scholarly journals Weakened by the storm

2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 336-350 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Walch
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Organizational Structure ◽  
Natural Disasters ◽  
Opportunity Cost ◽  
The Philippines ◽  
Tropical Storms ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Group Recruitment ◽  
Rebel Group

How do natural disasters affect rebel group recruitment? Some influential research to date suggests that natural disasters – by lowering the opportunity cost of joining an armed movement – are likely to facilitate rebel group recruitment. In contrast, this study argues that natural disasters can negatively affect rebel organization and their recruitment efforts. It posits that natural disasters may weaken rebel groups in two main interrelated ways: (1) by leading to acute scarcity for rebel combatants and supporters, weakening the rebel group’s organizational structure and supply lines, and (2) by increasing government and international presence in areas where the insurgents operate. Empirically, this article explores these suggested mechanisms in two cases of natural disasters in the Philippines (typhoons Bopha in 2012 and Haiyan in 2013), which affected regions partially controlled by the communist rebel group, the New People’s Army (NPA). Based on data from extensive fieldwork, there is no evidence suggesting a boom in rebel recruitment in the wake of the typhoons. Rather, the NPA was temporarily weakened following the tropical storms, significantly impacting the civil war dynamics in the Philippines.

Rebel Fragmentation and the Recruitment of Child Soldiers

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher M Faulkner ◽  
Austin C Doctor
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Child Soldiers ◽  
Recruitment Strategies ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Rebel Group ◽  
Cross National

Abstract The recruitment and use of children in armed conflict remains a prevalent feature of modern civil war. But which conflict actors are more likely to recruit children? We argue that the process by which rebel groups form shapes their recruitment strategies. Specifically, we contend that rebels that form as splinter factions from the ranks of pre-existing rebel organizations are more likely to recruit child soldiers than other rebel groups. Splinter groups face unique constraints as they materialize in the midst of an active conflict environment, necessitating that they mobilize a sufficient force to contend with existing competitors. As a result, rebel factions are more likely to pursue recruitment strategies that are low cost vis-à-vis alternatives, focusing on their immediate survival. Under such conditions, children become especially attractive recruits. Leveraging the Foundations of Rebel Group Emergence Dataset, our cross-national investigation of 237 rebel groups active between 1989 and 2011 provides robust support for our hypothesis that splinter factions are strongly associated with the recruitment of children.

Rethinking Ripeness Theory: Explaining Progress and Failure in Civil War Negotiations in the Philippines and Colombia

2016 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Walch
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
The Philippines ◽  
Negotiation Process ◽  
Peace Negotiations ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
The Military ◽  
Civil War Negotiations

How can ripeness theory be extended to explain when and why parties remain at the negotiating table until an agreement is reached? Existing ripeness theory is crucial in understanding when conflicting parties consider negotiation as preferable to continued fighting. However, factors which may explain why parties stay at the negotiation table after the start of the negotiation process – that is, how the ripe moment is sustained until an agreement has been reached – are not well elaborated. This study seeks to extend ripeness theory and argues that organizationally fragmented rebel groups are less flexible to make concessions and unlikely to stay at the negotiation table until an agreement is reached, especially when there is a lack of cohesion between the military and political branches. This argument is explored through a structured focused comparison of the peace negotiations in Colombia and in the Philippines with communist rebel groups.

Rebel Group Attrition and Reversion to Violence: Micro-Level Evidence from Syria

2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 285-294
Author(s):  
Vera Mironova ◽  
Karam Alhamad ◽  
Sam Whitt
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Research Note ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Scholarly Community ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Syrian Civil War ◽  
Rapid Ascent ◽  
Micro Level ◽  
Rebel Group

Abstract Why might former rebel combatants ever revert to fighting? The purpose of this research note is to inform the scholarly community on rebel incentives to remobilize for violence, a topic which has been underexplored in the literature, using evidence from an ongoing conflict: the case of volunteer ex-combatants in the Syrian civil war. In late 2014 to early 2015, we conducted surveys with 196 ex-fighters who served with different rebel group brigades linked to the Free Syrian Army as well as moderate Islamist and jihadist groups. Interviews were conducted in Gaziantep, Turkey, a common destination for combatants exiting the battlefield in rebel-held territory in northern Syria. We find that ex-fighters who are ideologically committed to the defeat of the Assad regime and/or the establishment of an Islamic state are most likely to want to return to combat. However, rebel group organizational deficiencies and strategies keep many highly motivated fighters away. Our results illustrate how rebel fighters might quickly remobilize when disciplined, well-organized rebel groups emerge on the scene, as evidenced by the rapid ascent of the Islamic State (ISIS).

What do they Want? Rebels’ Objectives and Civil War Mediation

2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Carmela Lutmar ◽  
Lesley Terris
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Political Rights ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Intrastate Conflicts ◽  
Group Goals ◽  
Rebel Group ◽  
The Impact

AbstractIn this paper, we focus on mediation in intrastate conflicts, specifically on the impact of rebel group goals on the prospects for mediation. We ask whether the goals for which rebel groups fight (i.e. secession, irredentism, autonomy, greater political rights, government overthrow) have an impact on the likelihood that these conflicts will be mediated. We test our hypotheses on a new data set of rebel groups in Africa 1962–2010.

scholarly journals Rebel Rivalry and the Strategic Nature of Rebel Group Ideology and Demands

2020 ◽  
pp. 002200272096741
Author(s):  
Efe Tokdemir ◽  
Evgeny Sedashov ◽  
Sema Hande Ogutcu-Fu ◽  
Carlos E. Moreno Leon ◽  
Jeremy Berkowitz ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
War Literature ◽  
Group Conflict ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Civil War Literature ◽  
The Face ◽  
Rebel Group ◽  
The Government ◽  
Scholarly Attention

How does the presence of multiple combatants affect rebel groups’ ideological and demand positioning? Although violent forms of inter-group conflict have been widely studied in the civil war literature, rebel groups’ strategic use of ideology and demands has received scarce scholarly attention. We argue that the pressure of competition forces rebel groups to differentiate themselves ideologically and demand-wise from their rivals to maximize their chances of survival and success. Rebel groups strive to set themselves apart by offering unique products to their supporters and recruits. Thus, we contend that rebel groups are more likely to modify their ideologies and demands from the government in the face of competition from rival groups. We test this theory using novel data collected from rebel group manifestos and public statements. Our findings suggest that groups are more likely to shift their ideology and modify their demands as the number of rival groups increases.

The Rebels’ Credibility Dilemma

2016 ◽  
Vol 70 (3) ◽  
pp. 477-511 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jakana L. Thomas ◽  
William Reed ◽  
Scott Wolford
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Historical Data ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Strategic Incentives ◽  
Rebel Group ◽  
The Government ◽  
Conflict In Africa

AbstractThis article examines why rebel groups make large demands of governments that are inconsistent with their fighting capacity, especially when such demands are almost always rejected. We show that making large demands, even if ultimately rejected by the government, makes sense for rebels who face a credibility dilemma. Such a dilemma is most likely to arise when militarily weak rebel groups face governments of uncertain strength and can commit to fight credibly only when they believe the government is also weak. This results in a counterintuitive set of strategic incentives for weak rebels, who choose their demands to ensure that they are rejected even when the government is weak. Thus, to make their threat to fight credible, weak rebels make large demands that, when rejected, result in inefficient fighting. Since most civil wars are characterized by weak rebels bargaining with much stronger governments, it is important to understand how this particular feature of civil war shapes intrawar negotiations between the rebels and the government. We develop a model of bargaining between a government and rebel group and evaluate its implications using historical data on civil conflict in Africa from 1989 to 2010. The results suggest that the tendency for the government to be significantly stronger than rebels induces rebel groups to make unrealistically large demands.

scholarly journals Lasting peace or temporary calm? Rebel group decapitation and civil war outcomes

2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 172-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirssa Cline Ryckman
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
Group Leaders ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Lasting Peace ◽  
Rebel Group ◽  
War Outcomes ◽  
The Government

Existing research has found that killing or capturing rebel group leaders can lead to the termination of civil wars. This paper considers the quality of those terminations, examining how wars end and whether this produces a lasting peace or only a temporary reprieve from violence. Decapitation is expected to weaken rebel groups, shifting the balance of power to the government; however, results suggest that killing or capturing a rebel group leader tends to produce termination through inactivity rather than outright government victories. Decapitation is also found to have no effect on the chances of civil war recurrence. This suggests that the removal of rebel group leaders is effective primarily as a short-term strategy that does not tend to generate a lasting peace.

scholarly journals When Disasters Hit Civil Wars: Natural Resource Exploitation and Rebel Group Resilience

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yasutaka Tominaga ◽  
Chia-yi Lee
Keyword(s):  
Natural Resources ◽  
Natural Disasters ◽  
Natural Resource ◽  
Resource Curse ◽  
Rapid Onset ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Funding Source ◽  
Resource Exploitation ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Rebel Group

Abstract Existing literature on the relationship between natural disasters and conflicts provides mixed findings. In this article, we argue that whether natural disasters hurt rebel group resilience depends on their funding source and the mode of resource extraction. Rebel groups that obtain their funding from natural resources are more susceptible to natural disasters because this funding source could be easily disrupted by rapid-onset disasters. How rebel groups exploit natural resource wealth also conditions the effect of natural disasters on rebel group resilience. Rebel groups that depend on extorting resource production, despite having a seemingly stable revenue stream, are more likely to face funding cuts after a severe natural disaster. In contrast, rebel groups that rely on smuggling natural resources, due to a higher level of flexibility and mobility, are more likely to survive natural disasters. We test our arguments using data on armed groups, natural disasters, and rebel contraband, and the results of the logit models with interaction terms support our hypotheses. Our findings bridge the environmental conflict literature and the resource curse literature, and offer important policy implications.

Stick Then Carrot: When Do Governments Give Amnesty during Civil War?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lesley-Ann Daniels
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Policy Choice ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
The Government

Abstract Governments grant amnesties to rebel groups during civil wars and this is a puzzle. Why would the government offer an amnesty, which can be interpreted as a signal of weakness? In certain circumstances, offering amnesty is a rational policy choice. Governments should give amnesties when they are winning: the risk of misinterpreted signals is lessened, costs are low, rebel groups are weakened, and so amnesty can be used instrumentally to encourage defection or division among foot soldiers or as an incentive to leaders. Therefore, the government capitalizes on its military advantage and offers amnesty in a “stick then carrot” tactic. Using a database of amnesties during conflicts from 1990 to 2011, the article shows that governments are more likely to give amnesties following high rebel deaths. The use of amnesty during conflict is nuanced and context is important when understanding strategic choices.

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