The origins of the Cold War in Southeast Asia: Pre-Second World War Siamese cooperation with foreign powers against communism

The origins of the Cold War in Southeast Asia are most often located in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, in the late 1940s. Historians sometimes trace its origins to Japan's expansionist phase in the 1930s, which accelerated the decline of the European and American colonial order in this part of Asia. However, the necessity of the fight against communism appeared very clearly in the minds of the leaders of the major colonial powers well before the 1930s. Focused on the case of Siam, this article aims to show that the origins of the Cold War in Southeast Asia dated back to as early as the 1920s with the emergence of international cooperation in the fight against communism and the Thai elite's manipulation of imperialist powers to further their own political agenda and support their dominance in the domestic political arena. The Cold War in Southeast Asia was not only about the postwar fight against the spread of communism, but also closely intertwined with the decolonisation and nation-building efforts of every country in the region — including of the so-called un-colonised Thailand.

The Remaking and Unmaking of Multi-Ethnic Spaces. Diyarbakir and Southeast Anatolia in the 21st Century

Focusing on 21st century developments in southeast Anatolia, this article examines the circumstances of minority communities within the contexts of the shifting dynamics of Turkey’s national project. Until the early 20th century southeast Anatolia was an ethnic patchwork. The early republican era saw efforts to “Turkify” through the promulgation of a national identity project asserting ethnic unity. From the 1980s, conflict with the PKK gave urgency to the notion that uniformity was paramount for national cohesion. In this milieu, ethnic diversity was suspect. Circumstances changed with the AKP government’s 2002 ascendance and the earlier emergence of Kurdish municipal politicians. This article documents how thereafter the re-imagining of the national project away from an exclusive ethnic categorisation allowed acknowledgement and accommodation of ethnic and religious diversity across southeast Anatolia. The chapter analyses these events in light of a backlash by nationalist politicians, the 2015 re-ignition of the PKK conflict and the subsequent resurgence of nationalist rhetoric in the political arena. It appears a narrow, exclusive national identity is re-asserting itself. The article thus examines the extent to which the experience of south-eastern Anatolia represents the re-imagining of Turkey’s national project and the embrace of a previously denied multi-ethnic socio-political fabric.

Multifaceted Islam: Malaysia

This paper analyzes the Islam’s impact on the Malaysian politics. Islam as an instrument of Malaysia’s foreign policy has been used by the political elite of the state for decades. Observers note the Islamization of the country’s foreign policy, especially during the premiership of Najib Razak (2008– 2018). However, the trend towards Islamization can be traced back to the moment Malaysia gained independence from Great Britain in 1957 and especially during the premiership of Mahathir Mohamad (1981–2003). The formation of such a foreign policy of Malaysia took place against the background of the Islamization of the political and social environment within the country, which, in turn, was the result of an internal political struggle. Thus, the projection of Malaysia’s identity into the outside world and the foreign policy corresponding to this identity was often motivated by the need to retain or attract the support of the malay-muslim majority in the domestic political arena. Since many of the issues raised in the article relate to identity both at the national and global level, a constructivist paradigm is used to conceptualize Malaysia’s foreign policy with a special emphasis on the identity of states. Particularly important in this process is the formation of domestic and foreign policy discourse. Malaysia’s Islamic identity is viewed externally in three dimensions: the Sunni state, the activist state in the Islamic world and the standard of moderate Islam. Consideration of these dimensions reveals quite obvious contradictions between them, as well as between rhetoric and real politics.

TV Journalism, Infotainment, and Reality TV

This article analyzes the role of tv formats in the 2014 Burger King scandal in Germany as part of the popular representation of work, work-related conflicts, and the dynamic of power relations in both contemporary German companies and the German economy in general. It shows that investigative journalistic techniques in popular tv formats like Team Wallraff are essentially undermined by the existence of reality tv shows like Undercover Boss that use comparable techniques to present fundamentally different messages about companies, work conditions, and the relationship between employees and employers. I argue that to understand the effect of these representations of politics on the “real political arena,” in Germany and elsewhere, we should consider not only individual films, tv series, genres, and media formats, but also the crosseffects of multiple, often widely differing representations of politics in similar tv formats that can be viewed via identical media outlets.

Explaining the moderate platform of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood: Against the inclusion-moderation hypothesis

<p>Throughout its existence, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB) has consistently maintained a moderate policy on governance. The main aim of this study is to explain this moderation. Previous literature has usually explained moderation in similar movements by an “inclusion-moderation hypothesis”, which holds that moderation results when movements have the opportunity to participate in pluralist political processes. However, the SMB has been progressively excluded from the Syrian political arena since 1963. The inclusion-moderation hypothesis implies, as its converse, that exclusion leads to radicalisation. This study shows that contrary to this expectation, the SMB’s ultimate exclusion from the Syrian political arena in 1982 was in fact the primary driver of its moderate policy. The SMB also participated in parliamentary politics in its early history, and therefore has not moderated over time, as the inclusion-moderation hypothesis would require. Thus, the inclusion-moderation hypothesis does not work for this case, and this dissertation advances an alternate explanation for the SMB’s continued commitment to a moderate policy on governance. This study’s central thesis is that the SMB’s moderate policy on governance can be explained by the Brotherhood’s primary target audience, that is to say, the political force which, in the SMB’s view, can deliver its political objective. As this definition implies, the target audience shifts over time, in accordance with changing circumstances. In 1980, the primary target audience comprised diverse actors in opposition to the al-Asad government: the Fighting Vanguard, the Syrian ulama, and the secularist opposition. In 2001, the audience was the Bashar al-Asad government. In 2004, it was the secularist opposition; and in 2012, it was the foreign sponsors of the secularist opposition.</p>

Explaining the moderate platform of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood: Against the inclusion-moderation hypothesis

<p>Throughout its existence, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB) has consistently maintained a moderate policy on governance. The main aim of this study is to explain this moderation. Previous literature has usually explained moderation in similar movements by an “inclusion-moderation hypothesis”, which holds that moderation results when movements have the opportunity to participate in pluralist political processes. However, the SMB has been progressively excluded from the Syrian political arena since 1963. The inclusion-moderation hypothesis implies, as its converse, that exclusion leads to radicalisation. This study shows that contrary to this expectation, the SMB’s ultimate exclusion from the Syrian political arena in 1982 was in fact the primary driver of its moderate policy. The SMB also participated in parliamentary politics in its early history, and therefore has not moderated over time, as the inclusion-moderation hypothesis would require. Thus, the inclusion-moderation hypothesis does not work for this case, and this dissertation advances an alternate explanation for the SMB’s continued commitment to a moderate policy on governance. This study’s central thesis is that the SMB’s moderate policy on governance can be explained by the Brotherhood’s primary target audience, that is to say, the political force which, in the SMB’s view, can deliver its political objective. As this definition implies, the target audience shifts over time, in accordance with changing circumstances. In 1980, the primary target audience comprised diverse actors in opposition to the al-Asad government: the Fighting Vanguard, the Syrian ulama, and the secularist opposition. In 2001, the audience was the Bashar al-Asad government. In 2004, it was the secularist opposition; and in 2012, it was the foreign sponsors of the secularist opposition.</p>

Answering the Call of Conscience

This essay shows how three institutions—family, religion, and education—coalesced to shape the moral life of John Lewis. Lewis was born into a very religious, though uneducated, family who wished to see their son receive the education they were denied. The young Lewis took their zeal for education and religion into seminary and later college. It was in college that Lewis developed an intolerance for discrimination and came to champion the civil and human rights of all individuals. His call of conscience would not condone the suffering and abuse being generated by a segregated society. This passion for human rights led to his rising into prominence in the political arena, where many referred to him as the “conscience of the nation.”

The Power of Penal Populism: Public Influences on Penal and Sentencing Policy from 1999 to 2008

<p>This thesis explains the rise and power of penal populism in contemporary New Zealand society. It argues that the rise of penal populism can be attributed to social, economic and political changes that have taken place in New Zealand since the postwar years. These changes undermined the prevailing penalwelfare logic that had dominated policymaking in this area since 1945. It examines the way in which 'the public' became more involved in the administration of penal policy from 1999 to 2008. The credibility given to a law and order referendum in 1999, which drew attention to crime victims and 'tough on crime' discourse, exemplified their new role. In its aftermath, greater influence was given to the public and groups speaking on its behalf. The referendum also influenced political discourse in New Zealand, with politicians increasingly using 'tough on crime' policies in election campaigns as it was believed that this was what 'the public' wanted when it came to criminal justice issues. As part of these developments, the thesis examines the rise of the Sensible Sentencing Trust, a unique law and order pressure group that advocates for victims' rights and the harsh treatment of offenders. The Trust became an increasingly authoritative voice in both the public and political arena, as public sentiments came to overrule expert knowledge in the administration of penal policy. Ultimately, it argues that the power of penal populism is so strong in New Zealand that attempts to resist it are likely to come to little, unless these forces that brought it to prominence can be addressed and negated. To date, this has not happened.</p>

The Power of Penal Populism: Public Influences on Penal and Sentencing Policy from 1999 to 2008

<p>This thesis explains the rise and power of penal populism in contemporary New Zealand society. It argues that the rise of penal populism can be attributed to social, economic and political changes that have taken place in New Zealand since the postwar years. These changes undermined the prevailing penalwelfare logic that had dominated policymaking in this area since 1945. It examines the way in which 'the public' became more involved in the administration of penal policy from 1999 to 2008. The credibility given to a law and order referendum in 1999, which drew attention to crime victims and 'tough on crime' discourse, exemplified their new role. In its aftermath, greater influence was given to the public and groups speaking on its behalf. The referendum also influenced political discourse in New Zealand, with politicians increasingly using 'tough on crime' policies in election campaigns as it was believed that this was what 'the public' wanted when it came to criminal justice issues. As part of these developments, the thesis examines the rise of the Sensible Sentencing Trust, a unique law and order pressure group that advocates for victims' rights and the harsh treatment of offenders. The Trust became an increasingly authoritative voice in both the public and political arena, as public sentiments came to overrule expert knowledge in the administration of penal policy. Ultimately, it argues that the power of penal populism is so strong in New Zealand that attempts to resist it are likely to come to little, unless these forces that brought it to prominence can be addressed and negated. To date, this has not happened.</p>

Using Concept Mapping methodology to visualize Italian activists' motivations to collective action

In a political arena that is increasingly active on social issues, associations now more than ever need people who are committed to social change. Participatory methodologies are there-fore increasingly important to actively engage people and promote dialogue and collaboration between academia and local communities. In the present research, concept mapping methodology was applied with the aim of identifying the motivations underlying the commitment of a group of Italian activists to collective action. Findings suggest that sense of community and civic responsibility, typically "community" dimensions, are central in motivating the commit-ment of Italian activists.