Contingency, Free Will, and Particular Providence

The results from contemporary science, especially the theory of evolution and quantum physics, seem to favor process theology. Moreover, the evil committed by free will leads some theologians to reduce divine action in order to prevent God from being responsible for evil. Thus, among those who defend a particular providence, Molinism finds many followers. This article first argues that contemporary science does not constrain us to deny particular providence. Second, it criticizes the implicitly deterministic character of Molinism. Thirdly, a Thomistic solution is proposed as an alternative which, by means of a different metaphysical approach to cosmic contingency and freedom of will, defends particular providence without reducing divine activity except in personal sins.

Truth, Identity, Pluralism in Contemporary Society - Gandhi's Response

This paper explores Gandhi’s attitude towards diversity of religions and examines as to how he attempted to bring inter-faith harmony. Religious diversity has been a topic of serious debate in the contemporary philosophical discourse on understanding religion. Religious pluralism is one of the approaches that deal with issues concerning the diversity of religions. It is believed that no single religion can make absolute claims about the nature of divine reality, its relation to man and the world. It stands in direct opposition to exclusivism, inclusivism and also to fundamentalism by denying that any one religion is the sole possession of the whole truth. Different religions seem to put forward different and incompatible interpretations about the nature of ultimate reality, about the modes of divine activity, the nature and destiny of the human race.

Rhetorical Economy in Augustine's Theology

Augustine of Hippo (AD 354–430) studied and taught rhetoric for nearly two decades until, at the age of thirty-one, he left his position as professor of rhetoric in Milan to embark upon his new life as a Christian. But this was not a clean break. Previous scholarship has done much to show us that Augustine integrated rhetorical ideas about texts and speeches into his thought on homiletics, the formation of arguments, and scriptural interpretation. Over the past few decades a new movement among scholars has begun to show that Augustine also carried rhetorical concepts into areas of his thought that were beyond the typical purview of the rhetorical handbooks. This study contributes to this new movement by providing a detailed examination of Augustine’s use of the rhetorical concept of economy in his theologies of creation, history, and evil, in order to gain insights into these fundamental aspects of his thought. Ultimately, this book finds that Augustine used rhetorical economy as the logic by which he explained a multitude of tensions within, and answered various challenges to, these three areas of his thought as well as others with which they intersect—including his understandings of providence, divine activity, and divine order.

Augustine’s Use of Rhetorical Economy in his Theodicy

Chapter 5 demonstrates that Augustine utilizes rhetorical economy to explain God’s providence over that which does not come from God—evil. The first section provides a reading of On Genesis against the Manichaeans 1.3.5 which indicates that part of Augustine’s solution—the separation between the acts of creating and arranging—is a logical separation based upon the first two principal parts of rhetoric, invention (inuentio) and arrangement (dispositio). The second section then argues, by means of a close reading of On Free Choice 3.9.27, that Augustine utilizes rhetorical economy as the logic by which he explains how God’s providence harmonizes with the source of sin, free will, by defining God’s providence according to the divine activity of arrangement rather than production.

Creation, History, and God’s Activity as Speech

Chapter 2 focuses on Augustine’s use of the media of literary and rhetorical theory—namely the book and the speech—to conceive of creation, history, and all divine activity therein. It also demonstrates that Augustine conceives of pieces of creation as functioning in the same manners as words in a book and a speech, that Augustine thinks of God as acting in history according to the rhetorical concept of eloquence, and that he conceives of God as arranging temporal things into the whole of history in the same way that an orator arranges syllables into a single speech.

PLAYING AND LAUGHING GODS OF PLATO’S DIALOGUES IN THE COMMENTARIES OF PROCLUS

“Socrates’ irony” is a well-known topos even for those readers who are far from ancient philosophy. Dialogues of Plato contain different modes of humour, from mild self-irony to quite sarcastic tones. Plato’s gods are ‘playful,’ they treat people as those were ‘playthings.’ The best way of mortals’ life is to play also, spending their time in “sacrificing, singing, and dancing.” However, Neoplatonic commentaries to Plato tend to avoid explicit laughter and any direct mode of humour. Proclus Lycaeus, one of the most fruitful commentators of Plato, seems to disregard anything ludicrous in Plato’s writing. The places, where Plato speaks about laughter or playing games, are explained by Proclus as signs to some kind of divine activity towards the material realm. Even smile and laughter of particular humans are interpreted in the same way as symbols (synthēmata) of gods’ providence. What Proclus discusses in minor details, is the dialectics of gods’ procession into the sensible world, causing substantiation of the universe, and retention of the internal bonds that keep it eternal and unchangeable. Similarly, temporary particular beings also benefit from divine providence, which fortifies their vital capabilities. In general, these forms of providence are depicted by “the undying laughter” of gods. In spite of this approach seeming to be superfluously ‘scholastic’ and therefore losing the dramatic perspective of Plato’s writings, we suggest that Proclean interpretation may assume laughter to be related to some theurgic practice. Therefore, reading and interpretation the game- and laughter-related passages of Plato could have been considered themself a kind of theurgic “sacred play.”

‘A field of divine activity’: Divine aseity and holy scripture in dialogue with John Webster and Karl Barth

In dialogue with John Webster and Karl Barth, this essay considers the intersection of divine aseity and holy scripture. I argue that the doctrine of holy scripture is constituted by a backward reference, namely, the plentiful life of the triune God. The doctrine of divine aseity denotes God's self-existent triune life, which anchors God's bestowal of life. Construed negatively, aseity establishes the incommensurability of God and creatures by distinguishing, without sundering, scripture and God's self-communicative presence. Construed positively, aseity constitutes scripture as ‘a field of divine activity’, the sphere of the life-giving missions of the Word and Spirit. The triune God who lives a se, elects the texts of scripture to serve as intermediaries of God's vivifying address.

The Two Highest Goods

The chapter argues that we can construe the relationship between Kant’s account of the moral law and God as a type of concurring moral dependence, on the basis of formal causation, such that the very activity of willing the moral law is a type of participation in the uncreated divine mind. In the end, morality does require divinity, and, even, a (carefully specified) type of divine activity, albeit that we do not arrive at this commitment through a traditional acceptance of the categories of revelation and faith. It is argued that there is a defensible sense of the notion of ‘divinity’ that Kant can be said to have warrant to believe in, given his assumptions about freedom, although it is a rather different sort of divinity from the ‘divine being’ of philosophical (let alone Christian) theism. I suggest that in his final fragmentary writings, Kant might be said to show some awareness of this. This interpretation throws a new light on Kant’s conception of the Kingdom of Ends, whereby the happiness that constitutes the highest good can be construed as an enactment of divinity, through willing the moral law, rather than the contemplation of a divine being.