The impact of ownership structure on the cost of equity in emerging markets

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 (10) ◽  
pp. 1221-1239
Author(s):  
Saad Faysal ◽  
Mahdi Salehi ◽  
Mahdi Moradi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Cost Of Equity ◽  
Asian Countries ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this study is to cover the ownership structure as (institutional ownership and managerial ownership) influencing the cost of equity in emerging markets. Design/methodology/approach The authors applied the regression model with the fixed-effect model in the data. Data collected from listed companies in the Iraq-Iran Stock Exchange during 2012-2017. Findings The authors found a significant positive associated between institutional ownership and the cost of equity in the Iranian and Iraqi contexts. The results also reveal a significant negative associated between managerial ownership with the cost of equity in the Iranian and Iraqi contexts. This means that when managerial ownership is increased, the cost of equity will be reduced. These results support the role of inside ownership to enhance fixed performance by reducing the cost of equity. So, managerial ownership can be a substitute for all shareholders. Moreover, the results indicate a similarity in the impact of the ownership structure on the cost of equity in the Iraqi and Iranian context, this means the similar elements among west Asian countries. Research limitations/implications Financial companies such as banks and investment companies were not listed due to the difference in the nature of their work with the other sectors in the Iranian and Iraqi stock exchanges. Moreover, the authors are heavily constrained as listed companies must continue during the study period to calculate the cost of equity. Therefore, the results are difficult to generalize widely. Practical implications This international study will enable investors in, as well as local and international investors to take the appropriate investment decision-making in the capital markets in these countries (Iraq and Iran). Moreover, it contributes significantly to helping corporate governance bloggers in Iraq and Iran understand the role of the ownership structure in corporate governance. Originality/value This is the first study of the interaction between institutional ownership, managerial ownership with the cost of equity in Iraq, the study will help complete the knowledge gap with developed markets. The results are important in future research because the authors believe that it is very important for the future to look at better for percentage levels of institutional and managerial ownership in the company ownership. Although the contribution is limited, it will provide a useful guide for more papers in other west Asian countries.

How does ownership structure affect the financing and dividend decisions of firm?

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tahar Tayachi ◽  
Ahmed Imran Hunjra ◽  
Kirsten Jones ◽  
Rashid Mehmood ◽  
Mamdouh Abdulaziz Saleh Al-Faryan
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Generalized Method Of Moments ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Debt Financing ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Impact

Purpose Ownership structure deals with internal corporate governance mechanism, which plays important role in minimizing conflict of interests between shareholders and management Ownership structure is an important mechanism that influences the value of firm, financing and dividend decisions. This paper aims to examine the impact of the ownership structures, i.e. managerial ownership, institutional ownership on financing and dividend policy. Design/methodology/approach The authors use panel data of manufacturing firms from both developed and developing countries, and the generalized method of moments (GMM) is applied to analyze the results. The authors collect the data from DataStream for the period of 2010 to 2019. Findings The authors find that managerial ownership and ownership concentration have significant and positive effects on debt financing, but they have significant and negative effects on dividend policy. Institutional ownership shows a positive impact on financing decisions and dividend policy for sample firms. Originality/value This study fills the gap by proving the policy implications for both firms and investors, as managers prefer debt financing, but at the same time try to ignore dividend payment. Therefore, investors may not invest in firms with a higher proportion of managerial ownership and may choose to invest more in institutional ownership, which lowers the agency cost.

scholarly journals Earnings quality and the cost of equity capital: evidence on the impact of legal background

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmed Hassan Ahmed ◽  
Yasean Tahat ◽  
Yasser Eliwa ◽  
Bruce Burton
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Equity Capital ◽  
Cost Of Equity Capital ◽  
Cost Of Equity ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Usa ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

Purpose Earnings quality is of great concern to corporate stakeholders, including capital providers in international markets with widely varying regulatory pedigrees and ownership patterns. This paper aims to examine the association between the cost of equity capital and earnings quality, contextualised via tests that incorporate the potential for moderating effects around institutional settings. The analysis focuses on and compares evidence relating to (common law) UK/US firms and (civil law) German firms over the period 2005–2018 and seeks to identify whether, given institutional dissimilarities, significant differences exist between the two settings. Design/methodology/approach First, the authors undertake a review of the extant literature on the link between earnings quality and the cost of capital. Second, using a sample of 948 listed companies from the USA, the UK and Germany over the period 2005 to 2018, the authors estimate four implied cost of equity capital proxies. The relationship between companies’ cost of equity capital and their earnings quality is then investigated. Findings Consistent with theoretical reasoning and prior empirical analyses, the authors find a statistically negative association between earnings quality, evidenced by information relating to accruals and the cost of equity capital. However, when they extend the analysis by investigating the combined effect of institutional ownership and earnings quality on financing cost, the impact – while negative overall – is found to vary across legal backdrops. Research limitations/implications This paper uses institutional ownership as a mediating variable in the association between earnings quality and the cost of equity capital, but this is not intended to suggest that other measures may be of relevance here and additional research might usefully expand the analysis to incorporate other forms of ownership including state and foreign bases. Second, and suggestive of another avenue for developing the work presented in the study, the authors have used accrual measures of earnings quality. Practical implications The results are shown to provide potentially important insights for policymakers, creditors and investors about the consequences of earnings quality variability. The results should be of interest to firms seeking to reduce their financing costs and retain financial viability in the wake of the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. Originality/value The reported findings extends the single-country results of Eliwa et al. (2016) for the UK firms and Francis et al. (2005) for the USA, whereby both reported that the cost of equity capital is negatively associated with earnings quality attributes. Second, in a further increment to the extant literature (particularly Francis et al., 2005 and Eliwa et al., 2016), the authors find the effect of institutional ownership to be influential, with a significantly positive impact on the association between earnings quality and the cost of equity capital, suggesting in turn that institutional ownership can improve firms’ ability to secure cheaper funding by virtue of robust monitoring. While this result holds for the whole sample (the USA, the UK and Germany), country-level analysis shows that the result holds only for the common law countries (the UK and the USA) and not for Germany, consistent with the notion that extant legal systems are a determining factor in this context. This novel finding points to a role for institutional investors in watching and improving the quality of financial reports that are valued by the market in its price formation activity.

scholarly journals Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance and Capital Structure of Non-Financial Firms of Pakistan

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-46
Author(s):  
Hassan Ahmad ◽  
Nasreen Akhter ◽  
Tariq Siddiq ◽  
Zahid Iqbal
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Capital Structure ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Debt Ratio ◽  
Significant Negative Impact ◽  
The Impact

This study is undertaken with the purpose of investigating the impact of ownership structure and corporate governance on the capital structure of Pakistani listed firms from 2011-2014, feasible general least square is used to investigate the impact of ownership structure and corporate governance on capital structure of KSE 100 index firms. Explanatory variables include ownership concentration, managerial ownership, foreign ownership, institutional ownership, board size, board independence and CEO duality along with the three control variables namely firm size, firm profitability and liquidity. There is insignificant positive relationship between ownership concentration and capital structure, managerial ownership has a significant negative impact on debt ratio. Foreign ownership has also a significant negative impact on firm capital structure and institutional ownership has significant positive impact on capital structure. Board size is positively related to capital structure, board independence also positively related to firm’s debt ratio but CEO duality negatively related to the dependent variable, all these variables have significant impact on capital structure of Pakistani firms. 

Impact of corporate governance on capital structure: mediating role of cost of capital

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Aisha Javaid ◽  
Mian Sajid Nazir ◽  
Kaneez Fatima
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Capital Structure ◽  
Cost Of Capital ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Mediating Role ◽  
The Relationship

PurposeThis paper contributes to the existing literature by extending the empirical work on the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure by analyzing the mediating role of cost of capital in the non-financial firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX).Design/methodology/approachThe sample for this study includes non-financial firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (formerly Karachi Stock Exchange) for the period of 2004–2016. Based on 1800 firm-year observations, three approaches of panel data analysis are applied for the step-wise analysis of the underlying study. Firstly, Pooled OLS is applied. Secondly, fixed and random effect panel regression followed by the Hausman test to check the unobservable individual heterogeneity of the data. Hausman test indicates that the fixed-effects model is the most appropriate model for the sample panel data.FindingsThe study's findings are that board size, board composition, CEO/Chair duality, institutional ownership and managerial ownership have statistically significant direct effect on the firm's financing decisions. However, CEO/Chair duality, institutional ownership and managerial ownership have significant indirect effect on firm's capital structure decisions. The interesting finding of the paper is on the evidence of mediating role of cost of capital in the nexus of corporate governance and capital structure. Moreover, some conventional determinants of capital structure, including the firm's size, asset structure of the firm, profitability, business risk and growth, are found as determinants of capital structure decisions of the firms.Research limitations/implicationsThere are a few limitations to our study which could be addressed by upcoming research. We did not include all the four mechanisms of corporate governance including board structure, audit structure, compensation structure and ownership structure. However, we used only five important attributes including board size, board composition and CEO/Chair duality form board structure, managerial ownership and institutional ownership form ownership structure of corporate governance as our explanatory variables to examine their impact on the capital structure choices of the firms. Future studies may fill this research gap by involving some other attributes of corporate governance and analyzing their effectiveness and impact on value relevant capital structure decisions. Further, due to limited time and resources, we only tested the mediating role of cost of capital, hence, future researchers can analyze the mediating and moderating roles of different variables which may influence the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure choices of the firms.Practical implicationsThe study has many valuable guidelines and practical implications for the financial managers of the corporations. Our results will facilitate the policymakers in setting their corporate governance policies and practices and making the value relevant capital structure decisions in compliance with the implications of corporate governance mechanism. In addition, our study provides the empirical evidence in accordance with the argument that good governance practices, particularly the voluntary disclosures by the firm may reduce the information asymmetry which, ultimately, reduces the agency cost and the cost of capital for the firm. However, while deciding the financial policy of the corporations, managers can use our findings in order to assess the effectiveness of corporate governance practices employed by the firm in achieving the optimal capital structure at which the weighted average cost of capital is at its minimum level.Originality/valueThis paper contributes to the literature by investigating the mediating role of the cost of capital in the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure decisions of the firms. This paper provides empirical evidence that corporate governance indirectly affects capital structure decisions through the mediating role of cost of capital.

The effects of ownership structure on likelihood of financial distress: an empirical evidence

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 589-612 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shahab Udin ◽  
Muhammad Arshad Khan ◽  
Attiya Yasmin Javid
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Financial Distress ◽  
Generalized Method Of Moments ◽  
The Body ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore the role of corporate governance proxies by ownership structure on the likelihood of firms’ financial distress for a sample of 146 Pakistani public-limited companies listed at the Karachi Stock Exchange over the period of 2003-2012. Design/methodology/approach The dynamic generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator and panel logistic regression (PLR) are used to determine the impact of corporate governance on the financial distress. The ownership structure is used as a determinant of corporate governance, while the Altman Z-score is utilized as an indicator of financial distress, as it measures financial distress inversely. The smaller the values of the Z-score, the higher will be the risk of financial distress. Findings The authors find insignificant impact of ownership structure on firms’ likelihood of financial distress based on the dynamic GMM method. However, the PLR results indicate that foreign shareholdings have a significant negative association with firms’ likelihood of financial distress, in the case of Pakistan. An evidence of a negative and insignificant relationship between institutional ownership and financial distress was observed, which indicates the passive role of institutional investors in Pakistan. The results also reveal a positive and significant relationship between insider’s ownership and likelihood of financial distress. This finding is consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis which predicts that insiders are more aligned with their self-interest than outside shareholders’ interest when their shareholding increases in the business. Furthermore, the results also reveal insignificant association between government shareholdings and the probability of financial distress. The reason could be the social welfare objective of the government entities rather than profit maximization. Practical implications The findings of this study provide more insight to corporate managers and investors about the association between the quality of corporate governance and the degree of financial distress, with respect to Pakistani firms. Furthermore, this study contributes to the existing literature by adding new evidence from developing countries like Pakistan which are helpful for regulatory bodies and policymakers in the formulation of long-term corporate governance strategies to manage the financial distress. It is well established that strengthening the quality of corporate governance practices enhances the efficiency of capital markets and reduces the probability of financial distress. Originality/value The study extends the body of existing literature on corporate governance and the likelihood of financial distress with reference to Pakistan. The results suggest that policymakers may pay special attention to the quality of corporate governance, specifically ownership structure, while predicting corporate financial distress.

Ownership structure and the cost of equity in the European context

2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 485-514 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabio La Rosa ◽  
Francesca Bernini ◽  
Roberto Verona
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Value Relevance ◽  
Equity Capital ◽  
Mediating Effect ◽  
Cost Of Equity ◽  
Anglo Saxon ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Positive Effect

Purpose Based on the institutionalized agency theory, this paper aims to analyses the role of earnings management (EM) in mediating the relationship between ownership structure (OS) and the cost of equity capital (COE). Design/methodology/approach The authors test the above relationship by investigating a sample of 249 European non-financial listed companies during 2005-2012. The authors adopt different measures for both EM and COE and identify three main types of ownership by the majority share of the ultimate owners. Path analysis is used to explore the role of direct, mediated (i.e. EM) and total effects of OS on COE. Findings While OS directly affects COE, the results support the idea that an EM-mediating effect contributes to further explain this relationship in some ownership structures. Particularly European listed family-owned firms experience lower COE owing to the prevailing direct and negative effect of OS, despite the fact that both accrual and real EM mediate and have a positive effect on COE. In financial institutions-owned firms, only a direct and positive effect can be observed on COE while state-owned firms do not have a direct influence on the COE, although they do reduce real EM, which, in turn, decreases the COE in a mediated effect. Further analysis comparing the Anglo-Saxon context with Continental Europe shows more detailed results. Practical implications The study marks its entry into the international debate on the evolution in the value relevance of accounting information by arguing that the COE implications of EM depend on institutional factors such as OS and the context investigated. Originality/value The paper contributes to extant finance, accounting and corporate governance literature by providing new, robust evidence on the mediating role of EM in defining COE for different ownership types and their diverse risk-taking propensities in Continental Europe, which differs from the Anglo-Saxon context both institutionally and legally.

scholarly journals The impact of corporate governance on the cost of equity

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-314
Author(s):  
Syed Tauseef Ali ◽  
Zhen Yang ◽  
Zahid Sarwar ◽  
Farman Ali
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Capital Budgeting ◽  
Coefficient Of Determination ◽  
Cost Of Equity ◽  
High Demand ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

Purpose In view of organizational inertia, with the occurrence of a major event, though resource rigidity minimizes, however simultaneously, it increases process rigidity, which creates difficulties in motivating managers and dealing with the agency problem. Therefore, keeping in mind the high demand created by the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor and Naya Pakistan Housing Scheme in the cement sector of Pakistan, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of corporate governance (CG) on the cost of equity (COE) in the cement sector, to deal with the problems surging during and after the completion of these projects and highlight further opportunities for the cement sector of Pakistan. Design/methodology/approach CG is a qualitative concept therefore, eight proxies have been used to measure it along with the two control variables. This study uses balance panel data of six years from 2012 to 2017, collected from 18 companies of the cement sector of Pakistan. Descriptive statistics have been used to describe the data, correlation matrix to see the nature of the relationship, and Pooled OLS as the estimation technique, while to analyze the data a statistical package 13 has been used. To measure the COE, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) has been used. Findings Regression results suggest that block ownership, insider ownership and the board size are insignificant, while CEO tenure is negatively and significantly associated with the COE. Non-executive directors, independence and CEO duality are insignificant; however, diversity is positively and significantly associated with the COE. Moreover, the mean value of the COE is 8.22 percent for the cement sector, while the coefficient of determination of the model under study is 74 percent. Research limitations/implications This paper is based on the data from the cement sector of Pakistan only. Therefore, this is the reason that these results cannot be generalized on the whole economy of Pakistan. Practical implications This study helps in finding out the COE value specific to the cement sector, which will help this sector to evaluate the capital budgeting decision more precisely and accurately than before. Moreover, the association of diversity as positive, while independence as negative with the COE highlights a room for improvement in the implementation of CG codes by SECP. This study also helps to mitigate the impact of inertia, the after-effects of high demand, and managing the agency problem in the cement sector. Originality/value This is the first study using CG data collected just after the revised promulgation of CG codes in 2012, along with a wide range of eight proxies measuring CG and its impact on the COE in the cement sector.

Ownership Structure and Stock Price Crash Risk: Evidence from Karachi Stock Exchange

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 72-75
Author(s):  
Maheen Imtiaz ◽  
◽  
Khalid Mahmood Ahmad ◽  
Abdul Karim
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Multiple Linear Regression Model ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Crash Risk ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
The Impact ◽  
A Company

Stock price crash risk is one of the most significant risks associated with the firm. Therefore, it is important to consider the factors which may influence the price crash risk. Various factors of corporate governance found to have an impact on the stock price crash risk. The ownership structure of the firm is a critical attribute of corporate governance. This study's objective is to determine the impact of two types of ownership of a company (managerial ownership and institutional ownership) on its stock price crash risk. To examine whether a firm's ownership structures have an association with stock price crash risk, the multiple linear regression model applied on the panel data of 190 companies listed on KSE for the year 2009-2018. The results of this study show that there is a significantly positive relationship between the institutional ownership and stock price crash risk. However, no association found between managerial ownership and price crash risk. These results imply that the percentage of institutional ownership should be reduced in the firm's ownership structure to reduce the firm's stock price crash risk.

scholarly journals Pengaruh Struktur Kepemilikan Dalam Mekanisme Corporate Governance Terhadap Cost Of Equity Capital

2009 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 89
Author(s):  
Tarjo Tarjo
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Equity Capital ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Strong Impact ◽  
Cost Of Equity Capital ◽  
Cost Of Equity ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Cost

AbstractCorporate governance mechanisms believed to have strong impact to the companies’ performance. Corporate governance mechanisms examined in this study are managerial ownership and institutional ownership structure. The purposes of this study are to know the variables effect of managerial ownership and institutional ownership on cost of equity capital. The samples of the study are firms listed in Jakarta Stock Exchange in 2005. The F-test on the all variables at the level confidence 1% indicates the effect of all variables on cost of equity capital is significant. The result of this study showed that managerial ownership and institutional ownership have positive significant impact (at the level of confidence 1% and 5%) on the cost of equity capital. However this result showed that corporate governance mechanisms fail to decrease the cost of equity capital.

Earnings management and audit quality at Damascus securities exchange: Does managerial ownership matter?

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zukaa Mardnly ◽  
Zinab Badran ◽  
Sulaiman Mouselli
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Ordinary Least Squares ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
External Audit ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the individual and combined effect of managerial ownership and external audit quality, as two control mechanisms, on earnings management. Design/methodology/approach This study applies ordinary least squares estimates on fixed-time effects panel regression model to test the impact of the investigated variables on earnings management for the whole population of banks and insurance companies listed at Damascus Securities Exchange (DSE) during the period from 2011 to 2018. Findings The empirical evidence suggests a negative non-linear relationship between managerial ownership (as proxied by board of directors’ ownership) on earnings management. However, neither audit quality nor the simultaneous effect of the managerial ownership and audit quality (Big 4) affects earnings management. Research limitations/implications DSE is dominated by the financial sector and the number of observations is constrained by the recent establishment of DSE and the small number of firms listed at DSE. In addition, the non-availability of data on executive directors’ and foreign ownerships restrict our ability to uncover the impact of different dimensions of ownership structure on earnings management. Practical implications First, it stimulates investors to purchase stocks in financial firms that enjoy both high managerial ownership, as they seem enjoying higher earnings quality. Second, the findings encourage external auditors to consider the ownership structure when choosing their clients as the financial statements’ quality is affected by this structure. Third, researchers may need to consider the role of managerial ownership when analyzing the determinants of earnings management. Originality/value It fills the gap in the literature, as it investigates the impact of both managerial ownership and audit quality on earnings management in a special conflict context and in an unexplored emerging market of DSE. It suggests that managerial ownership exerts a significant role in controlling earnings management practices when loose regulatory environment combines conflict conditions. However, external audit quality fails to counter earnings management practices when conditions are fierce.

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