CAPITAL THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF A HOLLING–TANNER-TYPE PREY–PREDATOR FISHERY WITH TAXATION AS A CONTROL INSTRUMENT
The level of fishing effort expands or contracts in a dynamic reaction model of a fishery accordingly as the net economic revenue (i.e. perceived rent) to the fishermen is positive or negative. A dynamic reaction model reflects this dynamic interaction between the perceived rent and the effort in a fishery. The combined harvesting of a prey–predator fishery is assumed to be regulated by an external authority by imposing a tax per unit biomass of both the species. The fishing effort is taken to be a dynamic variable of time, which is proportional to the instantaneous capital invested in the fishery. The steady states of the system along with their local as well as global stability are considered. The optimal harvesting policy with the tax as a control instrument is discussed. The results are numerically discussed and graphically illustrated. Sensitivity analysis of the parameters is carried out. The paper ends with concluding remarks.