirmed implicitly by the treason statute of 1352, had protected entailed estates from the scope of forfeiture, thus leaving only the fee simple and the widow's dower within the scope of the law. The wife's own inheritance or any jointure which had been made for her, because they ante-dated her husband's treason, as distinct from her right to dower which did not, were not liable to ultimate forfeiture—though a married woman could claim them only when ‘her time came according to the common law’, that is after the death of her husband when she ceased to be ‘femme couvert’. This equitable principle was confirmed by a statute of the Merciless Parliament of 1388 which, however, included for the first time the rule that lands held to the use of a traitor were also included in the scope of forfeiture. Thus, by 1388, of the lands held by a traitor (as distinct from the wife's inheritance and jointure), only those held in fee tail fell outside the scope of the treason laws. This loophole was closed by Richard II in 1398 when Parliament declared forfeit entailed estates as well as lands held in fee simple and to the use of a traitor, thus reverting with one exception to Bracton's view of forfeiture.


2010 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 223-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan S. M. Edwards

Following the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s. 56, the common law defence of provocation, which depended on a sudden and temporary loss of self-control (following R v Duffy1), is now abolished, as is s. 3 of the Homicide Act 1957. In its place is substituted a statutory defence of loss of self-control, which relies on some of the principles that constituted the grounds for provocation, its predecessor. For the first time fear qualifies as a new ground for loss of self-control (2009 Act, s. 55(3)). This article examines the new partial defence of ‘loss of self-control’ and considers what distinguishes the new defence from its predecessor and the features which are retained. It also evaluates whether the overarching objectives of restricting the ambit of the earlier defence and providing a new defence for battered women, shared by both the Law Commission and the government, are well considered and likely to be achievable. The new partial defence will be considerably restricted both by the new criteria and by returning the power to the judge, as ‘gatekeeper’, to prohibit an un***meritorious defence from going to the jury (2009 Act, s. 54(6)). The inclusion of fear as a new ground for loss of self-control will continue to present difficulties as long as the definition of ‘extremely grave’, a requisite of the qualifying trigger to this loss of self-control, is a jury question, and also insofar as ‘justifiable sense of being seriously wronged’ is to be judged on objective grounds. Further difficulties are presented by the requirement that the capacity for self-control, now expressed as the ‘tolerance’ and ‘restraint’, required of the defendant, is to be decided on objective grounds.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ignacio Cofone ◽  
Adriana Robertson

Privacy loss is central to privacy law scholarship, but a clear definition of the concept remains elusive. We present a model that both captures the essence of privacy loss and can be easily applied to policy evaluations and doctrinal debates. To do so, we use standard Bayesian statistics to formalize a key intuition: that information privacy is fundamentally linked to how much other people know about you. A key advantage of our model is that, for the first time, it takes privacy preferences seriously while maintaining tractability. Another key advantage is that, by viewing privacy as a continuum, it is more realistic and is better suited for evaluating “gray areas” than prior models.We apply this framework to two central areas of privacy law: the common law privacy tort and the Fourth Amendment’s third-party doctrine. In the tort context, we first show how our proposal helps to clarify current law, and then use it to distinguish between the two interests protected by the privacy tort: privacy interests and reputational interests. We then propose a simple framework for judges to use in providing remedies for both classes of claims. We then move on to the third party doctrine. We show that many of the shortcomings associated with the doctrine stem from the misguided assumption that privacy is dichotomous rather than a spectrum, as in our model. We then liken this to the standard of care familiar from tort law, and show how the current doctrine results in the equivalent of a strict liability standard, rather than a more appropriate negligence-based standard.


2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis David Alcaraz

The dramatic increase in genome sequencing during the last years has changed our ideas about bacteria diversity, from single gene to whole community DNA surveys; we have learned that the nature largest gene repository resides in bacteria. Comparison of bacteria genomes has contributed to understand the flexibility in size and gene content as well as the gene movement due to gene family expansions and Horizontal Gene Transfer. Bacteria species are currently defined by means of 16S rRNA sequence comparisons and some limited phenotypic traits. There is an ongoing debate about the biological and evolutive significance of the bacteria species, and thus the need of refine the definition of it using the most of the genomic shared information. When comparing multiple genomes of related strains we can divide the common shared features like the core genome, and the strain specific genes are known as accessory genome, both accessory and core genome as the total of the genetic composition are known as pan-genome. Here we present the possibilities using pan-genomics as a workhorse to describe both taxonomical and functional diversity within bacteria.


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