Philosophy of Language

Philosophy ◽  
2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael P. Wolf
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Speech Act ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Historical Review ◽  
Major Topic ◽  
Analytic Tradition ◽  
The World ◽  
In Virtue Of

The term “philosophy of language” is generally used more restrictively than newcomers to the discipline might expect. While philosophers of almost every stripe have something to say about language, people who speak of “philosophy of language” generally intend to restrict it to philosophers in the analytic tradition over the last one hundred years or so. This entry reflects that general convention. The entry also breaks the field down by major topic areas, with each later topic including at least one cornerstone work (usually more) and greater attention to recent papers of interest. The topics above (beyond the review of textbooks and supplements) may be thought of as falling into major groups based on a number of larger themes and questions in the field. After some historical review, we consider what our view on what languages must be: how do things become meaningful within a language and how do speakers adhere to the rules governing the language? We then look at how truth should be understood and, more narrowly, whether there are analytic truths (statements that are true in virtue of the meanings of their terms). Questions of how words themselves come to refer to or stand for parts of the world are then considered, both invariantly and in ways that are sensitive to context, including expressions of propositional attitudes. Two sections after that address more pragmatic matters in the philosophy of language: what is it to perform a speech act (and thus communicate with others) and what is it to use an expression metaphorically, deviating from accepted usage and yet being acknowledged by other speakers? We close with a review of an emerging debate between minimalists and contextualists over the degree to which the meanings of most of the language are fixed.

Searle, John (1932–)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Rust
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Speech Acts ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Illocutionary Force ◽  
Chinese Room ◽  
Chinese Room Argument ◽  
The World ◽  
Basic Facts ◽  
In Virtue Of

John Rogers Searle (born July 31, 1932) is the Slusser Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. This analytic philosopher has made major contributions to the fields of the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, and social ontology. He is best known for his Chinese room argument, which aims to demonstrate that the formally described systems of computer functionalism cannot give rise to intentional understanding. Searle’s early work focused on the philosophy of language, where, in Speech Acts (1969), he explores the hypothesis that speaking a language is a rule-governed form of behavior. Just as one must follow certain rules in order to be considered to be playing chess, rules determine whether a speaker is making a promise, giving a command, asking a question, making a statement, and so forth. The kind of speech act that an utterance is depends on, among other conditions, its propositional content and illocutionary force. The content depicts the world as being a certain way, and the force specifies what a speaker is trying to do with that content. For example, for an utterance to qualify as a promise a speaker must describe a future act (content) and intend that the utterance place him or herself under an obligation to do that act (force). In Intentionality (1983), Searle argues that the structure of language not only mirrors but is derivative of the structure of intentional thought, so that core elements of his analysis of speech acts can be used as the basis for a theory of intentionality. Just as we can only promise by bringing certain propositional contents under a certain illocutionary force, intentional states such as belief, desire, fear, and joy can only be about the world in virtue of a representative content and a psychological mode. A theory of intentionality does not explain how intentionality is possible, given the basic facts of the world as identified by the natural sciences. Much of Searle’s work in the philosophy of mind, as found in Minds, Brains, and Science (1984) and The Rediscovery of the Mind (1992), is dedicated to the question of how mental facts, including but not limited to intentional facts, can be reconciled with basic, natural facts. Searle’s Chinese room argument is formulated in the service of rejecting computer functionalism, a prominent attempt at such reconciliation. Searle’s positive view, which he describes as "biological naturalism," is that mental facts are both caused by and features of underlying neurophysiological processes. In Speech Acts (1969), Searle claims that using language is akin to playing chess, in that both activities are made possible by participants following what he describes as "constitutive rules," rules that must be followed in order for someone to be considered to be undertaking those activities. Other institutional facts, such as money or the U.S. presidency, are also created and maintained in virtue of our following certain constitutive rules. For example, someone can only count as a U.S. president if that person is, among other conditions, a U.S. citizen who receives a majority of electoral votes. This thought is extended and explored in Searle’s two book-length contributions to the field of social ontology, The Construction of Social Reality (1995) and Making the Social World (2010). In addition to the philosophy of language and social ontology, Searle has made book-length contributions to the philosophy of action (Rationality in Action (2001)) and the philosophy of perception (Seeing Things as They Are: A Theory of Perception (2015)). He also famously engaged Jacques Derrida’s critique of J. L. Austin’s discussion of illocutionary acts ("Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida" (1977)). Searle has summarized his various positions in Mind, Language, and Society: Philosophy in the Real World (1998) and Mind: A Brief Introduction (2004).

scholarly journals Verdade, interpretação e objetividade em Donald Davidson

2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
José Maria Arruda
Keyword(s):  
Key Words ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Donald Davidson ◽  
Radical Interpretation ◽  
Analytic Tradition ◽  
Philosophical Hermeneutic ◽  
Principle Of Charity ◽  
Radical Interpreter ◽  
Philosophical Importance

Donald Davidson foi um dos filósofos mais influentes da tradição analítica da segunda metade do século. A unidade de sua obra é constituída pelo papel central que reflexão sobre como podemos interpretar os proferimentos de um outro falante desempenha para a compreensão da natureza do significado. Davidson adota o ponto de vista metodológico de um intérprete que não pode pressupor nada sobre o significado das palavras de um falante e que não possui nenhum conhecimento detalhado de suas atitudes proposicionais. Neste artigo, eu apresento inicialmente a estrutura e os pressupostos da filosofia da linguagem de Davidson; passo depois a uma discussão sobre a importância do princípio de caridade para seu projeto interpretativo e, por fim, procuro apontar as diferenças do projeto de Davidson com a hermenêutica filosófica. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Interpretação radical. Princípio de caridade. Hermenêutica. ABSTRACT Donald Davidson was one of the most influential philosophers in the analytic tradition in the last half of the twenthy century. The unity of his work lies in the central role that the reflection on how we are able to interpret the speech of another plays in undestanding the nature of meaning. Davidson adopts the standpoint of the interpreter of the speech of another whose evidence does not, at the outset, pressupose anything about what the speaker’s words mean or any datailed knowledge of his propositional attitudes. This is the position of the radical interpreter. In this paper, I begin with an account of the assumptions and structure of Davidson’s philosophy of language; after this I discuss the philosophical importance of the principle of charity for the theory of radical interpretation and, at the end, I compare Davidson’s interpretative project to the philosophical hermeneutic. KEY WORDS – Radical interpretation. Principle of charity. Hermeneutics.

Frege's Detour

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Perry
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Cognitive States ◽  
Indirect Discourse ◽  
Attitude Reports ◽  
Sense And Reference ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Indirect Reference

I argue that Frege’s treatment of propositional attitudes in “On Sense and Reference” put the philosophy of language on a detour. His doctrine of “indirect reference” reflected and reinforced the view that beliefs, desires, etc. consist in having relations to propositions. According to this doctrine expressions in embedded sentences in indirect discourse and propositional attitude reports do refer as they do when unembedded, but instead refer to their ordinary senses, so sentences refer to Thoughts, Frege’s version of what are now callled general or qualitative propositions. Davidson call this move abandoning “semantic innocence” which is the view that such embedded sentences work as they usually do. I agree with Davidson, that semantic innocence should not be abandonned. I argue that such cognitive states have truth-conditions in virtue of their causal and informational roles, which can be encoded in a variety of ways for different purposes, and provide a better explanation of the considerations that drove Frege to abandon innocence. I trace the problems I see to Frege’s abandonment of the framework of his early work, the Begriffsschrift. I argue that by adding the levels of senses and Thoughts to his Begriffsschriftframework, and retaining “circumstances” as the referents of sentences containing singular terms, Frege could have avoided the doctrine of indirect reference, and philosophy could have taken a different path.

The Exchange of Words

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Moran
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Action Theory ◽  
Speech Act ◽  
Mind Reading ◽  
Second Person ◽  
New Approach ◽  
The World ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Paul Grice

The capacity to speak is not only the ability to pronounce words, but is the socially recognized capacity to make one’s words count in various ways. We rely on this capacity whenever we tell another person something and expect to be believed, and what we learn from others in this way is the basis for most of what we take ourselves to know about the world. The Exchange of Words is a philosophical exploration of human testimony, specifically as a form of intersubjective understanding in which speakers communicate by making themselves accountable for the truth of what they say. This account weaves together themes from philosophy of language, moral psychology, action theory, and epistemology, for a new approach to this fundamental human phenomenon. The account concentrates on the difference between what may be revealed in one’s speech (like a regional accent) and what we explicitly claim and make ourselves answerable for. Some prominent themes include the meaning of sincerity in speech, the nature of mutuality and how it differs from “mind reading,” the interplay between the first-person and the second-person perspectives in conversation, and the nature of the speech act of illocution as developed by philosophers such as J. L. Austin and Paul Grice. Ordinary dialogue is the locus of a kind of intersubjective understanding that is distinctive to the transmission of reasons in human testimony, and The Exchange of Words is an original and integrated account of this basic way of being informative and in touch with one another.

Feminist Philosophy of Language in the Analytic Tradition

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary Kate McGowan
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Hate Speech ◽  
Speech Act ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Feminist Philosophy ◽  
Social Phenomena ◽  
Future Directions ◽  
Analytic Tradition ◽  
Feminist Work

This chapter offers an overview of some central themes and issues in analytic feminist philosophy of language. Ways in which parts of language, language as a whole, or our study of it involve assumptions about gender are discussed. More recent feminist applications of the tools of analytic philosophy of language to social phenomena are also explored. This includes slurs, generics, silencing, and the speech act approach to both pornography and hate racist hate speech. Ways in which extent feminist work has changed or entered the mainstream of the field, and current and future directions in analytic feminist philosophy of language are also briefly discussed.

Beyond Concepts

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Garrett Millikan
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Conceptual Development ◽  
Natural World ◽  
Language Function ◽  
Natural Signs ◽  
Transmission Of Information ◽  
The World ◽  
Natural Information ◽  
Natural Ontology

This book weaves together themes from natural ontology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and information, areas of inquiry that have not recently been treated together. The sprawling topic is Kant’s how is knowledge possible? but viewed from a contemporary naturalist standpoint. The assumption is that we are evolved creatures that use cognition as a guide in dealing with the natural world, and that the natural world is roughly as natural science has tried to describe it. Very unlike Kant, then, we must begin with ontology, with a rough understanding of what the world is like prior to cognition, only later developing theories about the nature of cognition within that world and how it manages to reflect the rest of nature. And in trying to get from ontology to cognition we must traverse another non-Kantian domain: questions about the transmission of information both through natural signs and through purposeful signs including, especially, language. Novelties are the introduction of unitrackers and unicepts whose job is to recognize the same again as manifested through the jargon of experience, a direct reference theory for common nouns and other extensional terms, a naturalist sketch of uniceptual—roughly conceptual— development, a theory of natural information and of language function that shows how properly functioning language carries natural information, a novel description of the semantics/pragmatics distinction, a discussion of perception as translation from natural informational signs, new descriptions of indexicals and demonstratives and of intensional contexts and a new analysis of the reference of incomplete descriptions.

Sentence mood

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Portner
Keyword(s):  
Speech Act ◽  
Speech Act Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Major Topic

Sentence mood is the linguistic category which marks the fundamental conversational function, or “sentential force,” of a sentence. Exemplified by the universal types of declarative, interrogative, and imperative sentences (as well as by less-common types), sentence mood has been a major topic of research in both linguistics and philosophy. This chapter identifies the two main theories which address the topic, one based on speech act theory and the other on dynamic approaches to meaning. It explains and evaluates current research which uses the two theories, and identifies the most important insights which come out of each.

Gaslighting, First- and Second-Order

Hypatia ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Paul-Mikhail Catapang Podosky
Keyword(s):  
Second Order ◽  
First Order ◽  
The World ◽  
In Virtue Of

Abstract In what sense do people doubt their understanding of reality when subject to gaslighting? I suggest that an answer to this question depends on the linguistic order at which a gaslighting exchange takes place. This marks a distinction between first-order and second-order gaslighting. The former occurs when there is disagreement over whether a shared concept applies to some aspect of the world, and where the use of words by a speaker is apt to cause hearers to doubt their interpretive abilities without doubting the accuracy of their concepts. The latter occurs when there is disagreement over which concept should be used in a context, and where the use of words by a speaker is apt to cause hearers to doubt their interpretive abilities in virtue of doubting the accuracy of their concepts. Many cases of second-order gaslighting are unintentional: its occurrence often depends on contingent environmental facts. I end the article by focusing on the distinctive epistemic injustices of second-order gaslighting: (1) metalinguistic deprivation, (2) conceptual obscuration, and (3) perspectival subversion. I show how each reliably has sequelae in terms of psychological and practical control.

The Language of Fiction

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Speech Act ◽  
Fictional Characters ◽  
New Research ◽  
Fictional Names ◽  
Philosophy Of Fiction ◽  
And Linguistics ◽  
Literary Techniques ◽  
Fictional Story ◽  
Fictional Truth

The Language of Fiction brings together new research on fiction from philosophy and linguistics. Fiction is a topic that has long been studied in philosophy. Yet recently there has been a surge of work on fictional discourse in the intersection between linguistics and philosophy of language. There has been a growing interest in examining long-standing issues concerning fiction from a perspective informed both by philosophy and linguistic theory. The Language of Fiction contains fourteen essays by leading scholars in both fields, as well as a substantial Introduction by the editors. The collection is organized in three parts, each with their own introduction. Part I, “Truth, reference, and imagination”, offers new, interdisciplinary perspectives on some of the central themes from the philosophy of fiction: What is fictional truth? How do fictional names refer? What kind of speech act is involved in telling a fictional story? What is the relation between fiction and imagination? Part II, “Storytelling”, deals with themes originating from the study of narrative: How do we infer a coherent story from a sequence of event descriptions? And how do we interpret the words of impersonal or unreliable narrators? Part III, “Perspective shift”, zooms in on an alleged key characteristic of fictional narratives, viz. the way we get access to the fictional characters’ inner lives, through a variety of literary techniques for representing what they say, think, or see.

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