scholarly journals Defending the motivational theory of desire

Author(s):  
David Pineda-Oliva

In this paper I offer a defense of the motivational theory of desire. According to the motivational view, a desire is basically a disposition to bring about the desire’s content. First, I argue that two rival views on the nature of desire, the evaluative theory and the deontic theory, fall prey to the problem of the death of desire and that, when one tries to develop a plausible version of these theories which is able to overcome this problem, one ends up with a view that is not relevantly different from the evaluative view. Second, I respond to some objections to the claim that motivations are sufficient for desire, namely, the Radioman objection and the objection that some motivational states like intentions and habits are not desires. 

2010 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Walla ◽  
Maria Richter ◽  
Stella Färber ◽  
Ulrich Leodolter ◽  
Herbert Bauer

Two experiments investigate effects related to food intake in humans. In Experiment 1, we measured startle response modulation while study participants ate ice cream, yoghurt, and chocolate. Statistical analysis revealed that ice cream intake resulted in the most robust startle inhibition compared to no food. Contrasting females and males, we found significant differences related to the conditions yoghurt and chocolate. In females, chocolate elicited the lowest response amplitude followed by yoghurt and ice cream. In males, chocolate produced the highest startle response amplitude even higher than eating nothing, whereas ice cream produced the lowest. Assuming that high response amplitudes reflect aversive motivation while low response amplitudes reflect appetitive motivational states, it is interpreted that eating ice cream is associated with the most appetitive state given the alternatives of chocolate and yoghurt across gender. However, in females alone eating chocolate, and in males alone eating ice cream, led to the most appetitive state. Experiment 2 was conducted to describe food intake-related brain activity by means of source localization analysis applied to electroencephalography data (EEG). Ice cream, yoghurt, a soft drink, and water were compared. Brain activity in rostral portions of the superior frontal gyrus was found in all conditions. No localization differences between conditions occurred. While EEG was found to be insensitive, startle response modulation seems to be a reliable method to objectively quantify motivational states related to the intake of different foods.


Author(s):  
Sandra Godinho ◽  
Margarida V. Garrido ◽  
Oleksandr V. Horchak

Abstract. Words whose articulation resembles ingestion movements are preferred to words mimicking expectoration movements. This so-called in-out effect, suggesting that the oral movements caused by consonantal articulation automatically activate concordant motivational states, was already replicated in languages belonging to Germanic (e.g., German and English) and Italic (e.g., Portuguese) branches of the Indo-European family. However, it remains unknown whether such preference extends to the Indo-European branches whose writing system is based on the Cyrillic rather than Latin alphabet (e.g., Ukrainian), or whether it occurs in languages not belonging to the Indo-European family (e.g., Turkish). We replicated the in-out effect in two high-powered experiments ( N = 274), with Ukrainian and Turkish native speakers, further supporting an embodied explanation for this intriguing preference.


2006 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 577-595 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sonsoles Valdivia ◽  
Carmen Luciano ◽  
Francisco J. Molina
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret Hampson

AbstractMoral virtue is, for Aristotle, a state to which an agent’s motivation is central. For anyone interested in Aristotle’s account of moral development this invites reflection on two questions: how is it that virtuous motivational dispositions are established? And what contribution do the moral learner’s existing motivational states make to the success of her habituation? I argue that views which demand that the learner act with virtuous motives if she is to acquire virtuous dispositions misconstrue the nature and structure of the habituation process, but also obscure Aristotle’s crucial insight that the very practice of virtuous actions affords a certain discovery and can be transformative of an agent’s motivational states. Drawing attention, in Aristotle’s account, to an asymmetry between the agential perspective and the observation of others, I consider what the agential perspective affords the learner, and offer a novel interpretation of the role a learner’s existing motives play in her habituation.


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