Educational Simulations For the Neural and Cognitive Sciences

2019 ◽  
pp. 459-460
Author(s):  
Wolfram Horstmann ◽  
Sören Lorenz ◽  
Martin Egelhaaf
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Igor Grossmann ◽  
Nic M. Weststrate ◽  
Monika Ardelt ◽  
Justin Peter Brienza ◽  
Mengxi Dong ◽  
...  

Interest in wisdom in the cognitive sciences, psychology, and education has been paralleled by conceptual confusions about its nature and assessment. To clarify these issues and promote consensus in the field, wisdom researchers met in Toronto in July of 2019, resolving disputes through discussion. Guided by a survey of scientists who study wisdom-related constructs, we established a common wisdom model, observing that empirical approaches to wisdom converge on the morally-grounded application of metacognition to reasoning and problem-solving. After outlining the function of relevant metacognitive and moral processes, we critically evaluate existing empirical approaches to measurement and offer recommendations for best practices. In the subsequent sections, we use the common wisdom model to selectively review evidence about the role of individual differences for development and manifestation of wisdom, approaches to wisdom development and training, as well as cultural, subcultural, and social-contextual differences. We conclude by discussing wisdom’s conceptual overlap with a host of other constructs and outline unresolved conceptual and methodological challenges.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudia Mazzuca ◽  
Matteo Santarelli

The concept of gender has been the battleground of scientific and political speculations for a long time. On the one hand, some accounts contended that gender is a biological feature, while on the other hand some scholars maintained that gender is a socio-cultural construct (e.g., Butler, 1990; Risman, 2004). Some of the questions that animated the debate on gender over history are: how many genders are there? Is gender rooted in our biological asset? Are gender and sex the same thing? All of these questions entwine one more crucial, and often overlooked interrogative. How is it possible for a concept to be the purview of so many disagreements and conceptual redefinitions? The question that this paper addresses is therefore not which specific account of gender is preferable. Rather, the main question we will address is how and why is even possible to disagree on how gender should be considered. To provide partial answers to these questions, we suggest that gender/sex (van Anders, 2015; Fausto-Sterling, 2019) is an illustrative example of politicized concepts. We show that no concepts are political in themselves; instead, some concepts are subjected to a process involving a progressive detachment from their supposed concrete referent (i.e., abstractness), a tension to generalizability (i.e., abstraction), a partial indeterminacy (i.e., vagueness), and the possibility of being contested (i.e., contestability). All of these features differentially contribute to what we call the politicization of a concept. In short, we will claim that in order to politicize a concept, a possible strategy is to evidence its more abstract facets, without denying its more embodied and perceptual components (Borghi et al., 2019). So, we will first outline how gender has been treated in psychological and philosophical discussions, to evidence its essentially contestable character thereby showing how it became a politicized concept. Then we will review some of the most influential accounts of political concepts, arguing that currently they need to be integrated with more sophisticated distinctions (e.g., Koselleck, 2004). The notions gained from the analyses of some of the most important accounts of political concepts in social sciences and philosophy will allow us to implement a more dynamic approach to political concepts. Specifically, when translated into the cognitive science framework, these reflections will help us clarifying some crucial aspects of the nature of politicized concepts. Bridging together social and cognitive sciences, we will show how politicized concepts are abstract concepts, or better abstract conceptualizations.


This is the second volume in Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, a series with the aim of providing a venue for publishing work in this emerging field. Experimental philosophy is a new movement that seeks to use empirical techniques to illuminate some of the oldest issues in philosophy. It is an interdisciplinary field at the intersection of philosophy, psychology, and related disciplines, such as linguistics and sociology. Although the movement is only a few years old, it has already sparked an explosion of new research, challenging a number of cherished assumptions in both philosophy and the cognitive sciences. This volume includes both theoretical and experimental chapters as well as chapters that cross traditional disciplinary boundaries. It is divided into three parts that explore epistemology, moral and political philosophy, and metaphysics and mind, showcasing the diversity of work that has arisen as traditionally philosophical questions have met the tools of social science.


Author(s):  
Marek Jakubiec

AbstractAlthough much ink has been spilled on different aspects of legal concepts, the approach based on the developments of cognitive science is a still neglected area of study. The “mental” and cognitive aspect of these concepts, i.e., their features as mental constructs and cognitive tools, especially in the light of the developments of the cognitive sciences, is discussed quite rarely. The argument made by this paper is that legal concepts are best understood as mental representations. The piece explains what mental representations are and why this view matters. The explanation of legal concepts, understood as mental representations is one of (at least) three levels of explanation within legal philosophy, but—as will be argued—it is the most fundamental level. This paper analyzes the consequences of such understanding of concepts used in the field of legal philosophy. Special emphasis is put on the current debate on the analogical or amodal nature of concepts.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (6) ◽  
pp. 2646
Author(s):  
Jozsef Katona

Cognitive infocommunications (CogInfoCom) is a young and evolving discipline that is at the crossroads of information and communication technology (ICT) and cognitive sciences with many promising results. The goal of the field is to provide insights into how human cognitive capabilities can be merged and extended with the cognitive capabilities of the digital devices surrounding us, with the goal of enabling more seamless interactions between humans and artificially cognitive agents. Results in the field have already led to the appearance of numerous CogInfoCom-based technological innovations. For example, the field has led to a better understanding of how humans can learn more effectively, and the development of new kinds of learning environment have followed accordingly. The goal of this paper is to summarize some of the most recent results in CogInfoCom and to introduce important research trends, developments and innovations that play a key role in understanding and supporting the merging of cognitive processes with ICT.


Human Affairs ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Roman Madzia

AbstractThe paper proposes an outline of a reconciliatory approach to the perennial controversy between epistemological realism and anti-realism (constructionism). My main conceptual source in explaining this view is the philosophy of pragmatism, more specifically, the epistemological theories of George H. Mead, John Dewey, and also William James’ radical empiricism. First, the paper analyzes the pragmatic treatment of the goal-directedness of action, especially with regard to Mead’s notion of attitudes, and relates it to certain contemporary epistemological theories provided by the cognitive sciences (Maturana, Rizzolatti, Clark). Against this background, the paper presents a philosophical as well as empirical justification of why we should interpret the environment and its objects in terms of possibilities for action. In Mead’s view, the objects and events of our world emerge within stable patterns of organism-environment interactions, which he called “perspectives”. According to pragmatism as well as the aforementioned cognitive scientists, perception and other cognitive processes include not only neural processes in our heads but also the world itself. Elaborating on Mead’s concept of perspectives, the paper argues in favor of the epistemological position called “constructive realism.”


Istoriya ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (8 (106)) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Lidia Sofronova

The article presents an analytical review of the recent literature on cognitive history, especially the Russian collective monograph “Cognitive Sciences and Historical Cognition”, published in 2020. It traces the patterns typical for interdisciplinary research not only within the humanitarian disciplines, but also at the “borders” between the humanities and the “natural sciences”. The article highlights the paradoxical and productive nature of the “mutual interventions” of cognitive science and the humanities, which contribute to overcoming “atomism” both within the humanities and at the “frontier” between them and the natural science disciplines.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document