Tradition and Variation in Brazilian Foreign Policy

1967 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Bradford Burns

Mounting Anxieties, frustrations, and fears in Brazil effected a change of government by military force at the end of March of 1964. President Joáo Goulart fled to an Uruguayan exile. Congress, urged by the military, conferred supreme executive power on Marshal Humberto Castelo Branco. Many other sweeping changes followed. None was more complete than the about-face taken in foreign policy.Castelo Branco spoke out early and unequivocally in his regime in favor of a return to more traditional policies. The graduation exercise of the foreign service school, the Instituto Rio-Branco, on July 31, 1964, provided the propitious place and moment for him to outline the foreign policy goals of his government. He paid homage to the ideals consecrated by tradition: world peace, disarmament, selfdetermination, non-intervention, and anti-colonialism. Moving into the more pragmatic realm of national interests, the president emphasized that his government's foreign policy aimed to increase national power through social and economic development.

2012 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 38-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Kundnani

In this paper I examine the use of the concept of "normality" in debates about German foreign policy since unification. In the early 1990s, left-wing intellectuals such as Jürgen Habermas tended to criticize the idea of "normality" in favor of a form of German exceptionalism based on responsibility for the Nazi past. A foreign policy based on the idea of "normality" was associated above all with the greater use of military force, which the right advocated and the left opposed. Thus, "normality" became a synonym for Bündnisfähigkeit. Yet, from the mid 1990s onwards, some Social Democrats such as Egon Bahr began to use the concept of "normality" to refer instead to a foreign policy based on sovereignty and the pursuit of national interests. Although a consensus has now emerged in Germany around this realist definition of foreign-policy "normality," it is inadequate to capture the complex shift in the foreign policy of the Federal Republic since unification.


2013 ◽  
Vol 05 (01) ◽  
pp. 14-31
Author(s):  
Yongnian ZHENG ◽  
Liang Fook LYE ◽  
Gang CHEN

China devoted much effort to manage its relations with Asia-Pacific countries in 2012 due to the US pivot to the region. China views the military-centric focus of the US pivot as directed at China and as emboldening regional countries to be more assertive in their territorial claims vis-à-vis China. In 2013, the Chinese leadership will likely strike a balance between seeking a stable external environment and standing firm on issues concerning China's national interests.


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 168-192
Author(s):  
Alvite Singh Ningthoujam

As Southeast Asia gains prominence in global geostrategic and geoeconomic environment, Israel’s overture to South Korea is not an exception. Despite prolonged frosty relations between Israel and South Korea between the 1970s and late 1980s, both have managed to strengthen military–security relationship after reopening their embassies in the early 1990s. Currently, their defense cooperation revolves around arms trade but is expanding toward joint ventures, coproduction, and upgrading programs. Arms export is an important component in promoting Israeli foreign policy goals. At the same time, South Korea requires constant defense upgrade as it faces a hostile neighborhood. Within this context, the article argues that military and defense relations are the driving forces in flourishing Israel–South Korea relations.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Mieczysław P. Boduszyński ◽  
Christopher K. Lamont ◽  
Philip Streich

What determines Japan's willingness to flex its limited military muscle abroad? While analysts and scholars closely watched Japanese "militarization" under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (2012-2020), Japan had already deployed its military overseas over a decade ago in support of U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. By contrast, in 2014, Japan was unwilling to support U.S.-led operations against the Islamic State (ISIL) in Iraq and Syria. This presents a puzzle, as the fight against ISIL offered the kind of international legitimacy that the 2003 Iraq invasion lacked, and Japan traditionally seeks. Moreover, ISIL had killed Japanese citizens. This paper explains Japan's varying policies in Iraq in 2003 and 2014, thereby shedding light on the determinants of Japanese national security policy more generally. Our argument focuses on domestic political factors (especially the pluralist foreign policymaking) and strategic thinking rooted in realism. We argue that Japanese policies are driven by domestic politics, profound suspicions about the utility of military force and fears of becoming entangled in a seemingly never-ending conflict. While Koizumi may have had more room to manoeuvre despite long-standing public opposition to overseas military deployments when he dispatched the SDF to Iraq in 2003, it is precisely such deeply-entrenched popular anathema that many blame for the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) historic and devastating loss in the 2009 election. Abe was unwilling to repeat such a risky venture in 2014. We also highlight the role of realist calculations on both Japanese elites and the public, who by 2014 had come to see China rather than state or non-state actors in the Middle East as a primary security threat. We thus confirm Midford's finding that "defensive realism" tends to drive Japanese foreign policy thinking. Japanese citizens are not pacifists, as conventional wisdom might hold. Instead, Japanese public opinion supports the use of minimum military force when and if Japan is attacked to defend Japan's national sovereignty and territory but is much more suspicious of such power when it comes to deployments and the pursuit of other foreign policy goals.


Author(s):  
Спартак Гогонянц

The article deals with approaches to the choice of indicators of military danger in order to carry out an assessment of threats to the national interests of the state. The attention is focused on the acute need for a careful attitude to the analysis of the dynamics of changes in the military-political situation and the assessment of the level of military danger for Ukraine. It is formulated the necessity of using the scientific approach to the forecast of the level of military danger for Ukraine as a geopolitical player. An overview of existing research and publications of specialists in the national security strategy on the investigation of threats to national interests in the military field has shown that existing approaches are sufficiently developed and informative. In conducted research, military danger is considered as the potential ability of any state (group of states) to use military force to solve interstate political, economic, military, ethnic, religious and other contradictions. And this potential opportunity is constantly threatening the national interests of Ukraine, which can lead to different forms of armed confrontation. At the same time, the ambiguity in certain theoretical positions raises the need to clarify the definition of the most dangerous threats to national interests in the military sphere, and the constant transformations of the theory of military security of the state further complicate the solution of this problem. Therefore, in the interests of deeper formalization of geopolitical processes and taking into account their impact on the level of military danger, the application of the appropriate system of indicators is proposed. To assess the level of military danger for Ukraine, it is proposed to select 17 indicators that can be used together in the procedures for determining the level of military danger to Ukraine by other states. The use of separate values of the relevant indicators of military danger during the prediction of changes in the military-political situation can be used to substantiate the relevant decisions in the bodies of state military management.


Author(s):  
Zohreh Ghadbeigy ◽  
Masoumeh Ahangaran

To achieve national objectives and interests, different countries adopt specific orientations and strategies according to their domestic needs and geopolitical conditions, and based on the structure of the international system. In this regard, Iran's national power components, including strong national government, geopolitical position, and ideological elements, provides this country with a leading role in regional issues. Iran's strategic and geopolitical position, attained through its connection to some issues in the Middle East, provides it a context for serving the role of a regional player. This focus of Iran's foreign policy on regionalism safeguards the country's national interests in the long run. Thus, the Islamic Republic of Iran not only acts as a major player in the Middle East, but also upholds decisions to strengthen its position and to promote its national interests. At present, Iraq crisis is one of the central issues of Iran's foreign policy decisions in the region. In this study, we intended to discover the performance of Iran's foreign policy in Iraq crisis based on the components of its national interests. The investigated hypothesis is developed based on a realistic logic from the perspective of Iran's national interests including political-strategic and economic-commercial interests, as well as development model of Iran-Iraq cooperation.


Author(s):  
Michael Mastanduno

This chapter explores the link between economic instruments of statecraft and the broader foreign policy goals and strategies of states. Economic sanctions are used in conjunction with diplomatic and military measures in response to foreign policy problems and opportunities. However, they are not always effective. The chapter begins with a discussion of the instruments and objectives of economic statecraft, including trade restrictions, financial sanctions, investment restrictions, and monetary sanctions. It then explores the potential of economic incentives as a tool of statecraft and the question of whether economic interdependence leads to harmony, as liberals believe, or conflict among states, as realists predict. It shows that economic interdependence can either lead to peace or conflict depending on the future expectations of policy makers, the nature of the military balance, and the form that economic interdependence takes.


Unity Journal ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 54-69
Author(s):  
Dharma Bahadur Baniya

Since the emergence of the New World Order in the international relations, the pursuit of national interests through traditional hard power has come under intense criticism. Employment of military instrument in foreign soil in particular, has been questioned. Examples of Afghanistan, Korean Peninsula, Iraq, and Middle-East demonstrate that hard power approach alone, has been barely successful to handle multi-dimensional security challenges in the contemporary world. Although the hard power remains as important instruments of national power, its employment is becoming less significant due to its legitimacy and effectiveness in the changing global environment. Hence, the concept of soft power has been advanced as an alternative approach because of its potential of securing national interest without using force or coercion. Though the smart power, as an appropriate combination of hard and smart powers, has its implications in the international politics; soft power constitutes a very real power. This article argues on why soft power has been a more relevant instrument for the states being blessed or lacking the military might. Finally, the article presents its analysis with implications and recommends on ways in which small states like Nepal need to resort to soft power to ensure their foreign policy objectives and security in the changing international order.


Author(s):  
Lesia Zastavetska ◽  
◽  
Nataliia Taranova ◽  

One of the most promising areas of modern science is geopolitics, which determines the main trends of today's social life. The research pays detailed attention to the theoretical aspects of the development of geopolitics as an important area of modern social geography. The main geopolitical trends of the twentieth century and the brightest representatives of each of them are described. The purpose of this study is to systematize the existing geopolitical schools and demonstrate the peculiarities of the formation of each of them. Geopolitics has existed since the existence of states. Whether small or large, states are always worried about their borders, while others express a desire to expand to countries with which they border. But beyond the natural and demarcated borders of each country, there are other geographical factors that favor or discourage the development of a country into a Great Power. It seems, therefore, that over the centuries geography has been a common denominator in shaping the foreign policy of states, the implementation of a geostrategic and geo-economic policy in order to maintain or increase their power at regional or international level. Although geopolitics has at times been condemned and rejected by the scientific community, it is clearly demonstrated that it is one of the most important factors in shaping the foreign policy of all states, regardless of whether they are characterized as Great Powers or not. The difference between the less powerful states and the Great Powers is that the latter have the ability and the opportunity to formulate their foreign policy and to advance their national interests, while the less powerful states simply endure the effects of these politics. Geopolitics is defined by many manuals and dictionaries of geography as a field of knowledge, which considers the concept of «space» important for understanding the nature of international relations. Understood mainly as «the geography of power» and having from time to time received various slightly different interpretations, geopolitics involves the following stable core of interpretation: it is the study of the interaction of natural geographical division and human purpose with cultural construction ensuring the economic and the military condominium a force on a particular area of the globe.


2020 ◽  
pp. 98-116
Author(s):  
Oleksandr Potiekhin

The article puts forward an opinion that the current crisis of world order requires reverting to discovering the reasons of World War I. The author states that in 1914, a majority of decision-makers believed they had a dominant strategy; thus, the policy they followed was the best, irrespective of another party’s actions. The complicated task of clarifying the concerns and intentions of others as well as predicting the aggravation of the situation as a result of their actions was not taken into account. The quest for minimising responsibility and increasing comfort while taking bellicose measures hindered the realisation of the fact that a more cautious strategy was a safer option. The military and political alliances, including the Entente Cordiale (the Triple Entente) and the Triple Alliance (after Italy’s withdrawal, the Central Powers), the defence purposes enshrined in secret agreements notwithstanding, were established for waging wars but not for maintaining peace by mutual containment. Fragile arrangements between the two alliances did not allow them to prevent opponents or partners from unleashing the war and subsequently halt hostilities after the failure of a range of envisaged strategic operations. The states continuously threatened each other with their actions, and repeated attempts to create the impression of a threat of aggression, although without any intention to use military force, undermined international stability. The efforts of European leaders constituted a diplomatic game, as the parties bluffed and sought to play trump cards they never had. The initial stakes, particularly colonial and territorial claims of actors, were negligible as compared with the incommensurably higher payback – the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian, Russian, German, and Ottoman empires, and the two totalitarian revolutions in the 20th-century Europe, Russian (Bolshevist) and German (Nazi). The author concludes that it was not allied obligations that prompted states to choose a certain side; rather, each country’s government decided to join the war on their own, guided by spurious ‘national interests’. Keywords: World War I, Entente, military and political alliances, Europe, 20th century.


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