Reason, Induction, and the Humean Objection to Kant

Kant Yearbook ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin R. Busch
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Problem Of Induction ◽  
Empirical Concept ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
Positive Account ◽  
In Virtue Of

AbstractWhile Kant does not address the problem of induction often attributed to Hume, he does, by way of a transcendental deduction of an a priori principle of reflecting empirical judgment, address a distinct problem Hume raises indirectly. This problem is that induction cannot be justified so long as it presupposes some empirical concept applying to or some empirical principle true of more than one object in nature, a presupposition neither determined by nor founded on reason. I draw on Hume’s positive account of induction to motivate the following objection to Kant: in so far as induction can be justified, there is reason to doubt that it would be so in virtue of any a priori feature

Kant’s ‘Transcendental Deduction’

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Stroud
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Critical Assessment ◽  
Structural Description ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
The World ◽  
Empirical Realism

This chapter presents a straightforward structural description of Immanuel Kant’s conception of what the transcendental deduction is supposed to do, and how it is supposed to do it. The ‘deduction’ Kant thinks is needed for understanding the human mind would establish and explain our ‘right’ or ‘entitlement’ to something we seem to possess and employ in ‘the highly complicated web of human knowledge’. This is: experience, concepts, and principles. The chapter explains the point and strategy of the ‘deduction’ as Kant understands it, as well as the demanding conditions of its success, without entering into complexities of interpretation or critical assessment of the degree of success actually achieved. It also analyses Kant’s arguments regarding a priori concepts as well as a posteriori knowledge of the world around us, along with his claim that our position in the world must be understood as ‘empirical realism’.

The Duisburg Nachlaß

2020 ◽  
pp. 17-78
Author(s):  
Alison Laywine
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Special Focus ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
Object A ◽  
Classical Geometry ◽  
Central Claim

This chapter explores the so-called ‘Duisburg Nachlaß’, a set of sketches in Kant’s hand from the mid-1770s that may be understood as the ancestor of the Transcendental Deduction in the Critique. The chapter has two parts. The first explores a central claim in the Duisburg Nachlaß that we know an object a priori only according to its relations by means of an ‘exposition of appearances’. The question is what does this mean? The strategy is to confront the claim with some of Kant’s metaphysical commitments from the 1750s about relations and his engagement with the regimentation of proofs in classical geometry (with a special focus on the ‘ekthesis’). The second part of the chapter uses what is learned from the first part to argue that the exposition of appearances in the Duisburg Nachlaß is meant to yield a cosmology of experience. The author uses the findings of this chapter later in the book to illuminate peculiarities and insights of the Transcendental Deduction.

scholarly journals Kritische Metaphysik oder Analytische Hermeneutik?

2019 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 118-131
Author(s):  
Anton Friedrich Koch
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Transcendental Philosophy ◽  
Narrow Sense ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Present Essay ◽  
General Logic ◽  
Time And Being ◽  
Hermeneutic Science ◽  
Invasive Intervention

Abstract Kant in his critical metaphysics, as one might call his transcendental philosophy, proceeds from the syncategorematic, subject-sided forms of thinking, which are revealed by general logic qua doctrine of the inferences of reason (i. e. syllogistics), and assigns to them one-to-one categorematic, object-sided forms of thinking: the categories qua pure, non-empirical predicates of things. Kant then shows in his transcendental deduction that the categories are objectively, – i. e. without our invasive intervention – valid of all things in space-time. In the present essay, philosophy is understood not so much as critical metaphysics in a narrow sense of “metaphysics”, but rather as the a priori hermeneutic science; and the transcendental deduction of the categories is replaced by arguments for (1) a readability thesis and (2) a theory of the a priori presuppositions of referencing things in space and time. The readability thesis states that things can be read (1) as world-sided primal tokens (ur-tokens) of proper names of themselves and also (2) as world-sided primal tokens (ur-tokens) of elementary propositions about them. The theory of the a priori presuppositions clarifies the conditions of the possibility of subjects orienting themselves in space and time and being able to refer, first, to themselves qua embodied thinkers and then as well to arbitrary individual items.

scholarly journals Darwinism as the Missing Link in Kant’s Critical Philosophy

2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 51-80
Author(s):  
Igor K. Kalinin
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Physical Nature ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Entire System ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
Critical Attitude ◽  
Logical Functions

I proceed from the hypothesis that the difficulties in Kant’s presentation of his plan and, accordingly, the implicit reason for the critical attitude to this plan on the part of many contemporary philosophers stem from the fact that he had no theoretical link at his disposal which would offer a more solid scientific grounding for his entire system. I believe that Darwinism is such a link which bolsters the central but ungrounded thesis of the Critique of Pure Reason on the existence of a priori synthetic judgments. The synthesis of Darwinism and critical philosophy dictates, however, a substantial restructuring of the latter since some of its key elements prove to be weak in the light of modern studies and need to be revised or even reversed. The first reversal explored in this article determines the origin of the categories which are now revealed not “from the top down” where Kant sought them, i. e. not in logical functions in accordance with metaphysical deduction and not in self-consciousness as transcendental deduction claims, but “from the bottom up” if one considers things in the evolutionary dimension, i. e. in the instincts. The second reversal shifts the freedom of will which Kant placed in the same ontological basket with things in themselves at “the top,” to another level of the pyramid of ontologies, by changing dualism to pluralism because dualism is too narrow to accommodate all the autonomous components of critical philosophy. Thus spirit and freedom find a new place separate from the sphere of physical nature; the category of adaptation explains how different ontologies can coexist; while the problem of two interpretations of transcendental idealism (two-world vs. two-aspect interpretation) finds a solution through their reconciliation.

Judging by Refraining from Judgment

2019 ◽  
pp. 95-114
Author(s):  
Gerhard Richter
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Aesthetic Theory ◽  
Critical Practice ◽  
Work Of Art ◽  
Critical Engagement ◽  
Singular Form ◽  
To Come ◽  
In Virtue Of

This chapter focuses on Adorno’s understanding of the category of judgment. Proceeding from Adorno’s apodictic interpretation of a poem by the German Biedermeier writer Eduard Mörike, it reconstructs what it might mean for Adorno to argue for the critical practice of judging by refraining from judgment. Mörike’s children’s poem “Mousetrap Rhyme” is the only poem that Adorno chooses to quote in its entirety in his Aesthetic Theory. His surprising choice reveals how the uncoercive gaze can never be reduced to a set of ideological operations or a priori correspondences but rather must confront, in the space of the work of art, the question of its judgment—and the typically unspoken premises and presuppositions of any judgment—always one more time. Here, the uncoercive gaze fastens upon the artwork in a way that allows art to become world without reducing the art to the condition of being merely that which already is the case or that which already claims to be world. The artwork keeps alive the singular form of judgment as judgment without judging, in which the ultimate arrest of judgment remains deferred in virtue of another judgment, based on a future critical engagement, that is always still to come.

Analyticity Reconsidered1

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Paul Boghossian ◽  
Timothy Williamson
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
A Priori Justification ◽  
Metaphysical Notion ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
The Way

This essay distinguishes between metaphysical and epistemological conceptions of analyticity. The former is the idea of a sentence that is ‘true purely in virtue of its meaning’ while the latter is the idea of a sentence that ‘can be justifiably believed merely on the basis of understanding its meaning’. It further argues that, while Quine may have been right to reject the metaphysical notion, the epistemological notion can be defended from his critique and put to work explaining a priori justification. Along the way, a number of further distinctions relevant to the theory of analyticity and the theory of apriority are made and their significance is explained.

Necessary Presuppositions

2018 ◽  
pp. 128-149
Author(s):  
Erwin B. Montgomery
Keyword(s):  
Early Modern ◽  
Research Question ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Allopathic Medicine ◽  
Cell Theory ◽  
Problem Of Induction ◽  
Clinical Correlations ◽  
Natural Philosophers

Metaphysics has been a pejorative term since rejection of the medieval scholastic natural philosophers by the early modern scientists. Since that time, there has been the presumption that “data” speak for themselves and that data are self-evident. Metaphysics was seen as just so much philosophical speculation—science was above that, as was the rationalist/allopathic physician. However, the antipathy to enjoining metaphysics likely is due to a misunderstanding of metaphysics. Any time a theory or hypothesis is invoked, it necessarily goes beyond the data and consequently is a metaphysical exercise. Indeed, responses to the epistemic conundrum are metaphysical choices. Importantly, the metaphysical presumptions shape observations, such as what observations are relevant to a clinical or research question (the a priori problem of induction). Notable examples of metaphysical presuppositions are seen in the development of the cell theory and the derivative pathological–clinical correlations that propelled allopathic medicine.

Skepticism, A Priori Skepticism, and the Possibility of Error

2013 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 235-252 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hamid Vahid
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Main Concern ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Standard View ◽  
First Order ◽  
Radical Skepticism ◽  
In Virtue Of

Epistemologists have differed in their assessments of what it is in virtue of which skeptical hypotheses succeed in raising doubts. It is widely thought that skeptical hypotheses must satisfy some sort of possibility constraint and that only putative knowledge of contingent and a posteriori propositions is vulnerable to skeptical challenge. These putative constraints have been disputed by a number of epistemologists advocating what we may call “the non-standard view.” My main concern in this paper is to challenge this view by identifying a general recipe by means of which its proponents generate skeptical scenarios. I will argue that many of the skeptical arguments that are founded on these scenarios undermine at most second-order knowledge and that to that extent the non-standard view’s rejection of the standard constraints on skeptical hypotheses is problematic. It will be argued that, pace the non-standard view, only in their error-inducing capacities can skeptical hypotheses challenge first-order knowledge. I will also dispute the non-standard view’s claim that its skeptical arguments bring to light a neglected form of radical skepticism, namely, “a priori skepticism.” I conclude by contending that the non-standard view’s account of how skeptical hypotheses can raise legitimate doubt actually rides piggyback on the standard ways of challenging the possibility of knowledge.

scholarly journals Kant’s Original Space and Time as Mere Grounds for Possibilities

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Thomas Raysmith
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
Original Space ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Representations Of Space ◽  
Temporal Representations

Abstract In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant appears to make incompatible claims regarding the unitary natures of what he takes to be our a priori representations of space and time. I argue that these representations are unitary independently of all synthesis and explain how this avoids problems encountered by other positions regarding the Transcendental Deduction and its relation to the Transcendental Aesthetic in that work. Central is the claim that these representations (1) contain, when characterized as intuitions and considered as prior to any affections of sensibility, only an infinitude of merely possible finite spatial and temporal representations, and (2) are representations that are merely transcendental grounds for the possibilities for receiving or generating finite representations in sensibility that are determined (immediately, in the case of reception) by means of syntheses that accord with the categories.

scholarly journals Deduction of Freedom vs Deduction of Experience in Kant’s Metaphysics

2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-80
Author(s):  
Valeriy E. Semyonov
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
Transcendental Reduction ◽  
Methodological Basis ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals ◽  
Intelligible World ◽  
Critical Methods

My aim is to demonstrate the specificities and differences between transcendental deduction of concepts and deduction of the fundamental principles of pure practical reason in Kant’s metaphysics. First of all it is necessary to examine Kant’s attitude to the metaphysics of his time and the problem of its new justification. Kant in his philosophy explicated not only the theoretical world of cognition, but also the practical world of freedom. Accordingly, the fundamental means of proving metaphysics’ claims are the deduction of pure concepts of understanding (deduction of experience) and the deduction of the principles of pure practical reason (deduction of freedom). The underlying premises of the Kantian project of reviving metaphysics, “the Copernican Turn”, the critical methods and basic principles of transcendental (formal) idealism also provide the methodological basis of transcendental deduction, a new method of proving the claims of metaphysics in various spheres of human being. Proceeding from the above, I analyse the essence, structure and the peculiarities as well as the differences between the deduction of experience and the deduction of freedom. I single out the following features of the two types of deduction. First, theoretical use of reason is aimed at objects while practical reason is aimed at noumena, the foundations of will and freedom. Second, the transcendental deduction of space and time, as well as the deduction of categories, is preceded by transcendental reduction, which is absent in the deduction of freedom. Third, Kant orients the methodological movement of deductions in opposite directions. Theoretical deduction proceeds from pure forms of sensible intuition to concepts of understanding and thence to fundamental principles. Practical deduction proceeds from a priori principles to the concepts of the metaphysics of morals and thence to moral feelings. Fourth, deduction in the theoretical sphere forbids speculative reason to go beyond experience. Practical deduction has pointed to the intelligible world and has proved its “legitimacy”.

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