CO2 Emission from Brickfields in Bangladesh: Can Ethical Responsibility by Doing Reduce Level of Emission?

Recent years’ rapid urbanization and then rural to urban migration have created increasing demands of bricks usages in Bangladesh. However, brick industry has been largely using inefficient, dirty technology and burns woods-coal. It injects huge volume of CO2 in atmosphere. For policy guidance on the issue, this study analyzes the basic issues of CO2 emission from brickfields in terms of marginal damage (MD) analysis. Findings show that the marginal social costs are higher than marginal private (producer of bricks) costs where brickfields are benefiting with the expense of Bangladeshi society as a whole. As time passes by, rises of brick-prices have been causing upward trends of welfare losses where producers’ surpluses are dominating in the total surplus. This economic situation has been causing higher deadweight loss year after year. Addressing the issues, national strategies and policy actions are needed. Reforestation efforts can be achieved in multi-faucets: brick-fields’ charity, government policies on planting trees & policies on motivational efforts inspiring citizens of Bangladesh. Motivational policy can be: i) inspiring celebration individual’s “Birthday, Having 1st child in family and Event of marriage” by planting trees, ii) forcing to utilize green tech in brick kilns and iii) conducting academic research where financial supports are in need. Keywords: brickfields, effluent gases emission, causes social costs & deadweight loss, reforestation, motivational efforts of government policies

Indikasi Praktek Monopoli Dalam Pembayaran Tiket Kereta Api (KAI Access) Melalui Dompet Elektronik di Indonesia

This article, which aims to analyze the indications of unfair business competition by PT. Kereta Api Indonesia in selling local train tickets through the KAI Access application with payment methods via electronic wallets regulated under Law Number 5 of 1999 concerning the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition and also aims to determine whether the occurrence of deadweight loss is caused by on the existence of a monopoly in a market. This writing uses a normative research method, namely by researching the applicable laws and regulations by using a statutory approach, conceptual approach, and case study. Monopoly is a condition where there is only one business actor in a market, this condition becomes a problem if the business actor uses his monopoly power to dominate the market so that there are barriers to entry into the market. In this case, the purchase of local train tickets through KAI Access can only be paid for using the LinkAja electronic wallet.Keywords: Monopoly; Deadweight Loss; Elecronic Wallet.AbstrakDalam artikel ini yang bertujuan untuk menganalisis dari adanya indikasi persaingan usaha yang tidak sehat oleh PT. Kereta Api Indonesia dalam penjualan tiket kereta api lokal melalui aplikasi KAI Access dengan metode pembayaran melalui dompet elektronik yang diatur berdasarkan oleh Undang-Undang Nomor 5 Tahun 1999 tentang Larangan Praktek Monopoli dan Persaingan Usaha Tidak Sehat dan juga bertujuan untuk mengetahui apakah terjadinya deadweight loss di sebabkan atas adanya monopoli dalam suatu pasar. Penulisan ini menggunakan metode penelitian normatif yaitu dengan cara meniliti terhadap peraturan perudang-undangan yang berlaku dengan menggunakan pendekatan perundang-undangan, pendekatn konseptual dan case study. Monopoli merupakan kondisi dimana hanya ada satu pelaku usaha dalam suatu pasar, kondisi tersebut menjadi masalah apabila pelaku usaha menggunakan kekuatan monopoli nya untuk menguasai pasar sehingga adanya hambatan masuk ke dalam pasar tersebut. Dalam hal ini terdapat pembelian tiket kereta api lokal melalui KAI Access hanya dapat di bayar menggunakan dompet elektronik LinkAja. Kata Kunci: Monopoli; Deadweight Loss; Dompet Elektronik.

The Electric Vehicle Transition and the Economics of Banning Gasoline Vehicles

Electric vehicles have a unique potential to transform personal transportation. We analyze this transition with a dynamic model capturing falling costs of electric vehicles, decreasing pollution from electricity, and increasing vehicle substitutability. Our calibration to the US market shows a transition from gasoline vehicles is not optimal at current substitutability: a gasoline vehicle production ban would have large deadweight loss. At higher substitutability, a ban can reduce deadweight loss from vehicle mix and adoption timing inefficiencies. A cumulative gasoline vehicle production quota has smaller deadweight loss, and an electric vehicle purchase subsidy is more robust to regulator misperceptions about substitutability. (JEL H23, L51, L62, L94, Q53)

METHODOLOGY FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF REGULATION COSTS IN THE BANKING MARKET

Purpose – In the field of the economics’ regulation researchers so far have built the conceptual framework showing how the deadweight loss of market failures decrease and costs of the government intervention increase with the increased level of the government intervention. In order to quantify relationships between the level of intervention, intervention costs and the deadweight loss with econometric models it is important to understand how to quantify the regulation costs as a part of intervention costs. The objective of the research presented in this paper is to find the appropriate methodology for the quantification of the regulation costs in the banking market. Research methodology – literature review (regarding theories), mathematical methods for quantification and econometric methods for validation purposes. Findings – research shows that in the assessment of regulation costs three main stakeholders should be included – microprudential regulator, macroprudential regulator and financial regulation’s policy maker. Research presents their cost assessment methodology. Its validation shows that in general methodology works as expected, i.e., higher government intervention levels lead to higher regulation costs, however this general rule has exceptions, which in authors’ view indicates that other factors have an impact on the cost levels. Research limitations – research shows how to assess the costs of main stakeholders based on the publicly available information. More precise view could be obtained if in the cooperation with authorities more details on certain cost items are received. Practical implications – research results will be used to assess all government intervention costs (other positions include compliance costs and other indirect costs) and finalize the quantification of the framework. Quantified framework could be used for more precise policy making regarding the regulation of the banking market. Originality/Value – research shows how to quantify the regulation costs of the banking market as currently there are only conceptual ideas.

The Tax Elasticity of Financial Statement Income: Implications for Current Reform Proposals

Current reform proposals in international and corporate tax (most notably the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Global Anti-Base Erosion proposal) envisage taxing financial statement income. This paper develops a conceptual framework, based on the literature on the elasticity of taxable income (ETI), for the welfare analysis of such proposals and discusses the available evidence on the tax elasticity of financial statement income. The central conclusion is that the most relevant evidence suggests a large responsiveness of financial statement income to taxes (and, hence, albeit with significant limitations and caveats, arguably a large deadweight loss). The paper also highlights the need for more evidence on this question.

Competitive Personalized Pricing

We study a model where each competing firm has a target segment where it has full consumer information and can exercise personalized pricing, and consumers may engage in identity management to bypass the firm’s attempt to price discriminate. In the absence of identity management, more consumer information intensifies competition because firms can effectively defend their turf through targeted personalized offers, thereby setting low public prices offered to nontargeted consumers. But the effect is mitigated when consumers are active in identity management because it raises the firm’s cost of serving nontargeted consumers. When firms have sufficiently large and nonoverlapping target segments, identity management can enable firms to extract full surplus from their targeted consumers through perfect price discrimination. Identity management can also induce firms not to serve consumers who are not targeted by either firm when the commonly nontargeted market segment is small. This results in a deadweight loss. Thus, identity management by consumers can benefit firms and lead to lower consumer surplus and lower social welfare. Our main insight continues to be valid when a fraction of consumers are active in identity management or when there is a cost of identity management. We also discuss the regulatory implications for the use of consumer information by firms as well as the implications for management. This paper was accepted by Juanjuan Zhang, marketing.