Embedding Metadata-Enriched Graphs

This paper presents an on-going research where we studythe problem of embedding meta-data enriched graphs, with a focus onknowledge graphs in a vector space with transformer based deep neuralnetworks. Experimentally, we compare ceteris paribus the performance ofa transformer-based model with other non-transformer approaches. Dueto their recent success in natural language processing we hypothesizethat the former is superior in performance. We test this hypothesizesby comparing the performance of transformer embeddings with non-transformer embeddings on different downstream tasks. Our researchmight contribute to a better understanding of how random walks in-fluence the learning of features, which might be useful in the design ofdeep learning architectures for graphs when the input is generated withrandom walks.

The Age–Period–Cohort Problem in Hedonic House Prices Models

The age–period–cohort problem has been studied for decades but without resolution. There have been many suggested solutions to make the three effects estimable, but these solutions mostly exploit non-linear specifications. Yet, these approaches may suffer from misspecification or omitted variable bias. This paper is a practical-oriented study with an aim to empirically disentangle age–period–cohort effects by providing external information on the actual depreciation of housing structure rather than taking age as a proxy. It is based on appraisals of the improvement values of properties in New Zealand to estimate the age-depreciation effect. This research method provides a novel means of solving the identification problem of the age, period, and cohort trilemma. Based on about half a million housing transactions from 1990 to 2019 in the Auckland Region of New Zealand, the results show that traditional hedonic prices models using age and time dummy variables can result, ceteris paribus, in unreasonable positive depreciation rates. The use of the improvement values model can help improve the accuracy of home value assessment and reduce estimation biases. This method also has important practical implications for property valuations.

Racially Charged Police Enforcement Has Cost the U.S. Economy $53 Billion to $220 Billion in Lost Productivity

There is a major difference in the drug arrest rate and incarceration rates between Black and White individuals. However, the drug use rate across the two groups is similar (and has been over time). This study estimates the lost productivity over time of people arrested on drug charges because they are Black. Ceteris Paribus, if those using the drugs were White, instead of Black, at the point of arrest and incarceration, what would have been their additional productivity levels over their lives? In this study I estimate this lost productivity to be $53 billion to $220 billion from 1980–2018 (in 2019-dollars), suggesting that the Lucas wedge is substantial for racial drug arrests.

Online Calling Cards and Professional Profiles in Cybersecurity From Social Media

Demand is very high for people to work in various cybersecurity professions and ceteris paribus that demand may well continue into the near term. While there are more formal trails for employment, such as higher-educational pathways, performance in cybersecurity competitions, participation in professional conferences, and social media presentations may all offer less conventional paths into cybersecurity hiring. Through a convenience sample across a number of social media platforms and bottom-up coding, this work explores some aspects of cybersecurity professional profiles (“calling cards”) available on the open Social Web and what may be learned about respective skills and capabilities from these glimmers of the person(s) behind the profiles. These profiles are assessed based on a 2x2 axis with focuses on (1) target skills and (2) personhood attributes. From these analyses, some tentative insights are shared about the cybersecurity calling cards and how informative they may be for recruitment and retention of cybersecurity workers.

Rice quality and its impacts on food security and sustainability in Bangladesh

Rice market efficiency is important for food security in countries where rice is a staple. We assess the impact of rice quality on rice prices, food security, and environmental sustainability in Bangladesh. We find that while price varies as expected for most quality attributes, it is unaffected by a broken percentage below 24.9 percent. This reveals a potential inefficiency, considering the average 5 percent broken rate observed in the market. An increase in the broken rate of milled rice within the limits supported by our findings can, ceteris paribus, increase rice rations by 4.66 million a year, or conversely, yield the current number of rice rations using 170.79 thousand fewer hectares and cutting emissions by 1.48 million metric tons of CO2 equivalent. Thus, producing rice based on quality assessment can improve food security and its sustainability.

Democratic Assessment Colored by Understandings of Democracy

This chapter examines the attitudinal consequences of popular understandings of democracy. In particular, we focus on the influence of this critical mass opinion on how citizens assess democratic practices in both foreign countries and their own societies. Mixed-effect regressions confirm that, ceteris paribus, people who have embraced the procedural understanding of democracy by prioritizing its institutions and procedures in protecting basic rights and liberty are more critical of China’s democratic practice but more favorable to that in the United States. Similar mixed-effect regressions reveal that, again, people’s different understandings of democracy significantly shape how they assess their own societies’ democratic practices. On average, people who prioritize the intrinsic values of democracy are less satisfied with their regime’s democratic practices and more critical in assessing their regimes’ democratic nature. Furthermore, even a full democracy still needs to deliver to win over people’s hearts and minds, thereby fostering its popular support.

Induction, Experimentation and Causation in the Social Sciences

Inductive thinking is a universal human habit; we generalise from our experiences the best we can. The induction problem is to identify which observed regularities provide reasonable justification for inductive conclusions. In the natural sciences, we can often use strict laws in making successful inferences about unobserved states of affairs. In the social sciences, by contrast, we have no strict laws, only regularities which most often are conditioned on ceteris paribus clauses. This makes it much more difficult to make reliable inferences in the social sciences. In particular, we want knowledge about general causal relations in order to be able to determine what to do in order to achieve a certain state of affairs. Knowledge about causal relations that are also valid in the future requires experiments or so called ‘natural experiments’. Only knowledge derived from such experiences enable us to draw reasonably reliable inferences about how to act in order to achieve our goals.

Development of Retail Payment Systems Since 1949

<p>Starting with the introduction of the Diner's Club payment card in 1949, the means of exchange have progressed well beyond traditional instruments such as notes, coins and cheques. I use institutional economics to analyse historical data on the evolution of recently-developed retail payment systems in Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States. The framework I create yields insights into the incentives faced by the users of payment instruments and the payment networks that provide them. It also provides a means to assess the role of government in the evolution of retail payment systems. Ceteris paribus, consumers and merchants will prefer low transaction cost payment instruments. In order to complete a transaction, a consumer will proffer an instrument that may or may not be accepted by the merchant. Together, merchants and consumers will choose the payment instrument that generally reduces demand-side – i.e. consumer and merchant – transaction costs, relative to other available instruments. Consumer irreversible costs of adoption enhance the importance of network effects. To help overcome these, I argue payment networks need to make acceptance of their instrument attractive to merchants, which I find to be supported by analysis of the pricing of payment instruments. It distinguishes recently-developed payment instruments from other new technologies – the most technologically advanced instrument will not likely be adopted unless it is first acceptable to merchants. In workably competitive conditions, profit-seeking payment networks will attempt to provide an instrument that gets used while it at least recoups its costs of supply from fees paid by users. I argue this suggests a process of institutional adaption for profit-seeking payment networks. Network effects mean the use of an instrument grows disproportionately faster, the greater the number of people using it. For instrument supply, this means profit-seeking payment networks have an incentive to increase participation. In the presence of potential inter-network competition, a payment network will likely experience greater participation if, ceteris paribus, it offers an instrument that generally reduces demand-side transaction costs to a greater degree than competing networks' instruments and provides it with lower costs of supply. Governments play two key roles in retail payment system development. First, they can affect the development of systems by how well they protect property rights and enforce contracts. Although this role is performed relatively well in my sample countries, my analysis suggests that the use of recently-developed retail payment systems would fall, substantially, were it not so. Second and more importantly in my sample countries, governments impose restrictions on the freedom of contract for payment networks. If restrictions on this freedom are such that they prevent the trading of property rights, they risk reducing either the demand or the supply of payment instruments. Such restrictions might reduce demand if the instrument that would have been used no longer generally reduces demand-side transaction costs. They might reduce supply in two ways: by impeding payment networks' attempts to offer instruments that reduce these transaction costs or by reducing inter-network competition. In summary, I find that it is government restrictions on the freedom of contract that cause the substantial differences in the use of newly-developed retail payment systems between my sample countries. By risking reducing the supply and demand of retail payment systems, these restrictions may diminish innovation in payments, thereby harming dynamic efficiency.</p>

Development of Retail Payment Systems Since 1949

<p>Starting with the introduction of the Diner's Club payment card in 1949, the means of exchange have progressed well beyond traditional instruments such as notes, coins and cheques. I use institutional economics to analyse historical data on the evolution of recently-developed retail payment systems in Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States. The framework I create yields insights into the incentives faced by the users of payment instruments and the payment networks that provide them. It also provides a means to assess the role of government in the evolution of retail payment systems. Ceteris paribus, consumers and merchants will prefer low transaction cost payment instruments. In order to complete a transaction, a consumer will proffer an instrument that may or may not be accepted by the merchant. Together, merchants and consumers will choose the payment instrument that generally reduces demand-side – i.e. consumer and merchant – transaction costs, relative to other available instruments. Consumer irreversible costs of adoption enhance the importance of network effects. To help overcome these, I argue payment networks need to make acceptance of their instrument attractive to merchants, which I find to be supported by analysis of the pricing of payment instruments. It distinguishes recently-developed payment instruments from other new technologies – the most technologically advanced instrument will not likely be adopted unless it is first acceptable to merchants. In workably competitive conditions, profit-seeking payment networks will attempt to provide an instrument that gets used while it at least recoups its costs of supply from fees paid by users. I argue this suggests a process of institutional adaption for profit-seeking payment networks. Network effects mean the use of an instrument grows disproportionately faster, the greater the number of people using it. For instrument supply, this means profit-seeking payment networks have an incentive to increase participation. In the presence of potential inter-network competition, a payment network will likely experience greater participation if, ceteris paribus, it offers an instrument that generally reduces demand-side transaction costs to a greater degree than competing networks' instruments and provides it with lower costs of supply. Governments play two key roles in retail payment system development. First, they can affect the development of systems by how well they protect property rights and enforce contracts. Although this role is performed relatively well in my sample countries, my analysis suggests that the use of recently-developed retail payment systems would fall, substantially, were it not so. Second and more importantly in my sample countries, governments impose restrictions on the freedom of contract for payment networks. If restrictions on this freedom are such that they prevent the trading of property rights, they risk reducing either the demand or the supply of payment instruments. Such restrictions might reduce demand if the instrument that would have been used no longer generally reduces demand-side transaction costs. They might reduce supply in two ways: by impeding payment networks' attempts to offer instruments that reduce these transaction costs or by reducing inter-network competition. In summary, I find that it is government restrictions on the freedom of contract that cause the substantial differences in the use of newly-developed retail payment systems between my sample countries. By risking reducing the supply and demand of retail payment systems, these restrictions may diminish innovation in payments, thereby harming dynamic efficiency.</p>

Choosing a Price and Cost Combination—The Role of Correlation

Often, firms can choose from different combinations of price and cost processes. For example, they can choose between different production locations or technologies, between different products to produce, or between different locations for selling them. To study the choice of the optimal combination, we return to themodel that was developed by Dixit and Pindyck, where both output price and production cost are stochastic processes, and add a novel focus on how the correlation between these processes affects the firm’s decision. We find that, ceteris paribus, the firm prefers the combination with the lowest correlation between the processes, as it seeks a greater profitability variance which maximizes its value.