Opciones estratégicas de Rusia desde la óptica del neorrealismo ofensivo

Neorealism gives us clues to how States -the main actor in international relations- interact with each other, and being their main mission their own survival, develops specific strategies to ensure it, the reasons for choosing between them, and the actions that they ensure the end goal. It will be within this theoretical framework that an attempt will be made to revisit the special relationship between Russia and China. Once ideological partners, other adversaries as heads of the two largest power structures under the umbrella of socialism, and today, it seems that powers are increasingly close in their common aversion to American power. And yet ... This work tries to identify Russia's strategic options, framed in the paradigm of the realist school.

MILITARY POWER DOES NOT DENOTE CAPACITY

The following study analyzes the exercise of power by both the United States and China in their confrontation for hegemonic dominance. Through observational and qualitative methods, an examination of the mechanisms underlying China's strategic statecraft and how it implements its exercise of power reveals its genesis and how it contested and controlled the order in Southeast Asia. Navigating through economic indicators, the research determines that the decline of American power is a myth, but it establishes a decline in its influence and prestige arising from its strategic and tactical choices. The study identified multiple systemic contingencies and political irrationalities for the non-realization of systemic unipolarity, resulting in a nonpolar world. It concludes that neither the incomparable military power of the United States nor the greater economic power of China has, in the contemporary world, fundamental comparative advantages for achieving systemic hegemony.

Getting Grand Strategy Right

Grand strategy is essential to effective foreign policy. Yet even as the study of grand strategy has flourished within the academy, many academics have remained skeptical of grand strategy as a concept or been harshly critical of grand strategy as practiced by the United States. This essay defines the concept of grand strategy, emphasizing that it is best understood as the logic undergirding state action. The essay also explains why common academic critiques are mistaken; they set fire to straw-person visions that either reduce grand strategy to impractically detailed and rigid plans rather than recognizing the logic that guides purposeful state action, however imperfectly implemented, or to impossibly grandiose visions of American power in the post-Cold War era that ignores the genuine achievements of the last thirty years. Finally, the essay discusses how academics can usefully contribute to public debates on American grand strategy.

“New Cold Wars Have Begun”

Chapter 3 uses Party texts to explore China’s changing view of the United States at the end of the Cold War and the ends, ways, and means of its subsequent grand strategy to blunt American power. It demonstrates how China went from seeing the United States as a quasi-ally against the Soviet Union to seeing it as China’s greatest threat and “main adversary” in the wake of three events: the traumatic trifecta of the Tiananmen Square Massacre, the Gulf War, and the Soviet collapse. It traces how Beijing launched its blunting strategy under the Party guideline of “hiding capabilities and biding time,” which it tied to perceptions of US power captured in phrases like the “international balance of forces” and “multipolarity.” The chapter also introduces China’s effort to asymmetrically weaken American power in Asia across military, economic, and political instruments, which are discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters.

Introduction

This introductory chapter summarizes the book’s argument. It explains that US-China competition is over regional and global order, outlines what Chinese-led order might look like, explores why grand strategy matters and how to study it, and discusses competing views of whether China has a grand strategy. It argues that China has sought to displace America from regional and global order through three sequential “strategies of displacement” pursued at the military, political, and economic levels. The first of these strategies sought to blunt American order regionally, the second sought to build Chinese order regionally, and the third—a strategy of expansion—now seeks to do both globally. The Introduction explains that shifts in China’s strategy are profoundly shaped by key events that change its perception of American power.