The Common Good

Chapter 4, which begins Part II, addresses the moral theory from the African tradition according to which one is obligated to promote the common good without violating individual rights. This principle has been advanced by Kwame Gyekye, one of the most widely discussed African moral philosophers of the past twenty-five years. His ‘moderate communitarian’ ethic, although focused on promoting well-being, differs from Western utilitarianism, such that one cannot argue against the former by invoking well-known criticisms of the latter. The chapter advances fresh reasons for rejecting Gyekye’s welfarist approach to morality, principally on the ground that it does a poor job of capturing several intuitions salient in the African tradition. Sometimes permitting great inequalities of wealth, being competitive in the economic sphere, and undermining cultures can best improve well-being without violating individual rights, yet many African philosophers would judge these actions to be wrong to some degree.

Analysing African Ethics

Chapter 3 spells out the analytic method used in Part II to evaluate theories of right action suggested by the African tradition. The central criteria invoked to ascertain whether a general moral principle counts as African and philosophically justified are the extent to which it entails and explains two classes of intuitions. One sort consists of particular moral judgements that are salient amongst sub-Saharan peoples or at least their philosophical exponents, for instance that reconciliation is the proper end of criminal justice and that consensus is apt in politics. The other sort comprises particular moral judgements widely accepted across the globe, especially as they figure into English-speaking philosophical discussions of morality, e.g., racial epithets are wrong. The (secular) moral theory that best entails and explains these two groups of intuitions is advanced as both African and justified in respect of a multicultural audience of moral philosophers.

To Live is to Devour Others

This paper studies how Ishida Sui’s Tokyo Ghoul creates its typical sense of “tragedy,” by stressing the injustice inherent in every act of eating, and by generalizing the model of nutrition to every ethically laden act. Ishida undermines the Kantian principle that “ought implies can,” depicting a twisted world which forces us into wrongdoing: we have to eat, but there is no Other we can eat with moral impunity. Still, his characters provide some ethical models which could be implemented in our everyday food ethics, given that the tragicality spotted by Ishida is not that alien to our food system: food aesthetics, nihilism, amor fati, living with the tragedy, and letting ourselves be eaten are the options Ishida offers to cope with the tragedy, to approach the devastation our need for food brings into the world in a more aware and charitable way. The examination of Ishida’s narrative device, conducted with the mediation of thinkers such as Lévinas, Ricoeur, Derrida, and other contemporary moral philosophers, shall turn the question: “how to become worthy of eating?” into the core problem for food ethics.

Agency, Negligence and Responsibility

This collection of essays represents a ground-breaking collaboration between moral philosophers, action theorists, lawyers and legal theorists to set a fresh research agenda on agency and responsibility in negligence. The complex phenomenon of responsibility in negligence is analysed from multi- and interdisciplinary perspectives, shedding light on key ethical and legal issues related to agency and negligence to impact substantive law and policy-making in different jurisdictions. The volume introduces new debates and questions old assumptions, inviting the reader to rethink substantive law and practical ethical reflection.

The Actuality of Aristotelian Virtues

Aristotle defined the ethical and intellectual virtues which are recognized as fundamental even today. Contemporary virtue ethics still takes into account Aristotelian virtues. The modern moral philosophers have tried to find new ethical values in a society in which religions are in decline and the old values lost their meaning. The starting point of their research has been Aristotle’s “Nicomachean Ethics” which has remained the most important work in ethics influencing the philosophical thinking until nowadays. This paper seeks to explain the actual importance of the cardinal Aristotelian virtues and how they are seen today.

The Epistemology of Moral Praise and Moral Criticism

Are strangers sincere in their moral praise and criticism? Here we apply signaling theory to argue ceteris paribus moral criticism is more likely sincere than praise; the former tends to be a higher-fidelity signal (in Western societies). To offer an example: emotions are often self-validating as a signal because they're hard to fake. This epistemic insight matters: moral praise and criticism influence moral reputations, and affect whether others will cooperate with us. Though much of this applies to generic praise and criticism too, moral philosophers should value sincere moral praise and moral criticism for several reasons: it (i) offers insight into how others actually view us as moral agents; (ii) offers feedback to help us improve our moral characters; and (iii) encourages some behaviors, and discourages others. And so as moral agents, we should care whether moral praise and moral criticism is sincere.

Future Selves and Present Moral Philosophers

Moral expertise requires a level of reliability in moral matters that is significantly higher than that of the average person. The author argues that this requirement of epistemic superiority in moral matters is sometimes fulfilled by our future selves and generally fulfilled by present moral philosophers. Our future selves are more reliable in answering moral questions than we are, when they have been prepared to answer those questions by various epistemic activities. But if our future selves are our epistemic superiors in such cases, moral philosophers are epistemic superiors in moral matters more generally since their epistemic advantages are even more significant. The author concludes by arguing that moral philosophers plausibly even qualify as moral experts.

Authority and Revelation

This chapter tracks the ascetic ideal from its religious point of origin to some of its key manifestations in the realms of morality and aesthetics. It relates Nietzsche’s original critique to Kierkegaard’s critical advocacy of Christianity, and uses Cavell to show how the latter can help us to understand twentieth-century artistic modernism as genealogically related to religious and moral concerns. It also argues that contemporary debates between moral individualists and moral philosophers influenced by Wittgenstein (such as Raimond Gaita and Cora Diamond) can be understood as arguments over contemporary manifestations of the ascetic ideal in both religion and morality. The central themes of the chapter are then brought together in a reading of a novel by William Golding.

Kant and the Criminal Law of War

The chapter focuses on Ripstein’s account of a doctrine that has caused a great deal of trouble to moral philosophers of law over the years: the equal criminal immunity of combatants. Thorburn sets out the contours of the Kantian approach to the morality of law, which begins with the relationship of public authority and only later proceeds to the evaluation of how that authority has been exercised. He then considers Ripstein’s application of that approach to the legal equality of combatants in war. Although Ripstein’s account suggests a comprehensive justification of the doctrine of equal criminal immunity, Thorburn shows that Ripstein’s chapter does not spell this out fully, though he outlines a way in which Ripstein can do so.