scholarly journals Evaluations on the potential productivity of winter wheat based on agro-ecological zone in the world

Author(s):  
H. Wang ◽  
Q. Li ◽  
X. Du ◽  
L. Zhao ◽  
Y. Lu ◽  
...  

Wheat is the most widely grown crop globally and an essential source of calories in human diets. Maintaining and increasing global wheat production is therefore strongly linked to food security. In this paper, the evaluation model of winter wheat potential productivity was proposed based on agro-ecological zone and the historical winter wheat yield data in recent 30 years (1983-2011) obtained from FAO. And the potential productions of winter wheat in the world were investigated. The results showed that the realistic potential productivity of winter wheat in Western Europe was highest and it was more than 7500 kg/hm2. The realistic potential productivity of winter wheat in North China Plain were also higher, which was about 6000 kg/hm2. However, the realistic potential productivity of winter wheat in the United States which is the main winter wheat producing country were not high, only about 3000 kg/hm2. In addition to these regions which were the main winter wheat producing areas, the realistic potential productivity in other regions of the world were very low and mainly less than 1500 kg/hm2, like in southwest region of Russia. The gaps between potential productivity and realistic productivity of winter wheat in Kazakhstan and India were biggest, and the percentages of the gap in realistic productivity of winter wheat in Kazakhstan and India were more than 40%. In Russia, the gap between potential productivity and realistic productivity of winter wheat was lowest and the percentage of the gap in realistic productivity of winter wheat in Russia was only 10%.

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (8) ◽  
pp. 1232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yumiao Wang ◽  
Zhou Zhang ◽  
Luwei Feng ◽  
Qingyun Du ◽  
Troy Runge

Winter wheat (Triticum aestivum L.) is one of the most important cereal crops, supplying essential food for the world population. Because the United States is a major producer and exporter of wheat to the world market, accurate and timely forecasting of wheat yield in the United States (U.S.) is fundamental to national crop management as well as global food security. Previous studies mainly have focused on developing empirical models using only satellite remote sensing images, while other yield determinants have not yet been adequately explored. In addition, these models are based on traditional statistical regression algorithms, while more advanced machine learning approaches have not been explored. This study used advanced machine learning algorithms to establish within-season yield prediction models for winter wheat using multi-source data to address these issues. Specifically, yield driving factors were extracted from four different data sources, including satellite images, climate data, soil maps, and historical yield records. Subsequently, two linear regression methods, including ordinary least square (OLS) and least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO), and four well-known machine learning methods, including support vector machine (SVM), random forest (RF), Adaptive Boosting (AdaBoost), and deep neural network (DNN), were applied and compared for estimating the county-level winter wheat yield in the Conterminous United States (CONUS) within the growing season. Our models were trained on data from 2008 to 2016 and evaluated on data from 2017 and 2018, with the results demonstrating that the machine learning approaches performed better than the linear regression models, with the best performance being achieved using the AdaBoost model (R2 = 0.86, RMSE = 0.51 t/ha, MAE = 0.39 t/ha). Additionally, the results showed that combining data from multiple sources outperformed single source satellite data, with the highest accuracy being obtained when the four data sources were all considered in the model development. Finally, the prediction accuracy was also evaluated against timeliness within the growing season, with reliable predictions (R2 > 0.84) being able to be achieved 2.5 months before the harvest when the multi-source data were combined.


1999 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 145-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
GEOFFREY HAWTHORN

Many expected that after the Cold War, there would be peace, order, increasing prosperity in expanding markets and the extension and eventual consolidation of civil and political rights. There would be a new world order, and it would in these ways be liberal. In international politics, the United States would be supreme. It would through security treaties command the peace in western Europe and east Asia; through its economic power command it in eastern Europe and Russia; through clients and its own domination command it in the Middle East; through tacit understanding command it in Latin America; and, in so far as any state could, command it in Africa also. It could choose whether to cooperate in the United Nations, and if it did not wish to do so, be confident that it would not be disablingly opposed by illiberal states. In the international markets, it would be able to maintain holdings of its bonds. In the international financial institutions, it would continue to be decisive in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; it would be an important influence in the regional development banks; and it would be powerful in what it was to insist in 1994 should be called the World (rather than Multinational) Trade Organisation. Other transactions in the markets, it is true, would be beyond the control of any state. But they would not be likely to conflict with the interests of the United States (and western Europe) in finance, investment and trade, and would discipline other governments.


Author(s):  
Peter Baldwin

To Return To The Bulk of our material in this book, what absolute differences separate the United States from Europe? The United States is a nation where proportionately more people are murdered each year, more are jailed, and more own guns than anywhere in Europe. The death penalty is still law. Religious belief is more fervent and widespread. A smaller percentage of citizens vote. Collective bargaining covers relatively fewer workers, and the state’s tax take is lower. Inequality is somewhat more pronounced. That is about it. In almost every other respect, differences are ones of degree, rather than kind. Oft en, they do not exist, or if they do, no more so than the same disparities hold true within Western Europe itself. At the very least, this suggests that farreaching claims to radical differences across the Atlantic have been overstated. Even on violence—a salient difference that leaps unprompted from the evidence, both statistical and anecdotal—the contrast depends on how it is framed. Without question, murder rates are dramatically different across the Atlantic. And, of course, murder is the most shocking form of sudden, unexpected death, unsettling communities, leaving survivors bereaved and mourning. But consider a wider definition of unanticipated, immediate, and profoundly disrupting death. Suicide is oft en thought of as the exit option for old, sick men anticipating the inevitable, and therefore not something that changes the world around them. But, in fact, the distribution of suicide over the lifespan is broadly uniform. In Iceland, Ireland, the UK, and the United States, more young men (below forty-five) than old do themselves in. In Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway, the figures are almost equal. Elsewhere, the older have a slight edge. But overall, the ratio between young and old suicides approximates 1:1. Broadly speaking, and sticking with the sex that most oft en kills itself, men do away with themselves as oft en when they are younger and possibly still husbands, fathers, and sons as they do when they are older and when their actions are perhaps fraught with less consequence for others. Suicide is as unsettling, and oft en even more so, for survivors as murder.


Author(s):  
David Damrosch

This chapter discusses the comparatists who reshaped the comparative literature in the United States during the 1950s and 1960s. It mentions Anna Balakian, who became a leading figure in both the American and International Comparative Literature Associations. It also describes Anna and her family's emigration in 1921 from Turkey to western Europe and eventually to the United States. The chapter analyzes how comparatists sought to change the world in the postwar years, a time of rapid expansion in higher education and optimism about America's role in fostering international cooperation and understanding. It also focuses on the need of politics of comparative studies to have a dual focus on institutional politics, a wider political scene, and a postcolonial perspective.


Worldview ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 14-16
Author(s):  
Lionel Gelber

When the United States fostered the recovery and underwrote the security of Western Europe she had more than sentiment to impel her. That salient zone is a pivotal sector of the world balance, and while she may station fewer of her own troops upon its soil, she can entertain no total disengagement from it. But there is another West European item, the future of the Common Market, which calls for a fresh American scrutiny. The West will be better off if Western Europe acquires more of an ability to stand on its own feet. Gaullism, however, revealed a less modest goal, one that was not confined to France and did not vanish with the departure of General de Gaulle. On the contrary, it may have gained new leverage from his downfall.


Author(s):  
Deepak Nayyar

This chapter analyses the striking changes in the geographical distribution of manufacturing production amongst countries and across continents since 1750, a period that spans more than two-and-a-half centuries, which could be described as the movement of industrial hubs in the world economy over time. Until around 1820, world manufacturing production was concentrated in China and India. The Industrial Revolution, followed by the advent of colonialism, led to deindustrialization in Asia and, by 1880, Britain became the world industrial hub that extended to northwestern Europe. The United States surpassed Britain in 1900, and was the dominant industrial hub in the world until 2000. During 1950 to 2000, the relative, though not absolute, importance of Western Europe diminished, and Japan emerged as a significant industrial hub, while the other new industrial hub, the USSR and Eastern Europe, was short lived. The early twenty-first century, 2000–2017, witnessed a rapid decline of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan as industrial hubs, to be replaced largely by Asia, particularly China. This process of shifting hubs, associated with industrialization in some countries and deindustrialization in other countries in the past, might be associated with premature deindustrialization in yet other countries in the future.


1971 ◽  
Vol 56 ◽  
pp. 22-35

Developments in the world economy have on the whole been much as we predicted in February. It is becoming increasingly clear that renewed expansion is under way in the United States at a pace which, even if it falls short of the Administration's hopes, is more than compensating for the slowing down in industrial countries outside North America. This deceleration has become quite marked in Japan as well as Western Europe, but we expect a faster pace to be resumed before the end of the year. We still put real growth in OECD countries at around 4 per cent in 1971, unless there is a prolonged steel strike in the United States. This compares with about 2½ per cent last year, and we expect the rising trend to continue into 1972.


2019 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 449-469
Author(s):  
Isabela Nogueira ◽  
João Victor Guimarães ◽  
João Pedro Braga

ABSTRACT This article contributes to the debate on income and wealth distribution in China by analyzing the main characteristics of the Chinese accumulation pattern that determine its distributive dynamics in a comparative perspective. After a period of rapid growth of inequalities, coupled with improved living conditions for all distribution deciles, inequalities have stabilized in China since the mid-2000s. Globally, China is today in a distributive pattern worse than Western Europe or Japan, but it is more egalitarian than the United States and far from the world inequality frontier defined by Brazil, India, South Africa and the Middle East. In this article, we scrutinize three characteristics of the regime of accumulation in China that mitigate the capital-concentrating tendency: 1. the financialization process with Chinese characteristics, 2. the strategic share of State ownership in the economy, 3. its trajectory over the agrarian question.


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